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In 2013, the Dutch government adopted its ‘aid, trade and investment agenda’, commonly known as 
the ‘aid and trade agenda’. This thesis examines the application of this agenda and its forerunner in 
the Mozambican waterscape and how it has reproduced and transformed the Mozambican-Dutch 
water aid relationship. The aid and trade agenda is a consensual agenda, in which state- and aid-driven 
approaches to water management were presented as complementary and compatible with trade- and 
market-based approaches. In contrast, this thesis argues that this agenda and its implementation in 
Mozambique can be better understood dialectically, in terms of ‘water aid and trade contradictions’.  
 
The dissertation distinguishes between a primary water aid and trade contradiction that is constitutive 
of the bilateral water aid relationship as a whole, and secondary contradictions. The primary 
contradiction is explained in terms of the territorial and capitalistic logics of liquid power. These refer 
to the politics revolving around water’s multiple use values and place-based waters on the one hand, 
and the subjection of water(-related processes) to market mechanisms and market imperatives such as 
competition on the other. I trace the rise of the capitalistic logic throughout the bilateral relationship’s 
history, as it developed in tandem with contemporary capitalism since the 1980s. I argue that this 
capitalistic logic has come to contradict with territorial logics of liquid power, in particular by the water 
politics of the government and central state of Mozambique. This primary water aid and trade 
contradiction is derivative of and manifests itself in various contradictory realities, or in what I call 
‘secondary contradictions’. Firstly, the capitalistic logic translated in the will and attempts to apply 
market mechanisms in the bilateral relationship and in the Mozambican waterscape. However, these 
attempts were often negated by central state and bureaucratic power in Mozambique—the very power 
that these mechanisms sought to weaken. Secondly, a capitalistic logic underpinned a water access 
mechanism that Dutch and Mozambican actors jointly implemented in small towns in Mozambique, 
but this logic clashed with territorial logics in power struggles unfolding at the national and local 
scales. Finally, the capitalistic logic was expressed in exclusionary events, events that narrowed down 
imaginaries and pathways for hydrosocial development. These were therefore contested events and 
countervailed by agents based on social, political and environmental, rather than economic, grounds.  
 
The thesis argues that the aid and trade course followed in Mozambique has deepened rather than 
eased the primary water aid and trade contradiction. This has led to intensified power struggles and 
has complicated the governance and management of (Dutch) water (aid) in Mozambique. Moreover, 
rather than leading to inclusive and equitable hydrosocial development, it is argued that this agenda 
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1.1 From water aid to trade... 
 
In his treatise on political economy, Karl Polanyi (2001 [1944]: 187) remarked that “...what we call land 
is an element of nature inextricably interwoven with man’s institutions. To isolate it and form a market 
for it was perhaps the weirdest of all the undertakings of our ancestors”. A similar statement can be 
made about water, the ‘element of nature’ central in this thesis: that subjecting water to what Polanyi 
calls ‘the requirements of the market mechanism’ (ibid) is a peculiar undertaking. It may be considered 
even more peculiar than marketising land, considering the difficulty to (materially) isolate water as a 
‘flow resource’ as opposed to the relative fixity of land, or the social and moral objections, and political 
sensitivity to deny people access to water—elements deemed necessary for markets to function well. 
Such ‘limits to capital’ (Harvey 2006 [1982]) are well-known and well-documented for water (e.g. 
Bakker 2003; 2005; Swyngedouw 2005; McDonald and Ruiters 2005; Roberts 2008; Loftus 2009), and 
they help explain why a market for water has not (yet) been established to the extent that it has been 
for land.  
 
In spite or because of such limits, there is a perseverance in subjecting water to market discourses and 
mechanisms. For those persuaded by and actively propagating neoliberal ideology, there is nothing 
weird about this. On the contrary, such limits are to be overcome in order to apply the (in their eyes 
superior) workings of the market to elements of nature like water. The (enduring) privatisation of water 
supply in England and Wales is amongst the best examples of this neoliberal ideology at work (see e.g. 
Bakker 2003; Walker 2014; Bayliss 2014; Loftus et al. 2018). Actors involved in international 
development (aid) appear to be driven by a more moderate politics. Those I spoke to are well aware of 
the controversy around water privatisation, which has been subject to debate ever since its widespread 
application from the late 1980s. While not supporting water privatisation as it exists for instance in 
England and Wales, most of them have grown tired of political and moral debates on this or 
likeminded topics such as the (universal) right to water and/or the question whether water should be 
managed by public or private entities. They take the pragmatic, depoliticised route. Rather than 
endlessly debating political questions that according to them produce no winners, or in which the 
nuance is supposedly lost, they tend to focus on instrumental and managerial (‘how to’) questions. 
They see the market not as a panacea or end in itself, but as a means to achieve progress. Whether 
public, private or non-profit agencies; all should work together in water development, they argue. This 
reminded me of Third Way politics and (development) approaches in which progressive goals are 
pursued, but still within the confines of and guided by the ordering principles set by neoliberal 
capitalism (Kiely 2005: 80-125; Didier et al. 2013).  
 
The Dutch government’s ‘aid, trade and investment agenda’ (GON 2013a) and its attempted realisation 
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in the Mozambican waterscape
1
 that this thesis examines represents a quintessential Third Way 
approach, or so I argue. Commonly referred to as ‘aid and trade’, this agenda fits a wider trend in 
which donors similar to the Dutch state aim to achieve progressive ends by tying actors, objects and 
processes of aid (closer) to those of trade and (private) investment.
2
 In other words, aid agencies linked 
to or dependent on the state are encouraged to partner up with private companies and to engage in 
marketisation, in their will to improve human and nonhuman conditions (Li 2007; Mawdsley 2015). This 
agenda was launched in a political economic context of crisis and austerity in the Netherlands and in a 
context of growing criticism on aid especially by right-wing and nationalist parties.
3
 A budget cut on 
aid was part of austerity measures taken and criticism was responded to by pledges to make aid more 
effective, more market-oriented and more self-beneficial. An influential report that took stock of Dutch 
aid in 2010 (WRR 2010) had also already opted for a reorganisation of Dutch aid. Combined, these 
events shaped the aid and trade agenda as a whole and the choices that were part of it. Among these 
choices was a reduction in the number of partner countries from 33 to 15 and of aid sectors to four. 
Mozambique was selected as an aid and trade partner country and water as an aid and trade 
spearhead sector or ‘priority’ (GON 2013a: 7).  
 
The initial idea of Dutch decision-makers was to move from aid to trade in Mozambique in the course 
of five years, that is, to replace a relationship based mainly on aid with one based only on trade. What 
notably inspired this idea of “thinking beyond aid” (GON 2013b) was the discovery of extensive gas 
fields in northern Mozambique in the late 2000s and the frenzy it triggered. Mozambique’s foreseeable 
future was considered bright, with a Gross Domestic Product (GDP) that was expected to triple in size. 
It was envisaged that Dutch companies could exploit “new opportunities” in this alleged “dramatic 
transformation in its economic structure” (ibid; GON 2013c). Notwithstanding a number of challenges, 
the Mozambican water sector was equally seen as a reservoir of “opportunities for trade and 
development” and for “further Dutch (private sector) engagement” (GON 2013c: 5). In short, the aid 
and trade agenda was supposed to add a promising chapter to the Mozambican-Dutch (water) aid 
relationship, whose origins go back to before Mozambique’s independence in 1975. 
 
1.2 ...to water aid and trade 
   
Targeting Mozambique and its water sector as promising destinations in which to realise this agenda 
was deeply puzzling for two main reasons. Firstly, by the time this agenda was set, the actual 
foundation and mechanisms of Mozambique’s political economy were considered highly problematic 
(Cahen 2005; Sumich 2010). Surely, the country had experienced consistently high economic growth 
figures for decades. Members of the international aid community by and large attributed this to the 
development pathways promoted and largely designed by them from the late 1980s onwards (Pérez 
Niño and Le Billon 2014). These pathways aimed at the country’s integration into global capitalism, 
                                                          
1
 Waterscape refers to ‘a produced hydrosocial entity’ (Loftus 2007: 49). Waterscape is a much-used term in 
political ecology, the literature that this thesis engages with. Political ecology looks at how nonhuman nature is 
implicated in political economic processes and systems. See also below and the next chapters. 
2
 ‘Aid and trade agenda’ is also the name I use in this thesis. With donors similar to the Dutch state, I specifically 
refer to the so-called DAC-donors. DAC stands for the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Many of its members are donor states from 
Western Europe and North America that have been involved in international development since its beginnings in 
the late 1940s. Because of that, they are also sometimes referred to as the ‘traditional donors’ (Mawdsley 2015).  
3
 The crisis referred to is the financial crisis that broke out in 2007/8 and lasted until the mid-2010s. The political 
parties that particularly criticised aid were the VVD and the PVV.  
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which was itself undergoing change by the twin processes of neoliberalisation and financialisation. But 
these pathways, and the extensive privatisation and other market-oriented programs carried out as 
part of it, did not nearly bring about the widely hailed telos of a well-functioning liberal democracy 
and capitalist market economy. What had been created instead, according to Castel-Branco (2013; 
2014), was an economy one-sidedly focused on fossil fuel extraction and a political regime that has 
extensively used the state apparatus, Foreign Direct Investments (FDI), aid, various types of debts and 
other resources for accumulating private wealth and social power. This in turn fuelled uneven 
development and inequality in the country, with the production of wealth benefiting a minority 
occurring alongside the (re)production of widespread poverty (Cunguara and Hanlon 2012). The 
exploitation of natural gas could have expanded the economy and could have added billions of dollars 
to the state coffers. But it would not by itself have changed the workings of this political economy or 
lifted the poor out of poverty. Neither would have a general increase in trade. Routes to do business in 
Mozambique are closely entangled with the dominant political and economic classes, most of whom 
have major stakes in maintaining the political economy as it is (Macuane 2012; Buur 2014). 
 
Secondly, the Dutch agenda for Mozambique was puzzling because of the highly opportunistic 
imaginary of the Mozambican waterscape and the perseverance to make it more market-oriented. As 
mentioned, there are major obstacles to subjecting water to market mechanisms. Such obstacles make 
extensive state involvement and regulation, and hence, intensive power struggles, likely. These are 
aspects that do not generally encourage the private sector or private investors to step in. Mozambique 
served as an example. Despite many efforts of International Financial Institutions (IFIs), donors and aid 
agencies to stimulate water’s marketisation in Mozambique, the Government of Mozambique (GOM) 
and central state entities have remained dominant in shaping the postcolonial waterscape. The most 
notable neoliberal experiment in the country’s waterscape, the privatisation of urban water supply in 
Mozambique’s major cities from the late 1990s onwards speaks volumes; it ignited intensive struggles 
and antagonism between state- and international private actors, with the latter withdrawing 
prematurely (i.e. before contract’s end).
4
 The production of the Mozambican waterscape resembles 
that of the broader political economy, characterised as it is by uneven development and inequality. In 
particular the domain of water supply has seen major investments in the past decades, but these have 
benefited some areas and income groups in the country much more than others, concluded a major 
study by the World Bank (WB 2018; see also WHO/ UNICEF 2017: 100-101).  
 
These problematic conditions were already widely known in the early 2010s, also among Dutch state 
actors familiar with Mozambique.
5
 Some of them therefore regarded the decision to develop a 
bilateral (water) relationship exclusively based on trade as morally undesirable and/or practically 
unfeasible and disputed it. The outcome of this struggle inside the Dutch state was a compromise to 
combine aid and trade rather than to replace aid by trade altogether. This adapted aid and trade 
                                                          
4
 To ‘privatise’ refers in this case to the outsourcing of water supply production and distribution to private 
companies via management and lease contracts with public agencies that own the infrastructure. This is different 
from water privatisation in England and Wales, which involved the handover of both water supply management 
and infrastructure to the private sector. The term ‘privatisation’ was commonly used by the time it was introduced 
in Mozambique, but has later been replaced by terms such as ‘outsourcing’ or Public-Private Partnership due to 
the controversial nature of the term privatisation.  
5
 This point was made in interviews with a number of Dutch and Mozambican actors involved in the bilateral 
(water) aid relationship, e.g. interview EKN employee, 27 July 2016; interview EKN employee, 13 April 2017;  
Interview Dutch consultant/researcher and former embassy employee, 18 December 2015; interview EKN 
employee, 4 April 2017; interview WB employee, 20 February 2017. See also Manning and Malbrough (2012). 
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course meant that Dutch (water) aid would not be phased out in Mozambique, and offered those 
responsible for implementing it more policy space. Still, in the overall spirit of the aid and trade 
agenda, decision-makers insisted that aid had to become much more oriented towards the market, 
trade and private finance, and better tied to (Dutch) commercial strategies, processes and agents.  
 
1.3 Contradiction as problem and the problem of contradiction 
 
This thesis sets out to critically examine this (adapted) aid and trade course. It does so by squarely 
situating this course in the historical development of the Mozambican-Dutch water aid relationship, 
and in the Mozambican waterscape and political economy in which this relationship is nested. From 
this perspective emerged the central puzzle that informs the thesis, namely how an aid agenda that 
offers more of the same neoliberal development recipes should help undo uneven (hydrosocial) 
development that, I and others argue, has been co-produced by these very recipes. I hypothesised that 
pursuing this strategy, with even more vigour than before, would be a breeding ground for 
contradictions. In other words, I figured that specific processes and actors driven by this neoliberal aid 
agenda would stumble upon actors and processes driven by other, often opposing, agendas.  
 
This is not just a hypothesis based on a brief glimpse into the history of the Mozambican-Dutch water 
aid relationship; it is also based on broader research. In literatures I engage with, political ecology and 
development studies, the concept of contradiction is often used to capture the complexity and 
inconsistencies of addressing socio-environmental problems within the confines of contemporary 
(neoliberal and financial) capitalism. Li (2007), for instance, identified a contradiction in development 
actors’ “will to improve” the lives of communities in Indonesia. A non-negotiable neoliberal 
development strategy informed these actors’ practices, a pathway that was not shared, and indeed 
often resisted by, the very communities whose lives ought to be improved by the strategy. Li observed 
that in the design of improvements schemes she examined “...capitalist enterprise and the search for 
profits appeared (...) only as a solution to poverty, not as a cause” (ibid: 267). Mansfield (2004) showed 
how the will to privatise fisheries in the North Pacific had not led to a widely hailed and anticipated 
‘free’ market, but instead led to a highly complex (re)regulatory structure to protect that very market. 
Bakker (2005) argues how the attempted commodification of water supply in England and Wales has 
generated various contradictions, such as the water regulator’s objective to stimulate competition 
between water companies while safeguarding water access to all types of consumers. This type of 
incommensurable processes in water supply, argue others, point at a fundamental contradiction 
“between water as a commodity and as a basic need” (Ahlers 2010: 226; see also Loftus 2009: 963-964).  
 
These contradictions are often problematic, as they tend to severely complicate socio-environmental 
development processes and tend to reproduce patterns of uneven development (Ioris 2013; 
Swyngedouw 2005). But there is also a problem, I argue, with the concept of contradiction as it used in 
the mentioned literatures. While the abovementioned and other works have taught us much about 
socio-environmental contradictions and their problematic nature, the concept of contradiction per se 
often remains poorly explained. Why something is called a contradiction, what its qualities are or how 
it differs from or relates to terms such as antagonism, paradox, tensions, conflict or simply politics, is 
often left to the reader to figure out (De Ste Croix 1981). Moreover, contradiction is used to describe 
and analyse a broad range of situations in the real world, at a variety of geographical (spatio-temporal) 
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scales. In other words, the ontology of contradictions is not often accompanied by an epistemological 
statement about what a contradiction entails (Wood 2002). 
 
My aim in this thesis is therefore twofold. Firstly, I want to come to grips with the ontology of 
contradictions in the empirical case, the Mozambican-Dutch water aid relationship. Secondly, I aim to 
combine this with a theoretical exploration of socio-environmental contradictions and add another 
perspective as to how such contradictions can be approached and investigated. In all, the following 
main research question guides this thesis: 
 
How have contradictions within Mozambican–Dutch water ‘aid and trade’ relations and 
interventions evolved under contemporary capitalism, and how do these relate to the 
reproduction and transformation of uneven development in the Mozambican waterscape? 
 
1.4 The thesis’ storyline: water aid and trade contradictions 
 
While the aid and trade agenda was introduced and promoted as a complementary agenda, this thesis 
argues that its implementation in the Mozambican waterscape can best be understood in terms of 
‘water aid and trade contradictions’. I define contradiction dialectically and in critical realist terms, as 
entailing two mutually constituting but opposing (sets of) powers or forces unified in a given social 
structure (Harvey 2014; Fleetwood 2014). The social structure of focus in this thesis is the 
Mozambican–Dutch water aid relationship, which is further introduced in the next section. 
 
I distinguish between a primary contradiction and derivative, secondary contradictions at work in the 
Mozambican–Dutch water aid relationship. The primary water aid and trade contradiction is defined by 
the dialectical interplay between the ‘capitalistic logic of liquid power’ and ‘territorial logic of liquid 
power’. On the one hand, the water aid and trade agenda is driven by the logics of contemporary 
capitalism, which means subjecting various water-related processes to market imperatives and 
mechanisms, such as competition and outsourcing services to private companies. On the other hand, 
these capitalistic logics depend on, but also often collide with, the various political and social logics 
that stem from the governance, management and uses of actual waters found in Mozambican territory. 
Chapter three examines the origins of both logics as they evolved throughout the relationship’s history 
and emphasises that these logics are historically shaped. The capitalistic logic of liquid power 
strengthened in the bilateral relationship, along with its progressive integration into contemporary 
capitalism from roughly the mid-1980s onwards. As it grew strong, it increasingly conflicted with a 
dominant territorial logic that had already grown strong. This logic is defined by a centralised, state-
led approach to governing water affairs Mozambique. The aid and trade course introduced in the 
2010s intensified the strain between these logics, which became expressed in contradictory realities, or 
in what I call ‘secondary contradictions’. These are examined in chapters four to six.  
 
In chapter four I contend that the aid and trade course entails various mechanisms of water (aid) 
marketisation, which had already been introduced in the bilateral relationship in the past. These were 
aimed at weakening state and bureaucratic power, and at strengthening the power of market forces 
and relations, in the governance of water (aid). Rather than marketisation transforming and weaken 
state and bureaucratic power, the contradictory reality was that marketisation attempts were 
themselves deeply dependent on and often thwarted by state and bureaucratic power that had 
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remained strong. Chapter five shows how a strong capitalistic logic has translated in a preference for 
and the use of market-based water access mechanisms. I show how the implementation of one such 
mechanism based on Private Sector Participation (PSP) unfolded in a terrain of power struggles, in 
which ideal-based operating principles underpinning this mechanism clashed with different territorial 
logics, including national and local state politics and between the public water agency and private 
operators. Chapter six reverses the focus on water access and investigates events with exclusionary 
effects, i.e. evens that narrow down water (aid) access imaginaries and pathways. One is the 2016 debt 
crisis in Mozambique, which poignantly illustrated how the set up of the Mozambican political 
economy causes exclusion in its society and waterscape. The other is the tendency on the part of 
Dutch state and non-state agents to take the own waterscape and ideas prevalent therein as the point 
of departure for hydrosocial development in Mozambique. These exclusionary processes are contested 
and countervailed by agents based on social and political, rather than economic, motivations.  
 
Altogether, the aid and trade course pursued in Mozambique intensified already existing 
contradictions and hence, power struggles between actors involved in the bilateral relationship. This 
indeed complicated bilateral water aid relations and processes and made it difficult to realise long-
lasting results. Moreover, by intensifying rather than diminishing the strength of the capitalistic logic, 
and by not challenging the dominant territorial logic in Mozambique, the aid and trade course left the 
root causes for uneven development very much intact. 
 
1.5 A brief introduction of the Mozambican–Dutch water aid relationship 
 
This section briefly introduces the Mozambican–Dutch water aid relationship as the social structure of 
focus in this thesis. The Mozambican and Dutch states have been the principal drivers behind this 
structure, even though it was a Dutch solidarity organisation called the Eduardo Mondlane Stichting 
(EMS) that had first established relations with Frelimo in the 1960s. Frelimo has been the political party 
in power in Mozambique ever since independence in 1975. Before independence, Frelimo was 
established as a united ‘front’ of various Mozambican resistance groups that fought the Portuguese 
colonizer. The EMS was supportive of Frelimo’s struggle against colonialism and (capitalist) 
imperialism, which explains their close bonds. The bond between the two only grew stronger after 
independence, when the Frelimo government officially adopted a socialist agenda, but grew weaker 
after Frelimo turned towards capitalism from the mid-1980s onwards. By then, the Dutch state had 
established itself as an important and reliable bilateral donor, one of the first and few Western nations 
that aided independent and (proto-)socialist Mozambique (AHM and NIZA 1995; Scholtens 2018; 
Hanlon 1994). 
 
Under Portuguese colonialism, the Mozambican waterscape had been developed in highly uneven and 
unequal ways, with water (infrastructural) development serving the economic and social needs of the 
coloniser and its allies, leaving the great majority of African people unserved. The independent, proto-
socialist GOM sought to redress this with a highly ambitious, state-led agenda.
6
 In its endeavours it 
was supported by the Dutch state that provided financial aid to projects in water supply, drainage and 
water resources management and by Dutch individuals working as cooperantes (paid or unpaid 
volunteers) in Mozambican state water entities or in water projects. All this occurred under difficult 
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conditions, and these only exacerbated during the civil war that lasted from 1977 to 1992. 
Deteriorating social and economic conditions prompted the GOM to open up the country for Western 
aid agencies in the mid-1980s, and hundreds of them flocked in afterwards. It also adopted structural 
adjustment packages engineered by the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
and replaced its socialist development agenda for a (neo)liberal one (Hall and Young 1997). By the end 
of the civil war in 1992, the condition of the national waterscape was in no less a troubling state than 
upon independence, and the task to develop it was enormous.  
 
In the time after the civil war, the Dutch state developed into the biggest bilateral water donor in 
Mozambique and the structure of the bilateral relationship expanded rapidly. Until the 2000s, Dutch 
state entities still carried out quite a number of large (water) projects itself and had non-state agencies 
such as NGOs and engineering companies carry out specific projects and assignments in various 
domains in the Mozambican waterscape. The post-civil war era had seen a change in the institutional 
set up of the Mozambican waterscape, with the introduction of new water laws, policies and public 
entities—processes in which Dutch actors were closely involved (Alba and Bolding 2016). In the early 
2000s, the Dutch state introduced the Sector Wide Approach in which it supported the National 
Directorate of Water (DNA) in its task to oversee and guide the institutional changes in the waterscape 
through multi-year programmes. The new millennium also saw the domain of global water governance 
as well as the world market for water services and products expand. In response to these global 
developments, new Dutch (aid) initiatives, funding schemes and entities were established to better 
profile Dutch water expertise and products. The Mozambican waterscape was seen anew and 
reconceptualised through this ‘global lens’, namely as a waterscape akin to the Dutch waterscape, in 
which Dutch water expertise could (continue to) be deployed for development ends, but also 
increasingly for commercial/ trade purposes. The water aid and trade agenda pre-eminently reflected 
this approach. The potential for such an agenda was considered high due to a grand, but false 
optimism about the future of the political economy and waterscape in Mozambique.  
 
In all, bilateral water aid relations and interventions date back to before independence and have 
continued even through the most troubling of times. This produced a solid structure with a firm 
historical basis, close-knit networks between actors from both sides and a collective imaginary that is 
still often mobilized for diplomatic ends today.
7
 Even though actors involved in this structure have 
multiplied and diversified over time, the two states have remained at the heart of the relationship, not 
least because aid processes and interventions are almost all directly or indirectly financed by the 
states. This is why due attention is paid to the two states and the role of state entities in this thesis. 
The next section elaborates on the concept of the state as well as other key concepts in this structure, 
when discussing the research approach that guided my PhD journey.  
 
1.6 Research approach: relating epistemology and ontology to methodology 
 
I carried out in-depth qualitative research, drawing on two complementary research approaches: multi-
sited ethnography (Marcus, 1995; Falzon, 2009) and Burawoy’s extended case method (Burawoy 1998; 
2009). Both approaches stress the importance of research and fieldwork with an ethnographic 
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character, i.e. active engagement in events and processes, and with people and objects related to one’s 
research. But they deviate from conventional ethnography by placing a stronger emphasis on political 
economic and historical forces and conditions that shape the events under investigation. 
 
Multi-sited ethnography broke with the idea of staying long in one place of choice, as well as with the 
localised strategies that inform conventional ethnography. It urges researchers to situate oneself in 
two or more places and following the actors, relationships and connections between those over space. 
According to Falzon (2009), the Lefebvrian notion that space is socially produced and the product of 
global–local relations and interactions necessitates such a methodology. The same goes for the idea 
that contemporary societies are invariably embedded within, and to various degrees shaped by, larger 
structures. If Berman’s (1982) phrase “all that is solid melts into air” indeed applies to modernity, 
Falzon (ibid: 6) suggests, then “this includes ethnographic space”. 
 
The extended case method fits what Burawoy (2009) calls reflexive science. Reflexive science asks the 
researcher “…to unpack those situational experiences by moving with the participants through their 
time and space. The move may be virtual, as in historical interpretations; real, as in participant 
observation; or some combination of the two” (ibid: 13-14). Theory and history are two important 
features in the extended case method. As regards theory, Burawoy posits that “…there can be no 
microprocesses without macroforces, nor macroforces without microprocesses” (ibid: 9). Hence, he 
motivates the researcher to ‘dwell-in’ theory before, during and after fieldwork, and let theory guide 
the dialogues with participants (ibid: 20). Regarding history, Burawoy claims that to understand and 
explain phenomena, one must not only look at present relations and events, but also how they have 
been produced historically.  
 
Combined, these approaches have helped me making sense of the structure introduced in the former 
sections. In particular, they have stimulated me to think about methodological implications emanating 
from concepts and theories I use (i.e. epistemology) to refer to and explain events in the real world (i.e. 
ontology).  
 
A notable example in the context of this thesis is the concept of waterscape that I prefer to use over 
the ‘water sector’. Waterscape builds on the notion that nature, like space, is produced (Smith 2010 
[1984]). The production of a hydrosocial entity is, moreover, an inherently multi-scalar and political 
affair. With ‘multi-scalar’ I refer to human ideas about and interactions with water at different scales 
that co-determine how a particular waterscape is produced. Such ideas and interactions are, from one 
scalar angle, inherently place-based. Place-based means they are shaped by biophysical properties of 
H2O and land, by ‘local’ climatic and (geo)hydrological conditions as well as by the requirements and 
desires of various (proximate) social groups. At the same time, questions such as [a] how water ought 
to be managed; [b] by whom and in whose benefit; [c] with whose and what kind of money; and [d] 
with what instruments or technologies, are tackled at various other scales. Such questions are tackled 
in decision-making processes in which the national state usually plays a key role, not least because of 
the social, political and economic importance of water and the large amounts of financial capital 
required for water infrastructure (Molle et al. 2009; Parenti 2015; Ioris 2012). Such processes at the 
national scale are, in turn, interwoven with so-called global water politics, understood as the 
construction and global circulation of divergent ideas, imaginaries and discourses around water 




What is common for hydrosocial processes at all scales is that they are political. In other words, they 
imply more or less intensive power struggles between social agents over questions such as those 
posed above. What actually gets decided and done in relation to water hinges on the ever emergent 
outcome of these struggles. Political ecologists, including myself, are particularly interested in the 
increasingly dominant role that capital has played in shaping ideas and interventions in waterscapes. 
As Budds and Hinojosa (2012: 124) sum up, the concept of waterscape forces us to "...explore the ways 
in which flows of water, power and capital converge to produce uneven socioecological arrangements 
over space and time, the particular characteristics of which reflect the power relations that shaped their 
production". 
 
These abstract spatiotemporal and political economic properties of waterscapes become more 
concrete once they are used to make sense of the national waterscape of Mozambique. The maps of 
Mozambique given in figures 1.3 – 1.5 at the end of this chapter indicate a number of biophysical 
properties that play their part in producing the Mozambican waterscape. Figure 1.3 is a picture of a 
hydrogeological map that presents an overview of the hydrogeological composition in Mozambique. 
Figure 1.4 shows the various sedimentary and river basins in Mozambique, while figure 1.5 lists the 
overall climatic conditions in the country. Even though these maps were published decades ago, in 
1987, they still give an idea of the nonhuman, environmental makeup of the waterscape today. I chose 
these old maps because they tell another story as well. They were developed as part of a water aid 
project financed by UNICEF, with the help of Dutch water aid professionals. In an interview I had with a 
former director of DNA, a large copy of the map in figure 1.3 hung behind him on the wall and he 
referred to it as a vivid example of what collaboration with Dutch water professionals had brought 
about in the past. Moreover, the map was made during a time that the civil war intensified in 
Mozambique, which explains its compilation on the basis of a desk study using existing material only. 
Nevertheless, the map has according to the former DNA director long been regarded as the standard 




This story symbolises something bigger, namely the historical coproduction of the Mozambican 
waterscape by Mozambican and foreign agents. It indicates that the current state of, and dynamics 
within, the waterscape cannot be explained or understood by biophysical processes such as flows of 
H2O only, nor only by human agents and processes at the (sub)national scale in Mozambique. 
Numerous foreign agents have coproduced this waterscape prior to and after independence, driven by 
different political agendas such as colonialism, socialism and capitalism. My investigation into the 
Mozambican–Dutch water aid relationship provides an insight into this historical coproduction of the 
Mozambican waterscape, specifically in the period after independence and driven by agendas shaped 
by contemporary capitalist logics. This is necessarily a partial insight, given that this relationship 
represents only one ‘set’ among numerous sets of relations responsible for producing the postcolonial 
waterscape. But because Dutch water aid has played a prominent role in Mozambique in recent 
decades, I maintain that this still offers an insight into how the waterscape is produced more generally. 
 
The same relational, historical and multi-scalar lens emphasised in the approaches of Falzon (2009) 
and Burawoy (2009) is also applied to the concept of the state. First, I view either state as a social 
relation rather than a thing, an agent or a neutral object. The state is not homogenous, but comprises 
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of an ensemble of forces—related to and representative of forces in broader society—that clash and 
compete over the use of the state apparatus and the deployment of state power (Jessop 2016: 54-55). 
The abovementioned struggle within the Dutch state on the aid and trade course to follow can best be 
understood from this perspective on the state. Second, I apply a relational lens to the interplay 
between the Mozambican and Dutch states. I assess their mutual relationship as having developed in 
the modern interstate system, in which capitalist market imperatives as well as national political 
interests are key drivers (ibid: 42, see also next chapter). Third, I see the Mozambican and Dutch states 
as variegated states; they have different state forms and state apparatuses, with different capacities. 
Their power positions in this interstate system and vis-à-vis each other thus also differ. In short, they 
stand in an unequal power relationship, with important implications that will be assessed later. 
 
1.7 Operationalisation of the research and methodological choices and reflections    
 
1.7.1 How I operationalised the research approach  
 
I operationalised my research by dividing the Mozambican–Dutch water aid relationship up in three 
distinct, but overlapping case studies that I believe do justice to the multi-scalar nature of this social 
structure and which facilitated the planning of fieldwork. One case study focused on ‘water 
governance’. With governance understood as power-laden decision-making processes (Bakker 2010a), 
this case study focused on water governance at the national scale in Mozambique and on the role of 
Dutch aid (agents, resources, imaginaries) in this sphere. My aim was to obtain a better understanding 
of how decisions regarding hydrosocial development in Mozambique have come about, how this 
relates to the broader Mozambican state structure, how the water bureaucracy is organised and how it 
functions, and how (Dutch) aid is entangled in this state structure and -bureaucracy. Although the 
findings from this case study are used in all chapters, they are most extensively used in chapter four. 
  
The second case study focused on aid (and trade) interventions. I examined joint projects or 
‘interventions’ with more or less clearly defined time-space boundaries and ‘target objects’. I selected a 
number of projects that I assessed to be characteristic of the aid and trade course pursued in the 
Mozambican waterscape. One project, abbreviated as PO15, in particular received my attention. In this 
project financed by the Dutch state, several Dutch aid agencies supported a Mozambican water supply 
and sanitation state entity (called AIAS) in organising and managing water supply and sanitation 
services in 15 out of 152 small towns and cities that AIAS is responsible for.
9
 This project incorporated 
a mix of aid activities that interviewees referred to as ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’. ‘Traditional’ referred to 
institutional support provided to AIAS and technical assistance to water and sanitation operators. 
‘Modern’ was associated with market-based approaches such as outsourcing water supply to private 
operators and to the design and implementation of ‘innovative business models’. This project allowed 
me to investigate path-dependent and potentially path-shaping water aid (and trade) processes and 
how they combined affected access to advanced water and sanitation sources. It also allowed me to 
investigate practices and politics of daily water management, in local settings, and connecting them 
with processes at the national scale. Findings from this case study are mainly used in chapter five and, 
to a lesser extent, in chapter six. 
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In the third case study, I focused on transnational aid processes and global water politics. It involved 
investigating relatively remote and distant processes and events, in the Netherlands and elsewhere, 
that linked up with the bilateral water aid relationship. I aimed to enhance my insight into the 
emergence of the Dutch aid and trade agenda, how to ‘read’ this agenda in the recent history of Dutch 
(water) aid, and the revaluation of water in Dutch aid and the Dutch political economy more generally. 
I wanted to know how Dutch agencies that were involved in the bilateral relationship, but (primarily) 
based in the Netherlands rather than in Mozambique, thought and acted in relation to Dutch aid and 
trade in the Mozambican waterscape. Moreover, strategies and tactics related to the water aid and 
trade agenda and their implementation in Mozambique were discussed in various types of events in 
the Netherlands. These provided good opportunities to learn how the agenda was perceived, 
welcomed and contested by a variety of actors. Lastly, I traced some of the ways in which Dutch and 
Mozambican state and non-state agents were involved in global water governance networks. Chapter 
six is in part based on insights gained in this particular case study.  
 
1.7.2 Fieldwork carried out 
 
The foregoing called for multi-sited fieldwork. In general, fieldwork related to the first two case studies 
took (mainly) place in Mozambique and fieldwork related to the third (mainly) in the Netherlands. 
Fieldwork in Mozambique covered a year, from April 2016 to April 2017. Maputo, the capital of 
Mozambique, was the key place for fieldwork related to the water governance case study and also an 
important one for the aid intervention case. It was here where (my wife and) I settled. Maputo is a key 
place, because political and economic power is concentrated in the capital, and the scope for change 
elsewhere in Mozambique is largely defined by agents in Maputo (Jenkins 2012: 161). More 
specifically, Mozambique knows a highly centralised approach to governing water, which means that 
the most powerful Mozambican state and non-state agents are located or headquartered in Maputo 
and that important decision-making processes occur here. The corollary of this is that the international 
aid community, including IFI’s, donors and aid agencies are also generally located/ headquartered in 
Maputo. Moreover, the majority of important (water) events such as meetings, conferences and trade 
fairs take place in the capital and this is also the place where key archives are found. In all, Maputo 
proved to be a place with a large concentration of relevant agencies and processes/events for my 
fieldwork.  
 
From Maputo, I made what Falzon (2009) dubs ‘sojourns’—multi-day/week fieldwork trips—to ten 
towns elsewhere in the country, chiefly in the context of the aid intervention case study. The selected 
towns were involved in the PO15 water supply and sanitation aid intervention and are located in the 
southern provinces of Maputo, Gaza, Inhambane and in the northernmost province of Cabo Delgado. 
These towns are indicated by red arrows in the map in figure 1.2 at the end of the chapter. In some of 
these towns I did participant observation as part of short-term technical assistance (TA) ‘missions’ with 
a team of Dutch and Mozambican water professionals. In others I did so-called ‘transect walks’ and 
interviews with a variety of local and regional actors involved in water supply. The selection of these 
towns were thus guided by ongoing missions as well as by the type of operators in charge (private and 
public), relative distance (in the case of the towns in the southern provinces) and contextual conditions, 




Fieldwork in the context of the third case study was mainly (but not exclusively) carried out prior to 
and after the yearlong fieldwork in Mozambique. I interviewed Dutch actors in the Netherlands and 
attended various kinds of events related to the bilateral water relationship and the Dutch aid and trade 
agenda. These events provided good opportunities to grasp associated semiotic dimensions, such as 
the terminology used, prevalent discourses, visual objects and images, and appearances of 
contestation. Two events I visited can be seen as preeminent stages of ‘global water governance’. 
These were the 2015 and 2017 editions of the Amsterdam International Water Week and the 
associated trade fair Aquatech, and the 2016 edition of the biannual conference of the Water Institute 
of Southern Africa (WISA) in Durban, South Africa. These were stages where the Dutch water sector 
was branded alongside water sectors of other nations, and where presentations and discussions on 
global water issues took place. They offered me insights into global water politics and the role of 
Dutch agents herein. In all, the multi-sited fieldwork comprised of a mix of places in and outside 
Mozambique that allowed me to grasp the multi-scalar nature of the research. 
 
1.7.3 Methods used for data collection and analysis 
 
I relied on three data gathering methods during the entire fieldwork, namely interviews, (participant) 
observation and documentary collection and analysis. I did a total of nearly 90 semi-structured 
interviews with a variety of persons involved in the three case studies (see Annex I). Interviewees 
included civil servants working for relevant Dutch and Mozambican state entities, such as DNA and 
AIAS, the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs (BZ) and the Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands 
(EKN) in Mozambique. Interviews with non-state actors included personnel of NGOs such as Vitens-
Evides International (VEI), (private) water operators and various Mozambican and Dutch (water) 
businesses including consultants. All interviews were ‘semi-structured’ in the sense that I used an 
interview guide with topics I was interested in and wanted to probe into (Bricky and Green 2007). That 
said, interviews in the first stages of fieldwork were generally less (well-)structured than those in later 
fieldwork stages. This had to do with the iterative learning process I went through; I gained a clearer 
(in)sight of processes and problems as my fieldwork progressed. Interviews usually took an hour to 
several hours, depending on the person and his or her agenda. Many of them took place in the offices 
of these persons and had a more or less formal character, in the sense of making an appointment and 
doing the interview in the planned timeslot. Others were carried out as part of a diner or lunch. These 
interviews often had a more informal character; the pattern of me asking questions/probing and the 
interviewee answering was alternated with more general conversations. These conversations were 
often linked to the research (objects) and taught me much about the topics under investigation, or the 





I made notes of all interviews, which I worked out in interview sheets as soon as possible after the 
interview. I shared these sheets with my interviewees and asked them to check the text. Reactions and 
comments were processed in the sheet or they led to additional explanation. In many interviews, 
sensitive issues surfaced or were raised by myself. These for instance related to tensions between 
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Dutch and Mozambican actors, to rent-seeking practices or they concerned reflection on the self or 
statements and feelings about other actors, which I included in the notes. Not all such sensitive 
statements ‘survived’ in reviews of my interview sheets and I was sometimes asked to remove or 
rephrase lines. In other cases I was asked to treat parts of the text cautiously (which I respond to by 
referring to interviewees anonymously in some places in this thesis). In two cases, interviewees reacted 
surprised by the length of notes and the inclusion of sensitive statements, saying that what they 
shared they did in confidentiality and that these did not matter for the subject under investigation. In 
these cases, I ended up with interview sheets deprived of much of the content shared in the interview, 
even though I was already aware that these issues played a role. 
 
What helped corroborating and making sense of the views expressed in interviews were participatory 
observation and observation. These techniques were mainly applied in relation to the aid intervention 
and transnational aid case studies. They entail embedding and situating oneself in the field, observing 
(non)human processes in relation to ‘things’ such as water infrastructure and in the case of participant 
observation, actively taking part in processes under investigation (Russell 2006). In my case, ‘the field’ 
comprised a selection of places summed up above: events such as conferences and workshops in the 
transnational aid case study, target towns of PO15 in the aid intervention case study and the various 
offices and venues in Maputo, as the paramount field of ‘water governance’ in Mozambique. The 
abovementioned short-term TA missions in which I participated allowed me to gain first-hand insight 
into: the practices, politics and struggles of water operators in towns; their relations with various other 
agents such as municipalities, Dutch aid providers or Mozambican state agents; local hydrosocial and 
political economic conditions in which they operate; and the (condition of) water infrastructure in 
place. I also closely interacted with Dutch and Mozambican water professionals during these missions, 
whom provided context to and explanation of the activities, and with whom I engaged in 
conversations throughout the day and evening.  
 
Next to these missions, I visited towns by myself to do transect walks, engage in talks and short 
interviews with residents, and to do interviews with key informants. In these walks and talks with 
people, I was assisted by a local person who knew the town and its neighbourhoods, who helped me 
gain access to people and local leaders and who spoke the local language and translated it to 
Portuguese. Through these visits, combined with the TA missions I participated in, I obtained a 
thorough insight into the local conditions and struggles under which the water supply arrangement in 
PO15 was carried out. I jotted down my observations, experiences and thoughts gained from 
(participant) observation in notebooks and captured them in field notes proper as soon as possible 
after the research activities (cf. Jackson 1995; Sanjek in Russell, 2006). The bulk of field notes were 
descriptive. I selected moments during my fieldwork to write analytic field notes, which I inter alia used 
for compiling a mid-term fieldwork report for my supervisor.  
 
Field notes also constituted the data gained by (participant) observation activities at the various events 
I attended. Such events, as mentioned, included international and national conferences, taking place 
both in the Netherlands and in Mozambique. At these events, I conversed with people, listened to 
presentations, engaged in discussion sessions and attended social events. I frequented the booths at 
international conferences where the Dutch water sector and associated organisations were promoted. I 
collected documents/ written information as well as a range of other items such as promotional 
materials used to promote the Dutch water sector. This latter activity, the collection of various types of 
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documents or ‘secondary data’, was another activity I undertook throughout the fieldwork period, and 
related to all case studies. Many documents related to the Dutch (water) aid and trade agenda were 
available online
11
, but this was not the case for the bulk of relevant documents of Mozambican entities. 
Hence, in Mozambique, I made an extra effort to collect documents which I scanned or took with me. 
This included historical documents, such as those found in the archive of the National Water 
Directorate (DNA) in Maputo. I have also attempted to get hold of a list of documents of the Dutch 
embassy in Mozambique not publically available, and while I managed to gain some of them, others 
were not provided after several requests.  
 
Rather than inductive or deductive reasoning, I engaged during and after fieldwork in what critical 
realists call ‘retroduction’. Sayer (2010: 72) calls this a ‘mode of inference’ in which the researcher 
postulates, identifies and progressively refines deeper causes. These are often referred to in CR as 
mechanisms, powers or forces
12
, which help explain empirical events observed in fieldwork. Such 
powers are identified by an ongoing process of moving back and forth between one’s empirical data 
and theoretical concepts (Mollinga 2020: 399; Yeung 1997). In sessions I had with other PhD 
candidates and my supervisor before fieldwork, we discussed this process in the context of each 
other’s research. This helped me think through what my case constituted of in terms of agents and 
powers, and how these had changed over time.  
 
During and after fieldwork this retroductive process progressed and intensified, and this led me to 
conceptualise already or newly identified powers (the ones discussed from chapter three onwards) as 
ones that stand in a dialectical and often contradictory relationship. One illustration of how this 
process occurred is that I entered the field with the plan to investigate the power of marketisation and 
its various mechanisms deployed in the bilateral water aid relationship. In the field I realised that while 
various forms of water marketisation were pursued, they often stumbled upon bureaucratic power and 
practices that I assessed to be at least of equal strength. This led me to contemplate how the two 
powers related to one another, which resulted in discussing both powers as standing in a contradictory 
relationship (ch. 4). Likewise, while my initial focus was on powers of (market-based) access to water, in 
the field I identified politics and practices with a structural character that countervailed these powers of 
access. Chapters five and six discuss these powers and how they combined complicate the road 
towards universal access to water in Mozambique.  
 
What helped this retroductive process were my associations and discussions with researchers at the 
research institute IESE
13
 and the anthropological department of the Eduardo Mondlane University 
(UEM), both located in Maputo. The preparation of a number of papers that I presented and discussed 
at international conferences and workshops, and the publishing of two peer-reviewed articles, also 





                                                          
11
 Although some relevant documents and texts were only temporarily available, which is why I kept a copy of 
these in my own archive.  
12
 See Fleetwood (2011; 2012) for a discussion on the use of powers, mechanisms and forces in CR. 
13
 IESE stands for Instituto de Estudos Sociais e Económicos , the Institute for social and economic studies. 
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1.7.4 Doing fieldwork in times of crises: a reflexive note 
 
Preparations for fieldwork in the Netherlands and Mozambique started late 2015. The Netherlands was 
still recovering from the 2008 financial crisis that had hit its society and economy hard. It was the post-
crisis context, characterised by austerity and a persistent power of neoliberal and nationalist political 
forces, that allowed the aid and trade agenda to be imagined and adopted. Mozambique was by that 
time only little affected by the global financial crisis. Development trends in the previous two decades 
very much continued. The country still recorded high economic growth rates and wealth kept being 
concentrated in the hands of a few all the while poverty persisted or even deepened in some areas 
(Cunguara and Hanlon 2012). The country’s prospects were considered bright, as mentioned above, 
not least due to the anticipated exploitation of newly discovered gas fields. This was the ‘normal’ 
situation when I visited Mozambique in January 2016 for a two-week fieldwork preparatory trip. When 
I returned to Mozambique for fieldwork proper only three months later, the situation suddenly and 
radically changed; hidden and illegal debts worth more than $1.4bn. were disclosed, almost instantly 
plunging its economy in a deep recession.  
 
This crisis, and (austerity) measures taken in response, had immediate effects for my fieldwork in terms 
of access and positionality. Because the debts were illegally contracted by members of the GOM in 
2013 and 2014, i.e. without consent of parliament or the international aid community (IFIs and donors), 
the debt crisis at once led to a crisis of trust between the GOM and its aid partners. Aid partners, 
including the Dutch state, suspended all (financial) aid that went directly to the central state of 
Mozambique. All state agents dependent on aid, not least water entities, were forced to renegotiate 
aid modalities with their agitated partners.  
 
This produced a hectic and tense context, in which I had to establish contacts on both sides of the 
bilateral relationship. While certainly not impossible, many potential interviewees were pulled into 
some form of crisis management and had little time for non-urgent activities. This complicated access 
to potential interviewees, especially those on the Mozambican side and higher up in state entities. It 
asked from me a great deal of flexibility and simply more time in arranging appointments, not 
knowing whether appointments made would indeed take place at the time arranged. More than once I 
have been at an appointment that was cancelled or rearranged last-minute. Once I managed to gain 
access to these interviewees, it was up to the person whether he or she felt open to speak about the 
situation. Some Mozambican interviewees questioned my positionality. They considered me part of the 
Dutch and international aid community in Mozambique with whom they were in a tense relationship, 
even though I (thought I) clearly introduced myself as an independent PhD researcher investigating aid 
rather than being part of it. As a Dutch citizen, I had to repeatedly explain this in order to gain access 
to agents, processes and sites. 
 
The crisis had a deep impact on the economy and society, negatively affected living conditions for 
most people and also severely affected water governance and management in the country. This is an 
event that I did and could not anticipate, but which impacted on me and the subjects implicated in my 
research. I decided to take it not only as a negative event, but as an opportunity as well; a crisis this big 
disrupts normality, which allows us to observe things that are normally much more difficult to see. In 
chapter six, I will even use this crisis to illuminate the Frelimo-led Mozambican political system as a 
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driving force in the reproduction of wealth and poverty in the country, and specifically as a force of 
exclusion to water services.  
 
1.8 Thesis structure 
 
This thesis consists of seven chapters, including this introduction. Figure 1.1 below draws the structure 
and outlines the core themes of chapters two to six. The next chapter (ch. 2) provides a theoretical 
exploration of the concept of contradiction, drawing on radical political economy, political ecology and 
development studies. Based on this, I propose a critical realist conceptualisation of contradiction and 
introduce the territorial and capitalistic logics of liquid power from a theoretical point of view. Chapter 
three uses a historical political ecology/economy perspective to assess the evolvement and interplay of 
these logics throughout the Mozambican–Dutch water aid relationship’s history. Chapter four deals 
with the abovementioned contradictory powers of water (aid) marketisation and state and bureaucratic 
power playing out at the relationship’s governance level. Chapter five zooms in on the subdomain of 
water supply by investigating powers and politics of market-based water (aid) access, using the joint 
intervention PO15 as a case study. Chapter six looks at exclusionary events and processes impacting 
on, or playing out in, the bilateral relationship and the Mozambican waterscape, from a multi-scalar 
perspective. Chapter seven sums up and concludes the thesis, makes cross-linkages between the 
chapters in the benefit of the overall argument, and reflects on the conceptual premises and 
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Figure 1.1—Diagram outlining the structure of the thesis, the key concepts and how these concepts relate to one another. The dashed rectangles and lines at 




Figure 1.2—Map of Mozambique. The red arrows indicate towns visited by the author, as part of 
fieldwork on the project PO15. The capital of Maputo in the far south was the main place of 
residence during fieldwork. Following the 2017 population census, Mozambique has some 28 






Figure 1.3—Hydrogeological map of Mozambique, made in 1987 by B.P.A. Ferro and D. 
Bouman under the auspices of, and for, the National Directorate for Water Affairs (DNA) 
(picture by the author). Although over three decades old, and based on ‘indirect data’, it 
provides a generic overview of groundwater occurrence around the country, with blue and 
green areas representing more or less productive aquifers and deep brown (mountainous 
areas) and light brown ones with no or limited groundwater occurrence. (source: Ferro and 




Figure 1.4—This map and the one in figure 1.5 both belong to the report that accompanies 
the hydrogeological map given in figure 1.2. This map indicates the hydrogeological 
makeup of the country and combined with the previous map shows that Mozambique is 
endowed with a number of major surface waters, notably five international rivers such as the 




Figure 1.5—This map gives an idea of generic climatic conditions in Mozambique. In general, 
Mozambique has a tropical climate with a dry and a wet season. Rainfall is highest along the 
coast, and diminishes the further south and north one goes. Throughout history, rainfall has 
been unpredictable and the country experiences frequent droughts and floods (source: Ferro 
and Bouman/ DNA 1987: 8)    
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This chapter discusses the key theoretical concepts and premises of this thesis and proposes a critical 
realist approach to studying contradictions in the political ecology of development. It argues that 
‘development’ is simultaneously a social and environmental process that is largely shaped by the 
imperatives and contradictions of contemporary capitalism. However, what exactly constitutes a 
contradiction in capitalism is subject to debate. This chapter reviews this debate and, based on this 
review and on principles of critical realism, makes clear how contradiction is approached in this thesis.  
 
The chapter is structured as follows. I introduce the phrase ‘political ecology of development’ in the 
next section. In sections 2.3 and 2.4, I review the concept of contradiction using literatures of radical 
political economy, political ecology and development studies. Based on these insights, as well as on 
the main principles of critical realism, section 2.5 discusses how I conceptualise socio-environmental 
contradictions. Section 2.6 introduces the capitalistic and territorial logics of liquid power from a 
theoretical point of view—the two logics that make up the primary water aid and trade contradiction. 
The last section concludes. 
 
2.2 On the political ecology of development 
 
The point of this section is to make explicit what I mean by political ecology and development, and 
how I interpret their interplay. In brief, I approach development as a socio-environmental process 
shaped most prominently by conditions of contemporary capitalism. 
 
2.2.1 On political ecology 
 
Political ecology is a broad literature with deep roots and divergent perspectives (see e.g. Robbins 
2012). Most political ecologists do share some general, foundational assumptions, which are aptly 
summarised by Robbins (2012: 11-24):  
 
 Political ecologists treat processes related to nature, or the nonhuman environment, as 
imbued with power and politics rather than as neutral or natural; 
 Amongst the most influential forces shaping nature are political economic ones such as 
progressive capital accumulation;   
 Such forces explaining environmental change are not merely local, but extent from the local to 
the global scale, and these multi-scalar dynamics need to be taken into account; 
 Our ideas of nature are themselves mediated by political and economic processes; 
 Questions of environmental change have a normative dimension that needs to be 
acknowledged and critically reflected upon. This includes the assumption that some ideas and 
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theories on the human-environmental relationship are better than others, not only in the 
sense of better approximating how ‘real world’ processes work, but also in their ability to 
strengthen or weaken the potential for human flourishing and environmental sustainability 
(Sayer 2010).  
 
Political ecological research is critical in the sense that it challenges hegemonic and mainstream 
thinking, and associated conduct, on the relation between humans and (nonhuman) nature. A prime 
example of hegemonic and mainstream thinking on this relation is the idea that an external, non-
human nature exists independently of human nature (Moore 2015). Another is the intensification of 
capitalism as a condition for ‘saving nature’ (McAfee 1999; Katz 1998; Smith 2007; Castree 2010).  
 
In contrast to the latter idea, research in political ecology (including this thesis) does not take 
capitalism and its assumed capacity or potential to care for the environment for granted. It challenges 
this thinking, often drawing on radical political economy. This branch differs from orthodox and other 
heterodox approaches to economics such as liberal institutionalism or critical reformism in two main 
ways. Firstly, it places (much) more emphasis on the role of history, politics, (unequal) power relations 
and social struggle in economic processes and structures as they are shaped under capitalism (Hudson 
2015: Milonakis and Fine 2009). Secondly, it is committed to exploring alternative, more emancipatory 
and sustainable futures (Van Apeldoorn and Horn 2018: 6). Marx’ analyses of capitalism continue to be 
a rich source on which many political ecologists draw, and they have taken the field of political ecology 
forward on this basis. These works will be important sources for this thesis (e.g. Marx (1976 [1867]; 
Harvey 1993; Smith 2010 [1984]; O’Connor 1988; Swyngedouw 2004; Bakker 2003). 
 
In contrast to the former idea, political ecology claims that human and nonhuman nature, or the 
‘social’ and ‘natural’, are related and inseparable ontological realms. Marx (1976: 283), for one, 
famously declared that human labour changes (non-human) nature, which in turn mediates and 
changes human’s own nature in a continuous, metabolic, socio-natural process. Harvey built on this 
claim by arguing that “...all political economic projects (and arguments) are simultaneously ecological 
projects (and arguments) and vice versa” (1993: 25). Moore (2015) stretches this claim to an extreme 
by arguing that the ‘Cartesian divide’ between humans and an external nature, rooted in common 
sense, is the quintessential driver of the global environmental crisis facing us now. One departure point 
for combating this crisis is, according to him, finding a new language and set of categories that does 
justice to the inseparability between humans (and their political ideas and projects) and nature. This 
latter point is in turn criticised, for while humans and nature are ontologically entangled, there remain 
important differences between the two that matter for analytical and political purposes (see e.g. Foster 
and Burkett 2018).   
 
How to approach and label the relation between humans and nature (rightly) remains subject to 
debate. That said, it is common in political ecology to hyphenate the social and the natural to ‘socio-
natural’ in order to stress their entanglement and mutual influence.
14
 The social in this context is a 
preferred umbrella term for all processes related to human nature writ large. The social thus also 
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includes ‘political’ and ‘cultural’ processes, although this often remains implicit. Likewise, the natural 
involves all (physical) things and (material) processes of nonhuman nature. ‘Natural’ is often 
substituted by the terms ‘ecological’ or ‘environmental’, to avoid confusion with the use of natural/ 
nature as a way to claim something with universal validity (e.g. as in the nature of a thing or process). 
In this thesis, I also use the terms socio-environmental to consider human and nonhuman nature 
together as a metabolic entity. The derivative term ‘hydrosocial’ is used to refer to the co-constitutive 
relation between water and society.  
 
2.2.2 On development, in contemporary capitalism 
 
Applying a political ecology lens to development means I treat development as a socio-environmental 
process. This deviates from radical and other political economic perspectives on development, which 
are often preoccupied with the social and economic aspects of development. That is, the environment 
often figures as passive ‘input’ for production or as necessary condition for human development when 
themes such as poverty, inequality, labour, finance, industrialisation and trade are addressed in 
political economic accounts. In contrast, a political ecology lens attributes a more decisive role to (the 
properties of) nonhuman nature, sees it as being reproduced or transformed simultaneously with 
human/ social/ political economic processes, and acknowledges that such processes may be more or 
less emancipating for (or harmful to) humans and nonhuman nature (Benton 1989; Castree 2003; 
Loftus 2009).    
 
Where political ecology and radical political economy agree is on the complex and contested nature of 
the very term development itself. The tripartite definition of Thomas (2000) is one amongst others that 
does some justice to this complexity. He distinguishes between development as: 
 
1. A vision, description or measure of the state of being of a desirable society; 
2. An historical process of social change in which societies are transformed over long periods; 
3. Consisting of deliberate efforts aimed at improvement on the part of various agencies, including 
governments, all kinds of organizations and social movements. 
ibid: 777, italics in original 
 
Thomas (ibid) argues that the third meaning, abbreviated ‘development-as-practice’ or ‘intentional 
development’, has become the dominant view on development. The dominance of this utilitarian view 
is unfortunate, he thinks, as it reduces development chiefly to policies aimed at poverty reduction and 
the like, as well as to what development agencies do or the targets they set. That is why many scholars 
in development studies take the second meaning as the point of the departure. One such scholar is 
Bernstein, who makes explicit why he departs from Thomas’ second meaning: 
 
I start here because this is the original source of any meaning of modern ‘development’ in effect: that 
established by the initial (and long) transitions to capitalism of north-western Europe, and especially that 
epochal moment marked by the event of modern industrialisation in Britain from, say, the mid- or late 
eighteenth century onwards.  
Bernstein 2006: 45 
 
Indeed, this meaning of development motivates one to assess how (non)human environments have 
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developed over the longer run and in relation to capitalism as a key political economic system in 
modern history.
15
   
  
The relationship between development and capitalism can be approached in different ways. Thomas 
(2000) argued that the third meaning—the dominant view on development according to him—is 
predominantly interpreted and operationalised in ways that take (neo)liberal capitalism for granted. In 
other words, the mainstream interpretation of this meaning is one that is focused on development of 
capitalism or alternatively, on development alongside capitalism, for instance by making sure markets 
run efficiently or ensuring a level-playing field. He stresses the importance of acknowledging this, as 
“...only then can we move on, either to contest that meaning or to work through the implications” (ibid: 
782). This view on development is also very much prevalent in the aid and trade agenda pursued in 
Mozambique. It is my aim indeed to contest that meaning and work out its implications. I do so by 
situating the intentional development processes related to the Dutch–Mozambican bilateral 
relationship in a development perspective akin to Thomas’ second meaning. That is, I situate these 
processes within the historical development of Mozambique’s political economy and waterscape and 
how they have evolved under contemporary capitalism.  
 
When this thesis talks of ‘contemporary capitalism’, it specifically refers to how imperatives of the 
capitalist market (Wood 2017 [2002]) tend to operate under influence of the intertwined processes of 
neoliberalisation and financialisation. Such imperatives notably include progressive capital 
accumulation, profit-maximisation, competition and increasing labour-productivity (ibid: 6-7). Wood 
argues that these imperatives “regulate not only all economic transactions but social relations in 
general” (ibid: 7) and they have also fundamentally shaped our relationship with nonhuman nature 
(Smith 2010; Moore 2015).  
 
Neoliberalisation refers to various kinds of mechanisms associated with the neoliberal political 
ideology. This ideology views the institution of the ‘free’ market not only as the supreme way of 
organising the economy, but crucially, of the human and nonhuman environment at large (McCarthy 
and Prudham 2004; Harvey 2005; Castree 2010). Such mechanisms include privatisation and 
marketisation, aimed at removing obstacles to capital and extending the scope of the abovementioned 
imperatives, expanding existing markets or developing and exploiting new frontiers. Financialisation is 
driven by the neoliberal ideology and specifically refers to how financial markets, actors, logics and 
cultures have come to play an increasingly powerful role in the world economy since the 1970s 
(Christophers 2015; Sawyer 2014; Jessop 2014). The rising social power of financial actors and logics is 
not confined to the financial sector itself. Crucially, it has also shaped the way we look at and have 
organised daily life and non-financial sectors, including those of concern in this thesis: aid and 
environmental governance (Martin 2002; Mawdsley 2015; Soederberg 2013; Sullivan 2013; Loftus and 
March 2015).  
 
Yet, how socio-environmental relations have been and are shaped by contemporary capitalism—
positively or negatively—differs in time/space. Hence, argue Peck and Theodore (2007), we should 
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approach capitalism as a global and singular, but geographically variegated system. Likewise, argue 
Brenner et al. (2010), we should consider neoliberalisation and financialisation as geographically 
variegated processes. They involve generic mechanisms with ‘family resemblances’ that have similar 
patterning effects across space and time (ibid; C.H. Büscher 2019). At the same time, they have a 
polymorphic character and produce differentiated outcomes (if any) depending on place-based 
conditions, the power of (local) agency and the likeliness of resistance and social struggle against 
these mechanisms. These latter aspects render neoliberal policies or projects difficult to implement. On 
the one hand, therefore, omnipotent powers cannot be ascribed to neoliberalisation and 
financialisation. On the other hand, it is simplistic to conclude that these processes lack force when the 
implementation of policies or projects are not in accordance with the (neoliberal) ideology according 
to which they were designed (Fletcher and B.E. Büscher 2017; 2019). The implementation of neoliberal 
and/or financialised development agendas is always messy and often deeply problematic, but this 
does not necessarily make them less neoliberal (ibid; Eagleton-Pierce 2016; Li 2007).  
 
On the contrary, as this thesis will show, socio-environmental development agendas and processes 
remained rooted in or driven by the neoliberal ideology despite their deeply problematic features and 
implementation. And this, scholars in political ecology and radical political economy argue, is a 
breeding ground for contradictions (Harvey 2014; Bakker 2005). In the next three sections, I elaborate 
my approach on contradictions in capitalism through three prisms: radical political economy, political 
ecology and critical realism.  
 
2.3 Contradictions in capitalism  
 
A while ago, Ellen Meiksins Wood scrutinised the use of contradiction by scholars in radical political 
economy. She observed that this use, including her own,   
 
...has tended to oscillate between the absurd and the trivial, between pretentious and empty theoretical 
verbiage and ritual cliché, vague enough to cover almost anything we Marxists happen not to like. That 
would be reason enough to be nervous about using it, not only in relation to class struggle but 
altogether, and I have more than once been accused of ignoring ‘contradiction’ or at least of avoiding 
the word when clearly alluding to something that other Marxists would call a contradiction. Still, I have 
used the word, probably far too often, and my usage has been as vacuous as anyone else’s.  
 
Wood 2002: 276 
 
Wood defined the problem this bold, so as to encourage herself and others to get more out of the 
concept, convinced that contradiction“...as a key to social explanation, may in fact have more meaning 
today than at any other time in history” (ibid: 276). I think her message still has relevance today and I 
take it as an incentive to first review how scholars in radical political economy look at and use 
contradiction in their work. My aim is to distil from these works a first set of substantive and 
conceptual building blocks that inform my approach to contradiction. 
 
2.3.1 Contradictions in capitalism: a conceptual and substantive exploration 
 
Marx is a good place to start a review on contradiction. Marx used contradiction in all of his works, 
both in a narrow and broad sense. He starts his analysis of capital with the most fundamental building 
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block, the commodity. It is the commodity, writes Nicolaus (1973) in his foreword to Marx’ Grundrisse, 
that “...contains within it (is the unity of) a key antithesis (use value v. exchange value) whose 
development involves all the other contradictions of this [capitalist] mode of production”. As such, he 
continues, capitalist production according to Marx “...contains contradiction from the outset, in 
embryo” (ibid). From this insight follow numerous other contradictions, to the point that it led Marx 
elsewhere to claim that “...in capitalist production everything seems and in fact is contradictory” (Marx 
1963: 218). Contradiction in Marx is therefore a category that, according to Harvey (2010: 11-13), fits a 
dialectical way of reasoning in the sense that something (or a process) contains a unity of opposites.  
 
In line with Marx, both Harvey (2014) and Sum and Jessop (2013) treat use value and exchange value 
as the ‘foundational’ or ‘basic’ contradiction of capital. That the two constitute a contradiction that 
could end up in crisis is explained by Harvey (2014: 15-17), using the house as example. A house is a 
basic need, providing the proverbial roof over one’s head. This is the house’s use value. A house is also 
worth money in capitalist society, and this represents its exchange value. In contemporary capitalism, 
the exchange value of houses has tended to become increasingly important to people, as have 
exchange value considerations. This can take extreme forms such as in London, where an increasing 
number of houses are not being used to live in, but are standing empty and solely serve as financial 
assets in a broader context of housing shortage (Sassen 2001). From the contradiction between use- 
and exchange value follow various other contradictions, argue Sum and Jessop (2013: 244), such as 
between money as a store of value and a means of exchange/ interest-bearing capital, between land 
as an indispensable form of nonhuman nature and as a source of rent and, as we will see, between 
water as a fundamental need and as an economic product. 
 
Mao, in his essay On Contradiction (Mao 1937), adopts a similar distinction, differentiating between 
principal and non-principal (or secondary) contradictions. Mao departs from the assumption that each 
and every process (capitalist or not) not only contains, but exists by the virtue of contradiction, and 
there are always multiple contradictions. In every situation or process, therefore, there is one principal 
contradiction, all other contradictions are derivative of this principal one. Moreover, he argues, the two 
opposing forces constituting a contradiction (whether principal or secondary) are not equal either. He 
therefore distinguishes principal from non-principal ‘aspects’ of a contradiction. Mao adds that 
contradictions are not static, but evolve over time. Hence, what is considered a primary contradiction, 
or primary aspect of a contradiction in one point in time, may well change in the order of importance 
later on. This becomes clearer when considered in the context of the struggle then going on in China. 
What was once a principal contradiction between the communists and the nationalists in China, turned 
into one between a united front of both communists and nationalists against the Japanese imperialists 
(Liu 1971). This contextual consideration reveals Mao’s take on contradiction, namely as a struggle 
amongst opposite agents rather than as two opposing, but mutually dependent forces that consist of 
more than only agents (Žižek 2019).  
 
Giddens (1979) also distinguishes between primary contradictions and secondary (derivative) 
contradictions, but would disagree with Mao’s take on contradiction. Giddens, in his theory of 
structuration, speaks of social contradiction as “...an opposition or disjunction of structural principles of 
social systems, where those principles operate in terms of each other but at the same time contravene 
one another” (ibid: 141, italics in original). Applied to capitalism, he argues that this system is 
“...intrinsically contradictory because the very operation of the capitalist mode of production (private 
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appropriation) presumes a structural principle which negates it (socialised production)” (ibid: 142). 
Other than Mao, Giddens (ibid) makes a distinction between contradiction proper and antagonism or 
conflict in his theory of structuration. According to him, contradiction often, but not necessarily, 
involves conflict, understood as “relations of antagonism or struggle” (ibid: 145). 
 
This is in line with De Ste. Croix (1981) who, in his book Class struggle in the Ancient Greek World, says 
he had rather not talk about contradictions, given his discontent with Marxist discussions on the 
concept. He prefers to speak of “’class ‘struggles’, ‘conflicts’, ‘antagonisms’, ‘oppositions’ or ‘tensions’, 
arising as (in a sense) the result of ‘contradictions’” (ibid: 49-50). According to him, class struggle is not 
in itself a contradiction as is, for instance, the contradiction between the relations and forces of 
(capitalist) production. Triggered by this comment, and herself dissatisfied with the use of 
contradiction by Marxists, Wood (2002) reviews what a contradiction in capitalism is and does, and 
how it sets capitalism apart from other (or previous) political economic systems.  
 
Wood agrees with De Ste. Croix that class struggle does not in itself constitute a contradiction, as 
many Marxist scholars had claimed. Words such as conflict, struggle and antagonism often suffice to 
describe (collective) agents opposing each other. Class struggle must, according to her, be 
distinguished from structural contradictions, such as that between the forces and relations of capitalist 
production. In this contradiction, a constant revolutionising of the productive forces, for instance 
expressed in an advanced technological work system that requires other forms of cooperation, tend to 
contradict with constant changes in production relations between capital and labour, aimed at gaining 
a better hold on and planning of the production process. What makes the forces and relations of 
production a contradiction proper, according to her, and one that is unique to capitalism, is capital’s 
simultaneous self-expansion and self-subversion. Thus, argues Wood, the unique forces and relations 
of capitalist production at the same time “...produce an irreducible systemic need (...) and constitute a 
barrier to the fulfilment of that need. The imperative to overcome that self-imposed barrier drives 
capital relentlessly forward, only to throw up another obstacle in its place” (ibid: 278). As such, 
contradiction serves as “capitalism’s basic operating principle”, incorporating an unprecedented power 
not witnessed in other political economic systems (ibid: 278). Other contradictions that according to 
Wood set capitalism apart from other systems include those of market dependence. That even social 
reproduction, or the “access to the means of survival and self-reproduction”, depends on markets and 
“the imperatives of competition and profit-maximisation” has been true for no other system than 
capitalism, Wood argues (ibid: 283-286).  
 
Ollman (2015) contributes to this debate by specifying how Marx used contradiction based on the 
philosophy of internal relations. In this philosophy, a thing is treated as simultaneously a process and a 
relation that evolves and changes over time vis-à-vis other things. He contrasts this with the 
philosophy of external relations, in which things are generally seen/treated as static and independent 
from other things, so that change appears to happen external to (qualities of) things themselves (ibid: 
10). The latter philosophy is dominant in much of our thinking, Ollman argues. This is problematic, he 
thinks, which he explains by juxtaposing the concept of ‘contradiction’ (associated with the philosophy 
of internal relations) with that of ‘paradox’ (associated with the philosophy of external relations). 
Although their meaning is similar, a paradox is often taken as something external to ourselves, in 
which we play no role and on which we have (had) no influence. In contrast to a contradiction, a 
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paradox does not therefore trigger us to contemplate our own position or role in that situation, or 
what can be done about it. This is what Ollman finds problematic about paradox.  
 
To better illustrate this, he uses an example familiar to both emerging and late capitalist societies, 
namely expanding and concentrated wealth alongside growing poverty. Seeing this as a paradox may 
trigger a shock effect, but the two phenomena are mostly treated as unrelated, and perceived as 
processes in which we as individuals or collective agents play no role and/or which we cannot change. 
In contrast, treating it as a contradiction means that the simultaneous production of wealth and 
poverty is not a shock so much as it is intrinsic to combined and uneven development under capitalism 
in which we, ourselves, play a part. Whether we want it or not, we co-constitute (are already inside) a 
system called capitalism, a system that tends to translate most of our actions into the concentration of 
wealth alongside spreading poverty. This relational way of seeing the problem brings it closer to 
ourselves, Ollman argues, triggers us to contemplate our own position in it and it may even cause us 
to think and act differently. In Ollman’s own words: 
 
By studying the internal relations between the opposing processes in a contradiction as they have 
unfolded over time, we also learn how what we do or don’t do (a form of ‘doing’) will influence the 
eventual outcome. Practice, here, becomes an extension of the contradiction itself as well as of the theory 
that comprehends it, just as the theory, in so far as it becomes part of people’s consciousness, enters into 
their practice as a guiding force.  
Ollman 2015: 21-22 
 
Consider now Gramsci’s perspective on contradictions, rooted in his (interpretation of the) philosophy 
of praxis: 
 
For the philosophy of praxis the superstructures are an objective and operative reality (or they become 
such when they are not pure individual machinations). It explicitly affirms that men become conscious of 
their social position and therefore of their tasks on the terrain of ideologies, which is no small affirmation 
of reality; the philosophy of praxis is itself a superstructure, the terrain on which specific social groups 
become conscious of their own social being, their own strength, their own tasks, their own becoming. In 
this sense what Croce asserts is correct (...) namely that the philosophy of praxis is ‘history made or in the 
making’. There is however a fundamental difference between the philosophy of praxis and other 
philosophies: other ideologies are non-organic creations because they are contradictory, because they 
aim at reconciling opposing and contradictory interests; their ‘historicity’ will be brief because 
contradiction appears after each event of which they have been the instrument. The philosophy of praxis, 
on the other hand, does not aim at the peaceful resolution of existing contradictions in history and 
society but is rather the very theory of these contradictions.  
Gramsci 1995: Q10II§41xii 
 
 
2.3.2 Substantive and conceptual building blocks for my approach to contradiction 
 
From these works and scholars, I derive a first set of substantive and conceptual building blocks 
pertaining to contradictions in capitalism that informs how I interpret and use this concept. I also raise 




In substantive terms, I consider capitalism as an intrinsically contradictory political economic system, 
with the perpetual accumulation of capital for private appropriation structurally opposing principles of 
production and social reproduction. Not only luxurious items, but indeed the most essential needs 
such as housing, land and food are mediated through the capitalist market. This generates numerous 
dilemmas and conflicts that pertain to the contradiction between use and exchange values of things 
and processes. Contemporary capitalism as defined above only intensifies these contradictions, as the 
imperatives of the capitalist market are extended rather than checked or abolished.  
 
In conceptual terms, firstly, I will approach contradiction in the dialectical tradition as a process or 
object constituting two opposing, but mutually constituting (sets of) powers. Secondly, I assume a 
contradiction is never ‘alone’, there are always multiple contradictions in any structure. These multiple 
contradictions do not exist in isolation, but to various degrees relate to and co-constitute one another. 
However, there seems to be an order of importance among contradictions. The reviewed scholars 
distinguish between ‘foundational’ (Harvey 2014), ‘principal’ (Mao 1937; Žižek 2019), ‘primary’ (Giddens 
1973), ‘fundamental’, ‘core’ (Sum and Jessop 2013) or ‘structural’ (Archer 1995) contradictions on the 
one hand, and secondary contradictions on the other. Similarly, in this thesis, I am concerned with a 
‘primary’ water aid and trade contradiction and contradictory realities that derive from and depend on 
this primary contradiction. In other words, without the primary contradiction, the other contradictions 
would not exist. The third point relates to the time/space dimension of contradiction. Temporally, I 
treat a contradiction as a product of history, which evolves over time. It may take different forms over 
time, can be more or less stringent, or even be resolved. The same applies to each of the powers 
constituting a contradiction: over time, the strength of one power vis-à-vis the other may differ. 
Spatially, contradictions manifest themselves differently over space. Each contradiction emerges from 
different structural settings and is thus expressed differently. Or, as Sum and Jessop (2013: 245) posit, 
“...there is no contradiction in general, there is also no general contradiction”.  
 
This brief review also throws up questions or matters that I will return to in the next sections. A first 
one concerns the ‘outcome’ of contradictions and the question whether and how contradictions can 
be resolved. In Marxist accounts, a contradiction generally represents an increasing strain between two 
opposing forces that ends up in an economic crisis. The most prominent example is a crisis of 
overproduction or overaccumulation caused by the contradiction between the forces and relations of 
production. These types of crises refer to the production of too many goods or surplus capital that 
cannot be consumed and/or productively re-invested in a particular space economy, possibly leading 
to large-scale devaluation of capital and labour power (Harvey 1982; 2003). Solving an economic crisis 
often involves a spatial fix: reorganising a particular space economy or relieving stress internally by 
looking at (investment) opportunities outside a space economy (Harvey 2003). One might conclude 
that when an economic crisis is over and growth restored, a contradiction of capital is resolved. 
However, to quote Harvey (2014) once more, contradictions of capital “...have the nasty habit of not 
being resolved but merely moved around” (ibid: 4). They may be temporarily resolved in one space 
economy, but emerge elsewhere, or later in the same space with more force.  
 
Notwithstanding this, Harvey claims that contradictions “are by no means all bad”, and he warns 
against apocalyptic ideas and visions of crises as a result of contradictions (ibid). On the contrary, 
contradiction can, and often is, “the mother of invention”, he argues—a driver for innovation and 
creativeness as well as “...a fecund source of both personal and social change from which people 
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emerge far better than before” (ibid: 3). This is in line with Giddens, who claims that contradictions may 
prompt both “retrograde and progressive movements of historical change” (1979: 143). Wood (2002) 
argues that contradictions provide capitalism with its “unprecedented strength and dynamism”, yet 
“they are also the source of vulnerabilities”, creating space for struggle and opposition (ibid: 291). In 
short, as O’Connor (1988: xx) summarises, contradictions turn capitalism into a crisis-ridden system, 
but capitalism also depends on contradictions and crisis for its own renewal and reproduction. Lastly, 
contradictions and crisis constitute a source for struggle against capitalist ways of organising the 
economy and society. 
 
A second question relates to the structure–agency dimensions of contradiction. In relation to this 
debate we can clearly distinguish between approaches, such as between Marx and Mao. Mao relates 
contradiction mainly to class struggle, i.e. political agency, something that is unusual for Marx, 
according to De Ste Croix (1981). Marx used contradiction predominantly in relation to structural 
features of capital(ism). The accounts of Gramsci and Ollman point at contradictions manifesting 
themselves in the structure of societies and differentiate this from agents’ awareness or theorising of 
contradictions.
16
 Such awareness, they argue, is essential to position oneself in relation to 
contradictions. However, they do not specify how these structural and agential dimensions of 
contradictions interact. Likewise, in discussing contradictions intrinsic to capital, Harvey (2014) 
acknowledges the agential dimension of contradiction, stating that there is a “powerful subjective 
element in defining and feeling the power of contradictions” and “what is unmanageable for one may 
mean nothing special for another” (ibid: 3). This raises the question where these agential and cultural 
(semiotic) elements of a contradiction stem from, a question which he leaves unanswered. The same 
goes for De Ste. Croix (1981), when he says that he prefers to speak of ‘struggle’, ‘conflicts’, 
‘antagonisms’, ‘oppositions’ or ‘tensions’, arising as (in a sense) the result of ‘contradictions’” (ibid: 49-
50). In defining my position regarding this question, I find critical realism helpful. What CR is, and how 
it helps me conceptualising this and other aspects of contradiction, will be dealt with below. 
 
Before turning to this, however, it is imperative to tackle a gap in this political economic literature, 
related to the position of nonhuman nature in contradictions. The next section examines the 
environmental, next to social and economic, dimensions of contradictions in capitalism. 
 
2.4 Socio-environmental contradictions 
 
This section contains a brief review of work in political ecology and development that focus on socio-
environmental contradictions. It argues that when the nonhuman environment is taken into account, 
the concept of contradiction in capitalism is enriched with crucial other insights. 
 
Firstly, O’Connor’s (1988) thesis on capitalism’s ‘second contradiction’ directs our attention to socio-
environmental conditions that get compromised by progressive capital accumulation and the political 
crisis that this contradiction tends to trigger. O’Connor builds on what he calls the ‘first’ contradiction 
of capitalism between the forces and relations of production (see above). It is this contradiction that 
drives capital accumulation. Yet this contradictory process, he argues, structurally undermines the 
conditions on which human and nonhuman well-being and progressive accumulation itself depends. 
                                                          
16
 This is the ‘superstructure’ Gramsci talks about. The term superstructure derives from Marx, but in Gramsci’s 
work, superstructure and ideology are attributed a much more prominent role than in Marx. 
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His second contradiction is therefore one between production relations (and forces) on the one hand, 
and the conditions of production and social reproduction on the other. With production conditions, 
O’Connor refers to material conditions (‘external nature’), labour power, communal conditions and 
urban space (ibid: 15), or what Ekers and Prudham (2017: 14) refer to as socio-environmental 
conditions. O’Connor adds another type of outcome from contradictions to the one mentioned in the 
previous section. Rather than a crisis of overproduction or overaccumulation resulting from the first 
contradiction, he points at capitalistically produced barriers to [1] further accumulation and [2] socio-
environmental reproduction resulting in the underproduction of capital or nature.  
 
The undermining of socio-environmental conditions by this process manifests itself in numerous ways, 
such as: deteriorating environmental conditions and human health as a result of emissions of toxic 
substances caused by industrial capital (Boudia and Jas 2014); the growing influence of (global) finance 
capital on producing essential socionatures like food crops and water, making this production ever 
more prone to the vulnerabilities of financial markets and actors (Smith 2007; Fairhead et al. 2012; 
Loftus et al. 2018); or the accumulation of real estate and stimulation of urban growth and renewal by 
landed capital, affecting people’s ability to pay for decent housing while raising congestion costs 
(Sassen 2001; O’Connor 1988). Because these and other socio-environmental conditions constitute the 
very necessities for human- and nonhuman life itself, the crisis that this contradiction set in motion is 
first and foremost a political crisis, argues O’Connor (1988). Jeopardising such conditions essential for 
life raises ideological questions, sparks unrest and intensifies social struggle. It therefore calls forth the 
state, for its legitimacy is potentially at stake. According to O’Connor, it is only an economic crisis in 
the second instance—unlike the overproduction crisis that manifests itself primarily as an economic 
crisis, due to the less politicised character of the production process (ibid).   
 
Secondly, and building on O’Connor, political ecologists suggest that socio-environmental 
contradictions have intensified and multiplied under contemporary capitalism. The renewed spirit and 
pace with which nonhuman nature is subjected to market forces, driven by the neoliberal ideology and 
made possible by novel organisational and technological means, has fuelled this (Smith 2007). This is 
not to say that such contradictions were previously non-existing. O’Connor’s second contradiction 
point at how our nonhuman environment has changed through centuries of (industrial) capitalism, and 
how this has generated innumerable political crises, social struggles and indeed, contradictions over 
that same period of time.  
 
McAfee (1999) aptly summarises a prominent socio-environmental contradiction in contemporary 
capitalism as “selling nature to save it”. She argues that “...overcoming barriers to accumulation caused 
by toxic build-up, unstable climate, urban congestion, impaired worker health, degraded soil (...) and 
loss of biological diversity” has become a key concern of “far-sighted capitalists” (ibid: 134). Other than 
‘new social movements’ whom O’Connor (1988: 15-16) argued would fight for improved socio-
environmental conditions, these capitalist agents find solace in a neoliberal approach to overcoming 
these barriers. This means strengthening and extending private property (i.e. selling nature), putting a 
price tag on nature and extending market relationships into nonhuman environments. McAfee calls 
this ‘green developmentalism’, a win-win approach to saving nature that according to her “fosters the 
fantasy that we can ‘green the planet’ while continuing to grow along demonstrably unsustainable 




According to B.E. Büscher and Fletcher (2015), the grand contradiction in this neoliberal approach to 
conserving nature is that “...capitalism is now seen as the grand saviour of its own negative ecological 
contradictions (...) that is, the disjuncture between an economic system predicated on continual growth 
and the reality of finite natural resources” (ibid: 274). This contradiction plays out in the 
implementation of various concrete approaches and endeavours across the globe to protect a variety 
of socionatures, such as carbon- and ecotourism markets, wetlands banking, Payments for 
Environmental Services and the REDD+ approach to combat deforestation.
17
 That such market-based 
approaches are not only seen as desirable but necessary in environmental governance points 
according to these scholars at a strong consensus amongst the most powerful global institutions, 
including the World Bank, various United Nations (UN) departments and global corporations (ibid; see 
also McAfee 1999; MacDonald 2010; Goldman 2007).  
 
Li (2007) makes a similar point in the context of development. Focusing on landscapes and livelihoods 
in Indonesia, Li examines improvement schemes and the intentions and practices of what she calls 
‘trustees’ like state and development agencies intended to make the lives of others better. In so doing, 
she identifies a couple of contradictions “intrinsic to the will to improve” (Li 2007: 29). These are 
enduring contradictions with a long history, she argues, which are noticeable in colonial improvement 
schemes up to contemporary development projects based on neoliberal principles.   
 
One such contradiction is that between “the promotion of capitalist processes and concern to improve 
the condition of the dispossessed” (Li 2007: 31). Li traces the successive schemes introduced in the 
then Netherlands East Indies empire that were aimed at making profits for the Dutch coloniser by crop 
production (e.g. sugar, coffee) and at the same time improving welfare for local people. The strategy 
for making profits lay in extending free market forces—that was, in practice, free for the colonial ruler 
and allies, not for the ruled. The latter were disciplined in many ways or simply forced into ‘free’ wage 
labour in service of chasing and maximising profits to the benefit of the former. The various liberal 
schemes introduced to improve conditions of ‘natives’, from the Cultuurstelsel in the 1830s to ‘Ethical 
Rule’ later in the 19
th
 century, achieved little; they were introduced under the conditions that neither 
profit-making through an expanding capitalism, nor Dutch colonial rule, were to be abandoned. Li 
moreover juxtaposes the ethical policy introduced by the Dutch colonizers with a major development 
project by the World Bank in the 21
st
 century. She found the same contradiction at work, i.e. the will to 
improve lives under highly unequal power relations between trustees and citizens and ditto conditions 
of political economy. She argues that in either narrative “...capitalist enterprise and the search for 
profits appeared (...) only as a solution to poverty, not as a cause” (ibid: 267).  
 
The natural resource of focus in this thesis, water, illustrates the point about the intensification and 
multiplication of socio-environmental contradictions in contemporary capitalism particularly well. It 
also adds another crucial insight, namely the role of materiality and unique spatial properties of 
(nonhuman) nature in socio-environmental contradictions.  
 
Mansfield (2004), for instance, teased out contradictions in neoliberal regulation of fisheries in the 
United States North Pacific. ‘Neoliberal’ in this case entails the privatisation and marketisation of 
pollock fishery. A competitive market was planned to be developed for this type of fishery, as a 
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 REDD stands for Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation. The plus sign refers to actions 
aimed at enhancing forest carbon stocks. 
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response to a complicated history of settled interests by fishers and a tendency of overfishing pollock. 
To this end, various kinds of measures were taken such as setting up fisher cooperatives and 
introducing allocations or the leasing of quotas, each of which came to be ‘micromanaged’. As a result, 
various kinds of protective regulations were introduced that, according to Mansfield, “...explicitly 
restrict the competitive market to protect the competitive market” (ibid: 575). Based on this case, 
Mansfield argues pollock has biophysical traits that complicates privatisation: they swim around in an 
ocean that is public(ally accessible), are ‘fugitive’ and cannot therefore be privately owned except when 
they are caught. Privatised in this case therefore means privatising access. Such specificities translate 
into detailed regulatory frameworks and dense rules, all in the service of creating the desired 
competitive ‘free’ market. This provides ‘geographical specificity to the forms of contradiction’, 
Mansfield concludes (ibid: 579). 
 
Mansfield’s analysis resonates with Bakker’s work on water supply. Bakker and other political ecologists 
have shown that applying market imperatives to the governance and management of water supply, as 
has been attempted in many parts of the world in recent decades, is a recipe for contradictions. Bakker 
(2003; 2005) singled out such contradictions in the context of water privatisation in England and Wales. 
Her key argument is that “...water’s geography—specifically its spatiality and biophysical 
characteristics—underlies the contradictions faced by the architects of market environmentalism (...) 
and these violate the conditions necessary for well-functioning markets (...) or resist commodification” 
(Bakker 2005: 543-545). Similar to Mansfield’s argument, Bakker argues that contradictions with regard 
to water privatisation take a specific form in view of the spatiality and biophysical properties of water. 
 
Regarding the spatiality of water supply in England and Wales, the idea of the privatisation policy was 
to stimulate competition by introducing so-called inset appointments
18
 and to unbundle prices. This 
meant eliminating, or at least reducing, cross-subsidization, e.g. between urban and rural customers, 
which would have likely raised prices for the latter group. This objective by Ofwat contradicted with the 
UK environment ministry’s (DEFRA) objective to protect rural customers and prevent ‘cherry-picking’ 
by water companies. Water’s biophysical properties refer to [1] water’s ‘heaviness’: water being “cheap 
to store but expensive to transport relative to unit volume” (Bakker 2005: 555) and [2] water as a flow 
resource that fulfils essential ecological and social functions. These properties formed important 
obstacles to introducing competition by ‘common carriage’, whereby different water companies use 
the same infrastructure. From ecological risks resulting from integrating supply networks and thus 
integrating varying qualities of H2O from different catchments, to rising capital requirements for 
common carriage that would translate into higher customer prices; competition proved irreconcilable 
with water supply under the conditions set by various public entities (ibid). Bakker (2005) raises various 
other contradictions, inter alia related to water valuation and full-cost pricing on the one hand and 
social equity and political acceptability on the other.  These contradictions could not be resolved in the 
post-privatisation regulatory framework, which led to endless adaptations and reconsiderations, an 
ever-changing mix of state-led and market-based approaches, and a reconfiguration of power 
amongst the many agents involved in water supply. In short, they did not lead to deregulation, but a 
constant reregulation of the resource (ibid: 546).  
 
                                                          
18
 Inset appointments refer to companies that are entitled by the water regulator of England and Wales (Ofwat) to 
supply water services in a specified geographical area, thereby replacing the water company that was originally 
entitled to service that area (Ofwat: website).  
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Furlong (2010) reviewed the broader literature on neoliberal water management, and her key finding is 
that “...contradictions exist in the program between the prescriptions and the predicted outcomes, 
among the reforms themselves, and between the ideology and the ability to impose it” (ibid: 65). She 
(also) points at the ‘incompatibility’ between “full cost recovery and declining prices, between PSP 
(private sector participation) and increased investment in infrastructure, and between business-driven 
management and improved water conservation” (ibid: 65). Another recurring theme is the continued 
need for regulation after increased PSP in, and applying market mechanisms to, water supply. As to the 
question what these contradictions do, Furlong uses Ferguson’s (1994) insight that it is not about the 
failure of neoliberal measures applied to water management so much as it is about the unintentional 
‘side effects’ they bring about. These include the ‘downscaling’ of market-based water management 
from the global to regional and national scales, and the changes in agents involved, such as local 
private entities taking the place of multinationals in water supply management (Furlong 2010). Both 
the works of Bakker and Furlong point at a fundamental contradiction “between water as a commodity 
and as a basic need” (Ahlers 2010: 226; see also Loftus 2009: 963), which in turn gives rise to various 
other contradictions. It will come back to this particular contradiction below. 
 
In all, this section complements the former by emphasising the environmental, next to social and 
economic, dimensions of contradictions in capitalism. It has pointed out that capital accumulation tend 
to undermine socio-environmental conditions, forming an obstacle to further accumulation while 
producing all kinds of complications (next to benefits) for human and nonhuman nature alike. In terms 
of outcomes, these scholars stress the political and state regulatory (next to economic) dimensions of 
crisis that socio-environmental contradictions tend to generate. What is all the more contradictory, is 
that many powerful actors try to tackle these complications by extending (rather than diminishing) the 
reach of capitalist market forces and mechanisms. However, this is not easily, if at all, accomplished; 
material properties of nonhuman natures providing another potential obstacle to such endeavours, 
next to social struggle. Water pre-eminently reflects this.  
 
The next section deals with the question that I left unsettled in the previous section: the structure-
agency dimensions of contradictions. I turn to a third area of inquiry that I think is helpful in specifying 
these dimensions: critical realism. 
 
2.5 A critical realist approach to contradictions in the bilateral water aid relationship 
 
Critical realism (CR) is an approach to social science that has nothing substantive to say about 
contradictions, but its view on ontology and epistemology helps me conceptualise contradiction. In 
relation to this, a critical realist approach distinguishes between what actually happens in the real 
world (ontology) and our ability as researchers to grasp, analyse and theorize what happens in the real 
world (epistemology). The latter is always partial, incomplete and fallible, as we cannot possibly 
comprehend all that is going on. This leaves open the possibility for continuous and progressive 
improvement of our knowledge and the concepts we use, such as contradiction. In particular, I 
maintain, CR provides building blocks for specifying the structure–agency dimensions of contradiction 
that I already briefly referred to in section 2.3. In this section, I briefly outline what these building 
blocks are in relation to the Mozambican-Dutch water aid relationship as central case study, and apply 




A distinctive feature of CR, and of particular relevance to my approach, is acknowledgement of a depth 
ontology. Critical realists thus approach the world as ontologically stratified, made up of (more or less) 
specific and relatively short-lived events next to (more or less) generic and enduring socio-material 
structures. Structures constitute a relatively close-knit and ‘structured’ set of relations between human 
agents, and between agents and nonhuman resources/things. Applied to my case study, the 
‘Mozambican-Dutch water aid relationship’ has a generic structure emergent from relations between 
the two states, between state agencies and various type of non-state actors, and between them and 
various nonhuman resources and things, such as H2O or water infrastructures. This structure has 
various substructures, for instance those related to different uses of water (e.g. water resources or 
water supply) or those related to either side of the bilateral relationship (e.g. the Dutch aid or 
Mozambican state substructures). The Mozambican-Dutch water aid relationship is in turn nested in, 
and shaped by, broader structures, such as the Mozambican waterscape or political economy.  
 
Structures such as these must thus be distinguished from events and human agency. Or, as Fleetwood 
(2014: 129) argues, structure and agency are treated in CR as ‘different classes of thing’. A structure is 
inter alia made up of human agents, which allows a structure’s ‘make-up’ to be changed by human 
agency. Vice versa, structures shape events, and enable and constrain human agency, through causal 
powers (Sayer 2010). These multidirectional influences, however, are not equally strong. As Newman 
(2018: 112) argues, the ‘whole’ of a (sub)structure exert powers that are qualitatively different than 
those of individual constituents (agents and things) making up this whole. Structures are also more 
enduring and their forces more powerful, because they are constructed historically. This means they 
exist not solely by the (collective) actions of living agents in the here and now, but as Archer (1995) 
argues, also by the labour and actions of (dead) agents in the recent or more distant past. So while 
individual acts of human agency matter greatly in specific events, they do not necessarily or easily 
change the make-up of an entire (sub)structure. Human action per definition occurs in an already 
meaningful water- or landscape (structure), and such pre-structured land/waterscapes can only be 
reproduced or transformed. This notion, I will argue, is important for understanding the place of the 
water aid and trade agenda as an event vis-à-vis the broader structure of the Mozambican-Dutch 
water aid relationship as it has evolved in recent decades. 
 
About agency, Archer (1995: 2) posits that “...we [human beings] are simultaneously free and 
constrained and we also have some awareness of it”. In other words, agents (inter)act in restricted 
freedom, being motivated, enabled and constrained by structures. These (inter)actions add to 
structuration in the sense of emergent material social relations. Material relations in this sense must 
not be equated with something physical, but “instead refer to their independence from human 
understanding” (Porpora in Newman 2018: 117). Moreover, how agents (inter)act is also enabled and 
constrained by how they make sense of and attach meaning to agents (including oneself), processes 
and things. This sense- and meaning making, or semiosis, must be part of CR analysis, because 
meanings, reason, beliefs, theories and other semiotic expressions exert a force on the world, that is, 
they may act as ‘causes’, and such causes may be more or less beneficial to humans (Sayer 2009; 2010: 
74-75; Sum and Jessop 2013: 4). Applied to the case, I will argue that the aid and trade agenda has 
spurred agents responsible for implementing it to think in particular ways (i.e. more market-oriented) 
and act accordingly (e.g. stimulate PSP). Yet, they are also free and may choose not to do so, or choose 
to contest that (as was done in the aid to trade course).  
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Having briefly outlined these critical realist dimensions of structure–agency, I now turn to the 
implications for understanding contradiction in the context of my case. I will approach a primary 
contradiction as ‘existing’ at the (critical realist) level of structure. In line with Archer (1995: 215), a 
primary contradiction “...represents a systemic fault line running throughout the social structure”, or 
more accurately, throughout the socio-environmental structure underpinning the Mozambican-Dutch 
water aid relationship. Derivative (or secondary) contradictions intimately relate to this primary 
contradiction, but manifest themselves in more confined ways, in parts of a larger structure 
(substructure). As mentioned, a contradiction is defined by two (sets of) opposing powers and it is 
these powers that connect structure with human agency; these powers are constitutive of, and they 
condition, human agency. These powers, moreover, act tendentially on agents, meaning they may or 
may not become manifested in specific events.  
 
The notion that human agents can be or are conscious of contradictions, as alluded to by Harvey, 
Ollman and Gramsci, now makes more sense: because human agents constitute a given structure, by 
implication their agency is conditioned by (the powers making up) a contradiction in that structure. 
Fleetwood (2014) argues that contradictions exert a twofold causal influence on agents. First, he posits 
that “...contradictions can be experienced consciously as constraints or enablements on agents’ 
decisions and actions”. Alternatively, “...contradictions can be experienced unconsciously as 
institutions
19
 that, via a process of habituation, become internalized as habits” (ibid: 133). The notion of 
Ste Croix also makes more sense now. Indeed, if contradictions exist at the CR level of structures, then 
they cannot be equated with categories like ‘conflicts’, ‘antagonisms’, ‘oppositions’ or ‘tensions’. These 
are categories that apply to human agency, indeed “...arising as (in a sense) the result of 
‘contradictions’” (ibid: 49-50).  
 
But agents are not only motivated/constrained by contradictions, they can also exert influence on 
them. This inverted relation of how agents (can) shape contradictions is particularly important in 
Ollman’s and Gramsci’s accounts discussed above. They argue that agents’ awareness of contradictions 
enables reflection on contradictions, which in turn facilitates thinking about how to position oneself in 
relation to contradictions. This is important for contradictions to be tackled and perhaps resolved, but 
because contradictions exist at the level of structures, it is difficult for a single agent to tackle and 
overcome them. The powers making up a contradiction are indeed powers because they exist by the 
virtue of past and present (collective) human action and long-lasting material properties of structures. 
Single agents deal with realities arising from contradictions such as dilemmas or conflict, but it 
requires collective action and social struggle, perhaps even radical reforms, to alter the evolvement of 
(the two powers making up) a contradiction. 
 
In all, these structural and agential dimensions of a contradiction and their interplay reveal my 
conceptualisation of contradiction as a process —more specifically, as a historical, political and 
variegated process rather than as a static, neutral or universal thing or statement. This process-based 
view of contradiction is the departure point of the next chapter, in which I trace the rise or evolution of 
the primary contradiction in the Mozambican-Dutch water aid relationship. This contradiction is made 
up of two powers that I introduce, from a theoretical point of view, in the next and penultimate 
section.  
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2.6 The primary water aid and trade contradiction: two logics of liquid power 
 
In section 2.3, I mentioned that applying market imperatives to the provision of water generates a 
fundamental contradiction “between water as a commodity and as a basic need” (Ahlers 2010: 226; see 
also Loftus 2009: 963). This relates to what Marx, Harvey and other critical scholars treat as the basic 
contradiction in capitalism, between use value and exchange value (see 2.2). In this subsection, I build 
on and expand these notions in introducing the primary water aid and trade contradiction that, I 
argue, defines the structure underpinning the Mozambican-Dutch water aid relationship. I call the two 
powers that constitute this primary water aid and trade contradiction the ‘territorial logic of liquid 
power’ and the ‘capitalistic logic of liquid power’. I derive these logics from works in the same 
literatures that I employ above, radical political economy and political ecology. I first briefly review 
these works based on which I define these logics in relation to the case study. 
 
Arrighi (2010: 34) introduced the territorial and capitalistic logics “as opposite modes of rule or logics 
of power” in his analysis of the relationship between capital and state formation over the past 700 
years. He argues that during this period, a focus on territorial conquest and control over population by 
European powers began to ‘compete’ with a focus on capital accumulation. A focus on accumulation 
required another set of strategies than a focus on territorial expansion; not necessarily war and 
coercion (although it often involved this), but innovative ways of controlling trade routes or funding 
schemes. The two logics evolved in a contradictory relationship within subsequent hegemonic city-/ 
nation states he discusses, each logic backed up by (a group of) agents pursuing competing objectives.  
 
Harvey (2003) uses these logics of power as a way to analyse what ‘the new imperialism’ entails: 
 
I here define that special brand of it called 'capitalist imperialism' as a contradictory fusion of the politics 
of state and empire (imperialism as a distinctively political project on the part of actors whose power is 
based in command of a territory and a capacity to mobilize its human and natural resources towards 
political, economic, and military ends) and 'the molecular processes of capital accumulation in space and 
time' (imperialism as a diffuse political-economic process in space and time in which command over and 
use of capital takes primacy). With the former I want to stress the political, diplomatic, and military 
strategies invoked and used by a state (or some collection of states operating as a political power bloc) 
as it struggles to assert its interests and achieve its goals in the world at large. With the latter, I focus on 
the ways in which economic power flows across and through continuous space, towards or away from 
territorial entities (such as states or regional power blocs) through the daily practices of production, 
trade, commerce, capital flows, money transfers, labour migration, technology transfer, currency 
speculation, flows of information, cultural impulses, and the like.  
Harvey 2003: 26-27 
 
In short, he treats the territorial logic of power as encompasses strategies of state formation, while the 
capitalistic logic of power refers to the “the politics of production, exchange and accumulation” 
(Ashman and Callinicos 2006: 111). Other than orthodox Marxist theories on imperialism and empire, 
Harvey does not assume ‘an easy accord’ between the two logics. That is, he does not a priori assume 
“...that political-economic processes are guided by the strategies of state and empire and that states 
and empires always operate out of capitalistic motivations” (Harvey 2003: 29). It is more apt, he argues, 
to see them as distinct logics standing in a relationship viewed as “problematic and often contradictory 




According to Harvey (ibid), the strategies and politics associated with these logics differ in various 
respects. For instance, in terms of motivations and interests, agents related to capital are primarily 
focused on investing their money profitably, whilst politicians and state managers are often 
preoccupied with maintaining state power and influence vis-à-vis other states and over their 
population. In terms of responsibility and accountability, capitalists usually have a smaller circle of 
agents for whom they are/feel responsible or to whom they are accountable than state agents. The 
latter have to meet collective, public demands and are accountable to citizens—albeit of course to 
varying degrees, depending on the type of state, the power of elite groups, etc. In geographical terms, 
capitalists’ operations are not generally bound by any particular territory or temporal system 
(notwithstanding the possibility of bankruptcy, take-overs or mergers or capitalists’ dependency on 
states for enforcing the law etc.), while politicians and state agents operate in territorial space. 
Moreover, in democracies, politicians are temporally bounded by electoral cycles (ibid: 27). 
 
Kim and Gray (2016) applied the territorial and capitalistic logics of power, as defined by Harvey, to the 
field of international development. They investigated the claim of orthodox political economists that 
South Korean’s ODA to Africa is mainly an economic program, in which the South Korean state and 
capital are mutually reinforcing. They use the two logics to present a more nuanced analysis of South 
Korean’s ODA in Africa, arguing that this that does more justice to the complexity and indeed, 
contradictory dynamics going on in this programme. They identified a number of more-than-
economic, that is to say territorial, logics in this programme that not seldom clashed with capitalistic 
ones. These encompassed (geo)political and state motivations, including: portraying the ODA 
programme as representing a break with the state’s previous authoritarian rule; to improve South 
Korea’s reputation internationally and raising its prestige by entering the OECD’s DAC; to present its 
allegedly unique model of (intentional) development; and to gain political influence in the UN system 
through support of African states (ibid: 655-658).      
 
My use of the two logics is inspired by these works, but I adjust them to water using a political ecology 
lens. Hence, I speak of the territorial and capitalistic logic of liquid power. Liquid power is a term I 
derive from Swyngedouw (2015) and refers to the central role of water (politics) in long-term 
modernisation and development processes. Liquid power departs from the assumption that humans 
shape nonhuman nature, in this case water and the landscapes, aquifers or basins through which water 
flows. Such transformed natures (waters) in turn shape human processes in a continuous metabolic 
process. How humans shape water is not a neutral process devoid of power and politics, but occurs 
through political economic processes and projects at various scales. Power struggles between social 
forces co-determine environmental change and outcomes, such as who gets access to water and who 
gets not, how nature is valued and in whose benefit, etc. (ibid: 36). In analysing liquid power in Spain’s 
modernisation from the late 19th to the 21st century, Swyngedouw (ibid) argues that capital has 
become a major power shaping water and other socionatures, a point that is substantiated by the 
review in section 2.3. However, exactly how water is shaped by capital, and to what extent in actual 
contexts, is a highly complex matter and subject to debate (Bakker 2003; 2010b; Castree 2010).  
 
The introduction of the water aid and trade agenda, I suggest, clearly points at a capitalistic logic of 
liquid power at work in the Mozambican-Dutch water aid relationship. How exactly this power 
manifests itself in this relationship is examined in the next chapters, but suffice it to say here that while 
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it has grown into a powerful logic, it is not all-powerful, nor the only type of logic at work. On the 
contrary, in various ways this logic has been thwarted by the territorial logic of liquid power.  
 
In abstract terms, the two logics can be characterised as follows. The territorial logic of liquid power 
refers to place-based waters found in national territories, that is, H2O flowing over or under the surface 
of pieces of earth known as nation-states. This logic revolves around various use values of these 
waters, such as for social reproduction or production. Because water flows over national territories, 
because of water’s indispensability and because of the large amount of resources often needed for 
water interventions, this logic calls forth the state as a key social relation, the state apparatus as a key 
resource and state and non-profit entities as key agents in struggles over the (desired) uses of water 
and in mediating hydrosocial relations and processes. As Parenti (2015: 830) argues, the “...modern 
state is fundamentally geographic; it is territory, which is to say, it is environmental” and “...few forces 
call forth the state so consistently as does water” (ibid: 841). The essence of water for human and 
nonhuman life renders water among the most politically significant and sensitive socionatures, another 
reason for the state to be closely associated with this logic. All this renders water an important element 
in state formation (Molle et al. 2009). 
 
The capitalistic logic of liquid power, on the other hand, revolves around the (potential) exchange 
values of water and subjecting various water-related processes (such as water supply) and things (such 
as water technologies) to market imaginaries and mechanisms. The key social relation here is capital, 
understood as value in motion, key institutions and resources are markets and (private sources of) 
money, and key agents are private sector agents and various types of non-state agents, but also 
certain entities within the state. At stake here is the question whether, and how, exchange values of 
water-related processes and things can be realised in markets, and specifically in the context of aid, be 
mobilised as catalyst for triggering private sector-/ private investor-led development. Use values are 
relevant, indeed necessary, insofar they work in the service of exchange and accumulation. Economic 
or (world) market prospects in relation to water products and services are major reference points 
pertaining to the capitalistic logic of liquid power, just like flows of water/ physical H2O is the defining 
reference point in the territorial logic of liquid power (see e.g. Goldman 2009; Loftus 2009; Budds 2013; 
Ioris 2013). 
 
The two logics of liquid power have different spatiotemporal qualities. The territorial logic is generally 
more restricted or fixed in space and time than the latter, as it revolves around place-based waters, 
within or across a politically defined territorial boundary. The capitalistic logic is a more diffuse logic, 
revolving around water ‘in general’. With this I do not mean to say that place-based waters are not 
important in the capitalistic logic, on the contrary. The point is that if water’s exchange values take 
precedence, actors interested in realising these are generally not, or at least less so than state agents, 
bound by specific place-based waters. Their choice of place and their strategies are subject to more 
fluid decision-making than those guided by a territorial logic. Notwithstanding this, how exactly water 
becomes an object of market imaginaries, market mechanisms or accumulation strategies obviously 
depends on specific actors, in specific contexts. 
 
The two logics are dialectically related in that they are mutually constitutive and mutually conflicting at 
the same time. I do not therefore reduce the state to an instrument of capital, as Parenti (2015) seems 
to do. He argues that the capitalist state facilitates accumulation, with its ‘core feature’ being to deliver 
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nonhuman nature’s use values, found on a state’s territory, to capital (ibid: 830). By arguing this, he 
downplays the deeply politicised nature of natural resources, notably water, and the ever-present 
possibility of a political crisis when availability or use of water for social ends is compromised 
(O’Connor 1988). Just as state agents have opportunities for delivering value to capital, e.g. by 
enforcing private property laws or through specific accumulation strategies, they could also mobilise 
state power for hydrosocial ends that defy such capitalistic motives. Indeed, this is precisely what the 
next chapters will show.    
 
Moreover, the state is not some homogenous entity. The state comprise of different entities whose 
interdependence and mutual power relations reflect a structured, but always contested, balance 
between classes in society (Poulantzas in Jessop 2008: 125). This means that even within a ‘capitalist 
state’, state agents need not necessarily, let alone unproblematically, deliver value from (nonhuman) 
nature to capital. The state can therefore also not be seen as a neutral entity, and state agents not as 
neutral providers, of services.
20
 State agents respond to and make use of what Jessop (2008) calls 
‘strategic selectivities’ inscribed in the state and the broader society. As capital has grown into an 
increasingly powerful social force under contemporary capitalism, the associated capitalistic logic of 
(liquid) power exerts an increasingly strong pressure on state agents. Yet again, what makes water such 
a special subject/object in relation to this, is its indispensability for life as well as its peculiar material 
properties; these make subjecting water to capitalistic logics an often difficult and politically risky 
undertaking—a point clearly demonstrated during the height of water privatisation projects and 
experiments in the 1990s and early 2000s (Bakker 2003; 2005; Budds and McGranahan 2003; 
Swyngedouw 2004; 2005). Precisely this confirms the unlikelihood of an ‘easy accord’ between the two 




In this chapter, I clarified my position on development and associated key concepts mobilised in the 
thesis. The key argument is that development must be considered simultaneously a social and 
environmental process, shaped to a large extent by the imperatives and contradictions of 
contemporary capitalism. I reviewed literatures of radical political economy, political ecology and 
development studies to do three things in this chapter, related to this argument. 
 
Firstly, I distilled insights from these literatures about how contradictions manifests themselves 
ontologically, in the ‘real world’. I conclude that contradictions are intrinsic to capitalism, and that 
fundamental contradictions such as between the use and exchange values of commodities or between 
the forces and relations of capitalist production become expressed in a myriad of ways. I paid special 
attention to the nonhuman environment and noted how environmental next to social conditions 
necessary for production and social reproduction tends to be compromised by progressive capital 
accumulation. While this is contradictory in itself, the solution to protecting socio-environmental 
conditions for human and nonhuman needs is often found in the same system that tends to 
compromise these conditions: capitalism. This, scholars argue, is characteristic of contemporary 
capitalism. Contemporary capitalism is shaped by processes of neoliberalisation and financialisation, I 
argue, in which market imperatives and market mechanisms are seen as the supreme means of solving 
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 Ferguson’s (1994) analysis of and perspective on the ‘anti-politics machine’ remains a very forceful explanation 
of this argument in the context of aid. 
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development and environmental problems. Yet, applying these means only tend to intensify 
contradictions that co-produced these problems. 
 
Secondly, I used these literatures to come to terms with the epistemology of contradictions, i.e. how 
contradiction as a scientific concept can be used to explain real world events. I complemented these 
insights with principles of critical realism to spell out my conceptualisation of contradiction in this 
thesis. Thus, I define a contradiction in the dialectical tradition as encapsulating two opposing, but 
unified (sets of) powers.
21
 I distinguish a primary contradiction from secondary contradictions, with the 
former existing at the (critical realist) level of structure, in my case, in the structure underlying the 
Mozambican-Dutch water aid relationship. I consider the latter as derivative of the primary 
contradiction, which become empirically expressed or manifested in parts of the entire structure (i.e. in 
substructures). Crucially, I consider contradiction as a process. This means that a contradiction, and the 
powers that it encapsulates, evolve historically in tandem with the development of a social structure. A 
contradiction can be more or less stringent, and can generate dilemmas, conflict and even crisis, 
depending on the structure’s development over time. The contradictory powers enable and constrain 
human agency, but the form and strength of these powers can also be (and is) transformed by human 
agency, through political struggle.  
 
Thirdly, I mobilised selected works in these literatures to introduce and define the two powers that 
constitute the primary water aid and trade contradiction in the Mozambican-Dutch water aid 
relationship. I call these powers the territorial and capitalistic logics of liquid power. In generic terms, 
the territorial logic of liquid power revolves around the multiple use values of water, whereas exchange 
value considerations take primacy in the capitalistic logic of liquid power. The territorial logic relates to 
water(ways) found in national territories and their proximate social environments, while the capitalistic 
logic is a more fluid logic, focused on waters with the highest potential to realise exchange values. The 
state is the key social relation and state entities driving agents in the territorial logic, whereas capital is 
the key social relation and private sector and other non-state actors considered key agents in the 
capitalistic logic. The two powers rely on each other, but also potentially collide. In the next chapter, 
the two powers will each be examined in detail, as they evolved over time in tandem with the historical 
development of the Mozambican-Dutch water aid relationship. This empirical investigation makes it 
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 I use the two terms interchangeably.   
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Chapter 3  
 
 
Territorial and capitalistic logics of liquid power 
in the Mozambican–Dutch aid relationship’s history  
 
 




 of November 2015, the Netherlands and Mozambique celebrated forty years of bilateral 
water aid relations with a cocktail reception in Amsterdam. The gathering was well-attended, with the 
Mozambican Minister of Housing, Public Works and Water Resources leading the Mozambican 
delegation, while the Dutch side was represented by the (former) ambassador for Mozambique and 
the Deputy Director-General of DGIS.
22
 From both sides, prominent water experts and (aid) 
professionals then or previously involved in the Mozambican–Dutch water aid relationship also 
attended. This gathering marked the start of my fieldwork, being the first event that I attended as a 
PhD researcher investigating this relationship. It was an insightful event; not only did I meet 
prospective informants and interviewees, I also picked up various clues about important historical and 
contemporary dimensions of the Mozambican-Dutch aid relationship. 
 
The reception was held in a wooden, beach-like pavilion with wooden furniture, simulating a tropical 
atmosphere in an otherwise dark and winter-cold Amsterdam. The atmosphere was cheerful, even 
family-like at times, with a constant buzz of conversations and chitchatting between Dutch and 
Mozambican individuals who seemed to know each other very well. Many indeed knew each other 
well, as they had typically worked together on water issues in Mozambique, with some such 
experiences going back as far as the late 1970s. It is true that ever since independence, numerous 
Dutch professionals have worked for a shorter or longer period of time in the Mozambican waterscape. 
Many have maintained links with Mozambique and have kept coming back on a regular basis for 
private and/or professional reasons. Some have even settled in Mozambique permanently. Vice versa, 
many of the Mozambican visitors had already visited the Netherlands in the context of one or another 
bilateral water aid event or project. 
 
Only later did I learn that the ‘good vibe’ was attributable to these historical ties, personal bonds and 
shared anecdotes more than to contemporary water aid relations. Formal bilateral water aid relations 
had been under pressure in the period prior to the reception
23
, but this was not noticeable just by 
being present and having quick talks with attendants. Neither of course did the usual exchange of 
courtesies that are part of such diplomatic events, or the signing of a contract for another water aid 
project, give a sign that the relationship, in the words of one interviewee, was not “as special anymore 
as it once was”
24
—hinting at times that the Dutch state was still the largest bilateral donor in the 
Mozambican water sector and Dutch experts the ones where Mozambicans turned to in pursuit of 
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 DGIS is the Directorate-General for International Cooperation and is part of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(BZ).  
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 Field notes, 3 November 2015; interview former EKN employee, 8 November 2016. 
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 In short, there is a relatively brief, but rich history to the bilateral (water) aid relations, 
which has its roots before independence of Mozambique.  
 
This chapter examines this history. It has two aims. First, it reviews the reproduction and transformation 
of the postcolonial Mozambican waterscape
26
 since independence in 1975 until 2018, with a focus on 
the (changing) role of Dutch aid within it.
27
 In doing so, important national and international political 
economic and political ecological events are considered. Secondly, the chapter seeks to unravel the 
changing structure (in critical realist terms) of the Mozambican–Dutch water aid relationship over the 
same period of time. It focuses on how the territorial and capitalistic logics of liquid power, as 
introduced in the previous chapter, have each evolved in this structure and it specifies the form and 
content of these logics. The chapter notes, firstly, how the structure expanded and grew more complex  
over time, e.g. in terms of aid volume and the number and types of actors involved. Secondly, it shows 
how a capitalistic logic of liquid power has grown increasingly influential in this relationship in recent 
decades, in tandem with the rise of contemporary capitalism. The rise of this logic went hand in hand 
with the reproduction of a dominant territorial logic of liquid power that had rooted after 
independence, characterised by a centralised and state-led approach to water affairs. The chapter 
tentatively concludes that the two logics have grown into an increasingly contradictory relationship 
over time.  
 
3.2 Hydrosocial development in Mozambique and Dutch (water) aid until the 1970s 
 
This section examines how the Mozambican hydrosocial and political economic context as well as 
Dutch (water) aid had been historically shaped and patterned prior to the establishment of the bilateral 
relations in the 1970s. I make two points. First, I conclude that late Portuguese colonialism produced a 
political economic and hydrosocial context in Mozambique characterised by uneven development and 
inequality. Transforming this deeply problematic land- and waterscape was the task that the 
independent Mozambican government and its aid partner, including the Dutch state, would come to 
face. The second subsection argues that Dutch water aid from the late 1940s until the 1970s became 
increasingly shaped by a capitalist logic, but one embedded in a state-led development paradigm one-
sidedly focused on technical expertise and big infrastructure in the benefit of economic growth.  
 
3.2.1 Uneven development in Mozambique’s political economy and waterscape during colonialism 
 
Mozambique’s political economy was strongly shaped by colonialism and imperialism prior to the 
country becoming independent in 1975. The colonial ruler, Portugal, first arrived in present-day 
Mozambique around 1500 AD. At that time, Mozambique was home to many larger or smaller, more 
or less powerful African and Arabic chieftaincies/ kingdoms. Rather than the  Portuguese imposing 
their will on these societies in the first centuries after their arrival, “...it was the Portuguese who largely 
adopted African material culture and African ways”, argues Newitt (1995: 100). Indeed, from the arrival 
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 Interview water specialist UNICEF, 7 September 2016. 
26
 ‘Postcolonial’ (rather than post-colonial) is used by scholars to emphasise important continuities between 
colonial regimes and succeeding regimes after independence (Mbembe 2001; Bertelsen 2016: 23). As this chapter 
shows, this is very much applicable to the Mozambican waterscape, hence the use of ‘postcolonial’ in this thesis.    
27
 I cover the period until 2018, when I ended my field work activities.  Late 2017 also marked the end of the Dutch 
cabinet (2012-2017) that had designed and implemented the aid and trade agenda. This agenda was by and large 
pursued by the following cabinet, from the end of 2017 onward (GON  2018).   
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of the Portuguese around 1500 until the late 19
th
 century, Portuguese presence and influence in 
present-day Mozambique was restricted in space. The Portuguese occupied various settlements and 
fortresses along the northern coast of present-day Mozambique, infiltrated (slave) trade routes and 
established some strongholds inland, but their presence had not fundamentally transformed human 
dynamics and landscapes in the interior and the southern part of Mozambique. Save for advanced 
ships and guns, the Portuguese had also hardly introduced high-end technologies or modern 
statecraft common or emerging in Europe (ibid: 100). 
 
This situation changed dramatically from the late 19
th
 century onwards. Major events such as growing 
merchant capital from India, rising pressure from the British to abolish slave trade and promote liberal 
free trade, changing imperial policies in Lisbon and above all, the rapid expansion of mining and 
industrial capitalism in South Africa prompted economic integration of the various regions and 
peoples in Southern Africa (ibid). It also triggered the Portuguese, if they were to hold on to their 
colony, into conquering and controlling the interior of Mozambique and its peoples, establishing a 
modern colonial state and developing social and material infrastructure for the development of the 
colony. This was a long and complicated, messy and contested process, in which a weak Portugal 
nearly lost its claims to territory to other, far more powerful colonizers (notably the British).  
 
In the ‘partition of Africa’, the borders of present-day Mozambique were drawn in 1890-91. Portugal 
contracted out the use and exploitation of entire areas in central and northern Mozambique to 
(foreign) private companies until the 1920s/1930s. The southern part, after defeating and 
subordinating African chieftaincies, came under control of the Portuguese colonial state. The 
Portuguese designated Lourenço Marques (now Maputo) in the extreme south of the country as the 
new capital. This facilitated its integration with and dependence on the South African economy, for 
instance by Southern Mozambique becoming a labour reserve for the mines in Johannesburg. After 
the concessions ended in the 1930s, Portugal extended the reach and power of its colonial, 
bureaucratic state to the central and northern parts of Mozambique. Efforts to develop the colony 
were scaled up through all-encompassing development plans. With these plans, the authoritarian 
Portuguese government led by Antonio Salazar sought to integrate its Portuguese colonies into its 
own economic sphere. Mozambique had to be turned into both an importer of goods made in 
Portugal and a producer and exporter of commodities, including electricity, cotton, rice, cashew, 
mineral water and tobacco (Isaacman and Isaacman 1983; Azevedo et al. 2003: 184). 
 
Water had been a major source of development, impediment and struggle throughout this history. 
Mozambique knows a very long history of challenging hydrological conditions. This involved recurring 
and prolonged periods of very little rainfall. According to Newitt (1995), the many droughts 
throughout the (distant) past often forced African groups of people to migrate in search of water, 
inevitably coming into conflict with one another. This gave rise to great social instability as well as war 
and banditry. Major floods also regularly occurred in river basins, which created fertile lands, but also 
caused such lands to be infested with mosquitoes carrying malaria and other diseases. As we will see, 
droughts and floods have continued to be major sources of struggle in the more recent past. But the 
nature of these liquid power struggles, and of hydrosocial development more generally, would 




One major change was the introduction of a modern (colonial) state form in Mozambique in the image 
of, and subordinated to, the state in Portugal. Once established, this colonial state had become a 
powerful entity in liquid power struggles in Mozambique, defining the objectives and means of 
hydrosocial development in the country. Another change was the introduction of imperialist-
capitalistic principles as a driver behind hydrosocial development. The pursued modernisation of 
Mozambique relied on large-scale exploitation of the African peoples and on profit-making enterprise, 
in the sole benefit of the Portuguese ruler and its allies. The grand development plans required major 
amounts of water and electricity, and this in turn required advanced water infrastructure such as 
(hydroelectric) dams and irrigation schemes. Many of these were built across the territory, not least as 
part of state-driven, grand engineering schemes known as colonatos.  
 
This type of hydrosocial development in Mozambique is arguably best illustrated through the Cahorra 
Bassa Dam (Mondlane 1969: 97-98). This major dam was built between 1969 and 1974 in the Zambezi 
river valley in western Mozambique. It involved forced labour to build the roads to the construction 
site, harsh working conditions and violence in the dam construction itself, the displacement of more 
than 30,000 peasants, and many others impacted by the altered flows of the Zambezi River. Moreover, 
the dam’s majority ownership and management were in the hands of a Portuguese parastatal, which 
thus effectively controlled decision-making over processes such as water outflows and energy sales. 
Nearly all energy generated by the dam was sold to South Africa instead of using it for domestic ends. 
Ownership and management would only be granted to the postcolonial Mozambican government 
after repaying the 550 million US dollar debt that went into constructing the dam. Only in 2007 did the 
(independent) Mozambican government gain majority ownership over the dam, for 700 million US 
dollar (Isaacman & Isaacman 2003).  
 
Water supply also reflected this colonialist hydrosocial development. The construction and 
management of water supply systems were generally assigned to private companies. They were placed 
in cities and in (small) towns that were typically established during the late colonial period as a hub for 
industrial or agricultural development (Andersen et al. 2015: 336; Jenkins 2003).
28
 Water distribution 
(and in fact all other kinds of modern infrastructure) was limited to the central part of these cities and 
towns known as the ‘cement city’. This meant that water distribution was restricted to those holding 
rights as citizens, which were the Portuguese and assimilados.
29
 African people were classed as 
‘natives’ who had no right to live in these parts of the city under colonial legislation (Jenkins 2000). The 
latter were thus excluded from such advanced infrastructures. Public water supply in rural areas was 
virtually non-existent under colonialism and upon independence, more than 95% of the rural 
population relied on the nearest, unprotected water source.  
 
In all, this subsection argues that race, class and capital were key determinants in the state-led 
production of the colonial waterscape in Mozambique. Independent Mozambique thus ‘inherited’ a 
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 These later became provincial administrative towns, and are now labelled by the state as ‘secondary cities’. The 
rehabilitation and extension of water supply systems in these secondary cities is the central objective of one of the 
Dutch-Mozambican aid projects investigated in this thesis, the so-called PO15 project (see chapter 5 and 6).   
29
 Assimilados is the Portuguese term for a small class of African people with privileged rights under colonialism. 
Members of this class were allowed to live in cities, unlike other African people, and thus be distributed water. In 
practice, they often lacked such services (Azevedo 2003). 
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highly unevenly developed waterscape that benefited a privileged minority. A giant task lay ahead to 
transform this situation.  
 
3.2.2 Dutch (water) aid and trade avant la lettre  
 
Dutch foreign aid existed for more than two decades by the time aid relations with Mozambique 
became formally established in the mid-1970s. The direct trigger for establishing Dutch aid is generally 
considered to be ‘Point Four’ of the ‘Four Point Speech’ that former US President Truman delivered in 
January 1949. This comprised a ‘bold new program’ by developed countries for the ‘improvement and 
growth of underdeveloped areas’ (Truman 1949). The White House stressed that “...this technical 
assistance (TA) program could in no sense be described as involving exploitation or imperialism” (GUS 
1949). The UN was therefore attributed a major role in coordinating this, under the so-called ‘Extended 
Program for Technical Assistance’ (EPTA). 
 
The Dutch state, however, was still occupied with old-style imperialism; only a few weeks before 
Truman’s speech, the Dutch state had formally ended the second of two major military operations in 
their colony of the East-Indies. These were part of a five-year armed struggle aimed at restoring 
colonial rule in present Indonesia, which the Netherlands had lost to Japan in World War II (WWII). 
Becoming increasingly isolated internationally by this colonial attitude, and under pressure of the UN 
and the US, the Dutch state handed over sovereignty to Indonesia in December 1949. It was in this re- 
and decolonisation context that the Dutch state granted support to the EPTA in October 1949. Dutch 
aid started small; 1.5 million guilders were made available for providing TA to underdeveloped 
countries by Dutch experts, mostly engineers that had gained ‘tropical’ experience in Indonesia. The 
Netherlands was, however, quick to take in third place regarding the number of experts sent out 
abroad under EPTA (Van Soest 1975: 329; Dierikx 2001).  
 
Different motives lay behind the start of Dutch aid. Aid provided the Dutch state a ‘postcolonial 
instrument’ for maintaining and expanding its trade networks and connections in East Asia, and 
facilitated access to emerging markets elsewhere (Dierikx 2001; Hoebink 2010). This economic 
justification for starting Dutch aid was largely rhetorical, however. Van Soest (1975: 230-231) outlines 
that in order to get the Ministry of Economic Affairs (EZ) onboard—with its pre-WWII mindset that no 
policy should pass that is not in the national economic interest—the ‘aid-for-growth’ or simply ‘export 
argument’ was repeatedly raised, knowing well that the 1.5 million guilders for TA would have little 
commercial spin-off. But with the growth of the aid budget in subsequent decades, the interest of EZ 
in the aid budget would grow accordingly. Aid also served extra-economic aims. First, it provided the 
Dutch state an opportunity to break with its colonial past and to build up international prestige. An 
initial, second motive was the anti-communist agenda of the US. Third, the idea of solidarity gradually 
came to underpin Dutch aid, driven by non-state agents such as churches (Smits 2008).  
 
Water constituted an important element in Dutch aid from the very beginning (Dierikx 2017). This was 
stimulated by the many Dutch (civil) engineers who had gained extensive ‘tropical’ experience in the 
former colony of the East Indies; the Dutch government was eager to deploy this reservoir of 
knowledge in independent Indonesia and elsewhere in the world as part of providing TA. But reasons 
were also historical. The deployment of Dutch water expertise abroad stood in a much longer tradition, 
going back as far as the Dutch Republic. During the rise in power of the Dutch Republic (around 1650), 
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the Dutch were, according to Blackbourn (2006: 29) “...securely established as the hydraulic masters of 
the Continent”, a reputation which “...was based partly on the deeds of its celebrated engineers”. 
Across the European continent, Dutch engineers and water workers were hired by foreign powers to 
reclaim land from water, construct channels, dikes, sluices and other water works (ibid). Ever since, 
Dutch hydraulic engineers have worked abroad, in Dutch colonies and elsewhere. The first modern 
engineering companies, established in the late 19
th
 century, as well as individual researchers and 
consultants did water projects around the world in the first half of the 20
th
 century, including in 
colonial Mozambique (Frijlink 1963). Even TA was already provided by Dutch water experts in the 
1920s and 1930s, under the auspices of the League of Nations (Dierikx 2001; Van Soest 1975: 21). In all, 
the major role attributed to water management in and from the start of Dutch aid was no surprise. 
 
If engineering companies were to gain from the (expanding) aid budget, their hitherto dispersed and 
often small projects carried out abroad had to be better coordinated. That at least was what motivated 
the founders of Nedeco in 1951. Nedeco was a foundation (or syndicate) that would on behalf of 
Dutch engineering companies, and in close cooperation with Dutch state (aid) entities, do the 
acquisition of (mostly) water engineering projects abroad. It would then distribute these projects 
among its participating members. This was done to strengthen the market position of Dutch 
companies abroad, notably by minimising competition between them. In carrying out their projects, 
Nedeco made abundant use of water experts working for Dutch state entities, such as Rijkswaterstaat. 
Nedeco grew rapidly, and in the late 1960s was involved in more than 60 projects in 55 countries, 
mostly but not exclusively related to water, and reported a turnover of 14,5 million guilders 
(Luchtenbelt 2015). This was made possible not least by a rapid increase of bilateral, financial aid in the 
1960s that complemented multilateral, technical aid. Dutch business associations lobbied, with success, 
for bilateral aid to be spent through Dutch companies in developing countries. This ‘tied aid’ indeed 
became the norm in the 1960s and Nedeco, like other Dutch corporations, benefited significantly from 
this (Dierikx 2017; Hoebink 1988). 
 
Nedeco very well illustrated the close alliance between state and capital during that time, as well as the 
generous agreements and collaboration (even cartel-like) frameworks set up between them and/or 
between corporations (Luchtenbelt 2015). Nedeco also exemplified how Dutch water aid was delivered: 
state-driven and state-financed (but in close alliance with capital), focused on technical expertise and 
grand, imported water infrastructure (IOB 2000: 25). Water was predominantly considered as a 
‘resource’ to be harnessed and put to work in the service of economic growth (Bakker 2003: 20; UN 
1952: 7). This in turn reflected the dominant perspective on international aid, in which economic 
growth was seen as the prime objective, the state as the key driving force and the leading question 
how developing countries could ‘catch up’ with developed countries (Leys 1996: 7; Fine 2006; Khan 
2007: 6).  
 
This changed in the late 1960s, however, under influence of citizenries and social movements who 
increasingly criticised this economically reductionist way of thinking about development. The 
modernisation paradigm came under attack, with its focus on quantitative aspects of development 
(e.g. measured by a country’s Gross Domestic Product) and overall neglect of environmental processes. 
Also increasingly despised were the global uneven power relations and uneven wealth distribution 
between what dependency theorists called the capitalist core and (semi-)periphery. Injustice through 
colonial and apartheid (or other types of racist and oppressive) regimes became key targets of newly 
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formed solidarity movements. Meanwhile, the idea of aid as an act of solidarity became much more 
powerful. Precisely this idea and these movements would trigger the establishment of ties between 
(agents in) the Netherlands and Mozambique, as the next section shows. 
 
3.3 The bilateral (water) aid relationship in proto-socialist Mozambique (1970~1983) 
 
The period 1970~1983 in which the bilateral relationship became established differs in important ways 
from the previous and later periods. A liberation struggle against the Portuguese colonizer led to the 
independence of Mozambique and the establishment of a government that sought to develop the 
country and waterscape based on a socialist political ideology. At the same time, the economic 
modernisation approach driving Dutch aid, and the conservative governments that embraced this 
approach, came under attack in Dutch society and were replaced by progressive alternatives. I argue, 
firstly, that these simultaneous events in both societies opened up the possibility for establishing 
bilateral (water) aid relations. Secondly, they allowed ample space for a territorial logic of liquid power 
to prosper in this relationship, one in which the central state was attributed a key role in hydrosocial 
development. Space for a capitalistic logic of liquid power to prosper was limited, although not absent 
altogether.  
 
3.3.1 The independence war and the establishment of the Mozambican–Dutch aid relationship    
 
Formal bilateral relations between independent Mozambique and the Netherlands were established 
upon independence of Mozambique in 1975. However, the roots of this relationship lie in the period 
prior to independence, in particular in two key periods or events that are reviewed in this subsection. 
This is firstly, the war of independence that Frelimo fought against the Portuguese coloniser in 
Mozambique, and secondly, in the solidarity movements that sprang up in a rapidly changing Dutch 
society in the 1960s and 1970s.  
 
The independence war in Mozambique lasted ten years, from 1964 to 1974. It was ignited by Frelimo, a 
liberation front established in 1962, with the broad mission of liberating the country from Portuguese 
colonialism and oppression.
30
 Frelimo fought a guerrilla-style war against a far larger and better 
equipped Portuguese army. They did so, moreover, in a challenging and ambiguous global political 
context. During the time that Frelimo fought for independence, the global call and struggle for 
decolonisation intensified, especially in the UN. This should have aided Frelimo’s struggle against 
Portugal, but for geopolitical reasons and effective Portuguese propaganda
31
, Portugal in fact received 
political, financial and military support from the US and other NATO allies
32
, which it readily deployed 
in its African colonial wars. This Janus-faced policy of powerful western nations made it more, not less, 
difficult to fight the Portuguese, and it was only later in the war that Frelimo made significant strides 
(Newitt 2017). What helped ending the war was the Carnation Revolution in Portugal in 1974, during 
which the authoritarian Portuguese government was overthrown. Portugal’s new interim leaders 
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 Frelimo stands for Frente de Libertação de Moçambique or the Mozambican Liberation Front.  
31
 An important geopolitical reason was a US military base on the strategically positioned Azores, part of Portugal. 
Propaganda-wise, Portugal called its African colonies “overseas provinces” and depicted Mozambique as a “multi-
racial paradise” and Frelimo as a communist and terrorist threat to the Western ‘free’ world (Isaacman and 
Isaacman 1983: 103-105; Funada-Classen 2012). 
32
 Including the US and indeed, the Netherlands. NATO stands for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and was 
established in 1949 as a military alliance.  
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opposed the African wars and entered into negotiations with Frelimo, which led to independence on 
25 June 1975. All powers were unconditionally transferred to Frelimo.   
 
During the war, Frelimo’s leading cadre
33
 actively sought and gained support from state and non-state 
agents from around the world. In the East, Frelimo mostly connected with states, including the USSR, 
East Germany, Romania and Bulgaria. In the West, Frelimo mainly approached and connected with 





This is where the Netherlands comes in. It was a Dutch solidarity movement called the Angola Comité 
(AC) where Frelimo turned to. The AC was established in 1961, initially to support the Angolan 
liberation struggle, but it soon also supported movements in other African countries colonised by 
Portugal. The AC even built up its first and strongest ties with Frelimo, and Frelimo would have a 
lasting impact on the AC (AHM and NIZA 2005: 14). As the AC was known as an activist and radical left 
movement, a working group of the AC was turned into a separate solidarity movement in 1969 that 
initially took on a less activist profile, focused on fundraising and garnering broader political support 
for the Mozambican case.
35
 It was called the Eduardo Mondlane Stichting (EMS), after Frelimo’s first 
leader who was killed that same year.  
 
The establishment of the AC and EMS must be considered in the abovementioned context of profound 
changes then occurring in Dutch (and more generally, Western) society. The post-WWII hegemony of a 
conservative-right political establishment in the Netherlands, and its one-sided focus on economic 
modernisation, was increasingly challenged and resisted by progressive left voices and groups 
(Nekkers and Malcontent 1999). Some such groups established solidarity movements, which, together 
with the first aid NGOs and other non-state agents, became known as the Third World Movement. The 
common factor that bound these agents was the idea of solidarity with Third World countries, which 
motivated them to deploy all kinds of activities, from fundraising to protests and lobbying (Beerends 
2013). The EMS was particularly successful in fundraising and lobbying, and even managed to 
persuade conservative Dutch governments in power in the early 1970s to indirectly finance ‘non-




It was not until 1973 that (formal) ties between the Dutch state and Frelimo became established.
37
 That 
year a new, progressive Dutch government came to power that took a more critical stance towards 
Portugal. The former governments were generally oriented towards an Atlantic power bloc and a 
strong NATO led by the US (Kersten 1999: 224-225). They had defended and supported Portugal as a 
NATO member, despite the colonial wars it fought (De Goede 2000: 238). The new Minister for 
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 Consisting mostly of men from Southern Mozambique who were educated abroad.  
34
 They did not reach out to most Western states, given these states’ (implicit) support to Portugal during the 
liberation war. 
35
 During his first visit, Eduardo Mondlane made clear that the AC “...should not only mobilise the radical left in the 
Netherlands”, but also try “...to win over parliament, the government and the broader civil society for the 
Mozambican case” (Van Beurden and Huinder 1996: 67). 
36
 See archive BZ, Memorandum no. 24/46, code 999 (VN), 1965-1974, 999.232.314, omv.no. 2448 and brief no. 
DIO/PZ-220.484, archive BZ, code 999 (VN), 1965-1974, 999.214.9, inv.no. 995. 
37
 Informal contacts had already been established between personnel of Dutch embassies in Southern Africa and 
liberation movements, but this was not formal policy from BZ. See Dierikx (2005): conclusies (z.no.). private archive 
J.P. Pronk (Den Haag). 
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Development Cooperation, Jan Pronk, radically broke with the policies of the former governments. He 
put the concept of ‘self-reliance’ and ‘poverty reduction’ at the centre of his aid policy (GON 1977). 
Controversially, he added communist countries like Cuba and Vietnam to the list of aid-receiving 
countries and started to formally deliver aid to the liberation movements in Portuguese colonies in 
Africa. In 1974, Pronk granted one million US dollar of aid directly to Frelimo (GON 1974), which 





This state support to Frelimo even before independence would serve the future bilateral relationship 
well, but was not uncontested. On the contrary, it was denounced by the majority of countries in the 
NATO and European Community
39
 (De Wit 2008: 32) and was even contested within the government 
itself, for fear of isolation within the Atlantic bloc (Kuitenbrouwer 1999). Pronk nevertheless pursued 
and it made the Dutch government one of the few Western nations to be invited for the independence 
celebrations in Mozambique in June 1975. The first meeting between Frelimo and Dutch state 
representatives took place two months before these celebrations, in which Pronk granted Mozambique 
another 25 million guilders (GON 1976a). From then on, bilateral aid relations between the states 
developed quickly, although it could not yet match the strength of ties between Frelimo and the EMS. 
The latter were based on explicit and shared ideological and political inclinations, revolving around 
anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism, and increasingly around socialism and anti-capitalism.     
 
3.3.2 A socialist transformation of the Mozambican waterscape?  
 
Two years after independence, in 1977, Frelimo declared itself a Marxist-Leninist vanguard party. Its 
ambition was to undo the colonial legacy in terms of social relations, economic structure, 
infrastructures and other dimensions in the Mozambican society, and rapidly transform it into a new, 
modern nation, based on ‘people’s power’ and guided by ‘scientific socialism’. To this end, and 
stimulated by its popularity gained through its role in defeating colonialism and oppression, Frelimo 
launched grand, state-led political economic and social (engineering) projects (Hall and Young 1997). 
 
Water played a major role in this attempted socialist transformation, even though it did not receive as 
much attention as did other sectors such as education and health. First, water was vital for the 
envisaged economy. Large-scale agriculture and heavy industry were proclaimed the economy’s key 
pillars and these required large volumes of (irrigated and industrial) water. The generation of 
hydropower through newly planned and existing dams was another important economic pillar (Rusca 
et al. 2019). A second major task was to undo the abovementioned colonial legacy of Mozambicans 
having no or hardly any access to water of reasonable quality (Frelimo 1977). In rural areas, Frelimo 
addressed this problem primarily as part of a broader process of ‘villagisation’, or the creation of 
communal villages in line with its vision of the “socialisation and modernisation of the countryside” 
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 But after the Carnation Revolution had taken place in Portugal, and knowing that independence was 
forthcoming. The relationship still had a temporary character and it would take another two decades before Pronk 
– again as minister for development cooperation – granted the relationship a structural character. Yet, in 
hindsight, aid to Mozambique had continued and only increased in the intervening decades, making it a de facto 
structural relationship.  
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 Frelimo argued that public services such as water supply could be more 
effectively provided in such villages, as they concentrated the dispersed rural peoples of Mozambique 
(GOM 1978: 5;  Hall and Young 1997: 91). Communal villages were, however, established unevenly over 
the country’s vast territory and of the existing ones, half of them were serviced with water, whereas all 
lacked technical support and spare parts (UNDP 1981; Urdang 1989: 115). Lack of support and parts 
also severely affected urban water supply. Although in some cities, notably Maputo, a reasonable 
supply through water production systems could be maintained for a while
41
, all urban water systems 
were subject to greater or lesser deterioration (DHV and Consultec 1995). 
 
Chabal (2002: 84) and others (e.g. Hall and Young 1997: 203; Newitt 2002: 207) argue that in spite of its 
socialist, anti-colonialist and anti-capitalist rhetoric
42
, Frelimo actually followed a pragmatic, non-
dogmatic interpretation of socialism and Marxism. This made it reproduce rather than transform some 
important (hydro)social relations established under colonialism, including in the domain of water. Thus, 
Mozambique continued selling hydropower from the Cahora Bassa Dam to the apartheid regime in 
South Africa and remained a labour reserve for the Johannesburg gold mines. It therefore remained 
closely tied to South Africa’s capitalist economy based on racist exploitation (Cahen 1993). Moreover, 
in Marxist-Leninist fashion, it adopted a state-led, centralised and bureaucratised approach to 
(hydrosocial) planning, which was not so different from that of the Portuguese. So-called ‘green fields’ 
and collective farming projects were erected out of the colonatos, which were grand state-designed 
agricultural projects under colonialism. Many of the communal villages were erected out of community 
centres created during the war by the Portuguese, who used these as an instrument of control and 
security against Frelimo infiltration and attacks.
43
 Both represented grand, uniform plans that Frelimo 
imposed on a heterogeneous and dispersed population, and applied in a top-down and increasingly 
authoritarian way. Although this approach initially worked out quite positively in some sectors (health, 
education), it did not in others (e.g. agriculture) and an initial enthusiasm made place for 
disillusionment among some groups in society and in some areas of the country. This created a 




In view of this, it is not surprising that Frelimo frequently ‘used water’ to have people embrace its 
socialist ideas and projects. Samora Machel, the first president of independent Mozambique, made no 
secret of the fact that water served as a political instrument to attract people into communal villages 
(Munslow 1985; Coelho 1998; GOM 1980: 8-9). Ethnic groups who, more than others, sympathised with 
Frelimo and/or had provided support in the war enjoyed privileges with regard to water 
infrastructure.
45
 Moreover, Roesch (1992: 465) and Coelho (1998: 69) describe how floods were used by 
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 This process was similar to and inspired by the ujamaa village campaign in Tanzania (see Scott 1998, ch. 7). 
Frelimo had already started the creation of such communal villages during the war in the liberated zones in 
northern Mozambique. 
41
 Interview Dutch water expert, 3 November 2016. 
42
 In particular the rhetoric of Samora Machel, Mozambique’s first president (see e.g. Munslow 1985). 
43
 These were also, as far as possible, supplied with services such as water supply, in a last attempt to win the 
hearts and minds of the Mozambican people.   
44
 This is why Derluguian (2018) calls the popularity gained by Frelimo after the independence war 
‘overconfidence’: “Frelimo fell victim to its own ‘dizziness from success’ and Mozambique suffered thereafter 
almost two decades of civil war” (Morier-Genoud et al. 2018: 13).  
45
 For instance, Frelimo had built an advanced water supply system for the people of the water-scarce Mueda 




the central state to announce ‘emergency relief measures’ and to resettle people from fertile but 
flood-prone areas to higher grounds, which also happened to be planned communal villages where 
people initially refused to move into. This use of water as a political instrument produced similar 
effects as most of its plans: it pleased some groups in society, mostly those already sympathetic to 
Frelimo, while antagonising others (Bowen 2000).  
 
Transforming the Mozambican society and waterscape according to socialist ideals was thus highly 
problematic in various respects, but so were the conditions in which Frelimo had to realise its plans. 
Above all, Frelimo inherited a country with a sheer lack of nearly everything, notably skilled labour. 
Most of the Portuguese who had ran the country’s social and physical infrastructures had left the 
country upon independence. They had demolished much of the (water and other type of) 
infrastructure along their way, and left a population that had hardly enjoyed basic, let alone advanced, 
education. More generally, there was a shortage of all kinds of other resources required to put 
programs into practice, including money and foreign currency to import goods. On top of this, another 
war was started by the guerrilla movement called Renamo
46
 against Frelimo. These economic, social 
and politico-military conditions ‘entangled’ with adverse hydrological events; floods and droughts 
were frequent and destructive in the immediate post-independence period. These events combined 
resulted in a ‘perfect storm’, with Newitt (2002: 212) arguing once again that floods and droughts, as 
throughout Mozambique’s history, proved to be the final straw that led to the “...breakdown of civil 
order within African chieftaincies (...) pushing many people who already lived on the margins of 
existence into the position where the only means of survival was to prey on others”.  
 
In all, the political economic and hydrosocial context was extremely challenging to realise even a 
severely downsized version of the socialist state building project that Frelimo had envisaged. It is for 
that reason that this section speaks of proto-socialism, which refers to “socialism as the declared aim 
but where no fully developed form of socialism emerged” (Jenkins 2003: 122).  
 
3.3.3 Water aid structure embedded in a territorial logic of liquid power 
 
This last subsection argues that during this proto-socialist era, a bilateral aid structure emerged in 
which a territorial logic of liquid power, with the central state attributed a key position, was dominant. 
A capitalistic logic of liquid power, of the kinds prevalent under Portuguese colonialism and in Dutch 
aid (see previous section), lost strength.   
 
The bilateral structure emerged in the highly challenging context sketched above. The need for 
support was therefore immense, which Frelimo requested and received from allied and like-minded 
agents, including EMS and the Dutch state. Both EMS and the Dutch state continued providing 
financial aid after independence and soon also started sending out experts/ volunteers to work as so-
called cooperantes in various sectors of Mozambican society. Water was a major target of Dutch 
financial aid and a sector in which many experts came to work. Part of the financial aid to Mozambique 
went directly into rural water supply (GON 1976), a domain of water aid that received more attention 
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 Renamo stands for Resistência Nacional Moçambicana or Mozambican National Resistance, founded in 1977. 
54 
 
under the new aid policy of 1973. Bilateral or so-called ‘suppletion’ experts sent out by DGIS
47
 came to 
work for the central water state entity of Mozambique, the National Directorate of Water (DNA), from 
1978 onwards. EMS cooperantes worked mainly on water projects at decentralised levels, in districts.  
 
Both the Dutch state and EMS had affinity with, but positioned themselves differently towards, Frelimo. 
Dutch state aid had to be justified and often ‘depoliticised’ in response to Dutch parliamentarians who 
were critical of socialism and Frelimo.
48
 EMS faced no such accountability mechanism and followed 
Frelimo in adopting an increasingly radical, socialist line (Scholtens 2018). This difference was also 
noticeable in the type of cooperantes sent out by both entities. The water experts sent out by DGIS 
were mostly engineers and technocrats who had deliberately chosen for this type of development 
work abroad and who valued providing support to developing countries like Mozambique. But it was 
work nonetheless, a profession for which they expected a reasonable remuneration.
49
 EMS volunteers 
were recruited not only to deploy technical expertise in Mozambique, but to help build up a socialist 
country.
50
 They worked as volunteers and received a small remuneration. This ideological kinship made 
the ties between Frelimo and EMS stronger than those between Frelimo and Dutch state agents, even 




This last point says something about (decision-making) power in the aid relations and Frelimo’s critical 
approach towards aid in the first five to eight years of independence. That is, even though Frelimo’s 
socialist development strategies were mostly ‘imported’ (Pitcher 2002: 238) and subject to discussion 
and change (Adam 1996), Frelimo still maintained “considerable scope of agency in its actions” (Kaiser 
2013: 47). Indeed, Frelimo’s diplomatic skills and achievements in its socialist era are widely acclaimed; 
rather than following Moscow’s or any other agent’s diktat as some have argued, Frelimo had been 
fairly successful in gathering support and negotiating aid in line with its own development vision 
(Telepneva 2014; 2017; Shubin 2008; Morier-Genoud et al. 2018: 6-7; Hanlon 1984; 1991). It became 
member of ‘non-aligned’ supranational institutions, such as the UN, but did not join those that 
opposed its agenda, such as the Lomé Convention or the Bretton Woods institutions (BWI’s). It 
accepted and refused aid, depending on the partner and conditions that applied (Hanlon 1991: 28; 
Henriksen 1978: 448). In short, aid money and aid volumes did not translate into policy influence of aid 
agents as much as it would later do, and Frelimo appeared to have considerable power in the 
negotiation and destination of Dutch aid.  
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 Suppletion experts were experts whose local contract with and salary of the Mozambican state were 
supplemented by a contract with/salary of the Dutch state. Bilateral experts only had a contract with the Dutch 
state. 
48
 For example, the minister of development cooperation responded to claims about alleged Dutch state support 
for socialism in Mozambique that DGIS experts at the Eduardo Mondlane University in Maputo worked on 
subjects that “...did not or hardly lent themselves for a political approach”, including chemistry, agronomics and 
psychology (GON 1978: 1467). 
49
 Interview Dutch water expert, 3 November 2016. This expert remembered that in the early 1980s, the then 
minister summoned all experts in the project he worked for to become suppletion experts, which meant a 
reduction of salary since they would be (partly) paid in local Metical that was not worth much. 
50
 And fight capitalism/ neo-colonialism. EMS even envisioned a ‘catching up’ of capitalist Netherlands with 
socialist-to-be-Mozambique (Scholtens 2018). These volunteers often positioned themselves in opposition to the 
‘mainstream’ experts sent out by DGIS. 
51
 This point was substantiated by a visit of Samora Machel to the Netherlands in 1983, in which he chose to visit 
EMS people rather than attending a press conference after having met with the prime minister, Lubbers. 
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But the Dutch state also enabled Frelimo’s ‘scope of agency’ to be considerable, because it lacked 
capacity to coordinate its aid. Aid was mostly administered by DGIS employees in The Hague at that 
time, but they were expected to spend and keep track of a quickly expanding aid budget in the 1970s 
with more or less the same amount of people. This led to severe ‘spending pressure’, the ‘piling up of 
money’, poor preparation and weak coordination of aid projects and results (Hoebink 1988: 66).
52
 
Guidance from local Dutch state representation was also minimal, with only one Dutch state official 
acting as chargé d’affaire in Mozambique, who resided under the Dutch embassy in Lusaka. This 
situation strengthened the position of Frelimo to negotiate and determine the type and destination of 
Dutch aid.  
 
In view of this, the early bilateral water aid relationship was largely structured according to Frelimo’s 
hydrosocial imaginaries, which clearly espoused a territorial logic of liquid power. The form of this 
territorial logic had much in common with, and can be regarded a socialist version of, the so-called 
‘state hydraulic paradigm’ that Bakker (2003) describes in the context of England, Wales and the Global 
North more generally. It focuses on: 
 
...social equity, universal provision, planning for growth, supply-led solutions with an emphasis on 
hydraulic development as a means of satisfying water demands, command-and-control regulation, a 
discursive representation of nature as a ‘resource’ and state ownership; all based on a desire to provide 
sufficient quantities of water where and when needed such that economic growth could proceed 
unconstrained.  
Bakker 2003: 20 
 
Early state formation and Frelimo-led state politics played key roles in water affairs and were often 
‘frustrated’ and sometimes aided by water. With Frelimo’s affection for high-modernism and big 
infrastructure, combined with an increasingly authoritarian approach (cf. Scott 1998), this territorial 
logic in many ways resembled that of the colonial ruler. But Frelimo’s outspoken and ‘politicised’ 
emphasis on social equity and universal provision simultaneously marked a break with the colonial 
past. Neither was growth to be achieved through capitalist means, as was common in colonial 
Mozambique. Except perhaps for Frelimo’s authoritarian tendencies, which were largely condoned, this 
kind of territorial logic was by and large in line with the hydrosocial imaginaries of Dutch state agents 
and EMS. They, too, attributed a key role for the state in water affairs. 
 
A capitalistic logic of liquid power was not strongly present, but neither was it suppressed altogether. 
Frelimo’s pragmatic socialist course did allow for commercial investment to occur, provided the 
benefits were shared equally between the parties involved (Hanlon 1994). This thus opened up space 
for deploying a familiar Dutch water aid mechanism that was still common practice despite its 
contested nature: bringing in Dutch engineering companies through tied aid. The Dutch engineering 
companies DHV and Nedeco thus became involved in designing ‘master plans’ on drainage in Maputo 
and port rehabilitation in Mozambique’s second largest city of Beira respectively (GON 1984). Yet this 
was nothing like the capitalistic logic that would later emerge, with its seeds being planted during a 
raging civil war. 
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 See also Notitie no. 91, archief BuZa, DGIS/SC, inv.no. 41 in Dierikx et al. (2009). 
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3.4 Transition to capitalism and expansion of aid in times of war (1983~1992) 
 
Mozambique experienced a civil war that lasted roughly sixteen years, from the first attacks by Renamo 
in 1976 to peace in 1992. This means that Mozambique, after the independence war, was pulled 
almost directly into the next war. However, the intensity of the civil war varied over time and space. 
Until the early 1980s, the greater part of the country and population were still largely unaffected by it. 
This gave Frelimo space to put its socialist plans into practice, but precisely these plans (e.g. 
modernising the countryside by building infrastructure, schools, health centres, etc.) and the plans’ key 
agents and recipients (e.g. local Frelimo leaders, teachers, nurses, cooperantes, rural people) became 
the principal targets of destruction and often extreme violence by Renamo. From the early 1980s the 
war extended over the entire territory of Mozambique, with Renamo troops moving around in rural 
areas, and Frelimo forces controlling the urban areas while combating Renamo, with very mixed results 
(Hall and Young 1997: 138). Negotiations between Frelimo and the guerrilla movement-turned-
political party Renamo started early 1990s, and culminated in a peace accord in 1992 under the 
auspices of a UN peace mission. About a million people had died by then, another two million had fled 
their homesteads, many more were permanently disabled and/or traumatised and the country’s 
infrastructure was largely destroyed.  
 
This section examines two events that occurred during this war, which had a deep and long-lasting 
impact on Mozambique’s political economy and waterscape. One is a rapid expansion of Western aid, 
another the implementation of the first Structural Adjustment Plan (SAP). These ushered in a troubled 
transition to capitalism and, I argue, opened up space for a (novel) capitalistic logic of liquid power to 
prosper in the Mozambican waterscape and the bilateral relationship alike. 
 
The Frelimo-led Government of Mozambique (GOM) opened the country’s doors for Western aid, and 
embarked on a SAP, after a toxic combination of its own errors and adverse ‘external’ conditions had 
brought the country on its knees. By the mid-1980s, Frelimo realised the major shortcomings of its 
excessive centralised development approach and started redressing these. The war had already 
expanded by then, however, and on top of this, floods and droughts occurred with devastating impact 
on agricultural outputs. It had also reached a debt level whose payment obligations it could no longer 
fulfil. It desperately needed food- and other emergency aid as well as foreign currency. The Dutch 
state and other donors were willing to provide such aid, on the condition that Mozambique 
cooperated with the BWI’s and embarked on a SAP (GON 1992: 614). Being in such a critical position, 
Frelimo knew it could not sustain its critical approach towards aid (conditionality). Mozambique thus 
became a member of the World Bank (WB) and the IMF in 1984 and began designing a SAP, known as 
the Programme of Economic Rehabilitation (PRE). By the PRE came into effect in 1987, Samora Machel 
had died and Joaquim Chissano had taken over as president. Chissano led Frelimo into a path of 
abandoning socialism and embracing Western ideals, with Mozambique reaching peace in 1992 
formally as a ‘multi-party democracy’ and a capitalist market economy. 
 
Chissano propagated the PRE to be in line with conditions of these BWI’s, while meeting its own 
slimmed-down socialist philosophy and goals. However, according to Hall and Young (1997: 198-199), 
the PRE and other SAPs that would follow “...involved the massive subordination of the Mozambican 
state (...) and the wholesale handover of the economy to international agencies”. Indeed, these fairly 
well reflected Naim’s (1999) depiction of SAPs as a ‘shock therapy’, in which as many neoliberal 
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reforms associated with the Washington Consensus got adopted as was possible in the shortest period 
of time.
53
 They involved, among other, the biggest privatisation program in Sub-Sahara Africa
54
, one 
that Cramer (2001) calls “hasty and careless”. While the SAP had some immediate stabilising effects in 
the economy, the ‘upsurge’ of the market contradicted with growing poverty, noted one Dutch state 
document (GON 1992: 614). The number of people with access to the most essential goods such as 
water declined, mostly because subsidies were radically cut, state budgets capped and prices were 
rising. But instead of abandoning radical neoliberal reforms, which were considered necessary 
medicines to swallow by the BWI’s, such ‘by-effects’ were ameliorated by another WB program, called 
the “social dimensions of structural adjustments”. Like most Western donors, the Dutch state was 
deeply involved in both stimulating structural adjustment in Mozambique in return for balance-of-
payments and import assistance, while softening its hard edges by co-funding the social dimensions 
project (ibid).  
 
Regarding the expansion of aid, the Dutch state was one among a few Western donors in 
Mozambique in 1980 and the EMS was one of only seven ‘NGOs’.
55
 Five years later, many more donor 
countries and some 70 NGOs had become active in Mozambique, and in 1990 around 180 NGOs 
(Hanlon 1991: 64; Alden 2001: 94). Along with this came profound qualitative changes of foreign aid. 
The new aid agents were all in their own way bestowed with “the will to improve” (Li 2007), had aid 
money to spend, and results to report home. The Mozambican state lacked the experience and 
capacity to ensure a proper guiding of this massive (emergency and ‘regular’) aid inflow. As Wuyts 
(1995) argued, this not only led to aid dependency, it also severely complicated the ‘governance’ of the 
country. NGOs and donors generally delivered aid in projects, while the SAP introduced the 
phenomenon of ‘programme aid’. The latter pursued macro-economic changes on a national scale and 
was broad and all-encompassing. Projects were more focused and specific, often had different agents 
involved at different levels, working with different counterparts. Rather than the two complementing 
each other, this aid totality led to short-termism, Wuyts argues, and a sharp increase of donor 
influence (ibid).   
 
Meanwhile, the intensifying civil war in the late 1980s led to a sharp division in the geography of 
(water) aid. Most of the aid was delivered to, or aid work carried out in, Frelimo-controlled areas, which 
were mostly (peri)urban areas. Little of that aid reached the rural areas and people controlled or 
threatened by Renamo.
56
 Dutch (water) aid also continued during this war. Dutch experts continued 
working for DNA and other public water entities in Frelimo-controlled areas.
57
 Dutch financial aid only 
increased, notably food- and other types of emergency aid (such as aid delivered after floods), next to 
the mentioned macro-economic support. The (still socialist) EMS gradually lost its privileged position 
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now that Frelimo transitioned to capitalism and after numerous ‘mainstream’ NGOs, including some 
Dutch ones, had joined the EMS. The Dutch state took over the hitherto central position of the EMS in 
the bilateral aid relationship and became the key social relation along with its Mozambican 
counterpart. While the relationship had a relatively small and simple structure, with a territorial logic of 
liquid power as outlined above still dominant, a novel capitalistic logic of liquid power was emerging 
and rising in strength. This was one rooted in the upcoming neoliberal political ideology. 
 
3.5 Transforming the Mozambican waterscape in times of peace (1992~2010) 
 
The 1990s and 2000s were path-shaping for the Mozambican political economy, waterscape and the 
bilateral water aid relationship in multiple respects. At the same time, however, certain tendencies and 
powers that had entrenched in the Mozambican political (economic) system after independence 
continued to be strong in the transition to capitalism. In her study on the politics of privatisation in 
Mozambique, Pitcher (2002: 239) calls this a process of “transformative preservation”, that is, “...a 
dynamic but contradictory process of blending rupture with replication, of joining discontinuity to 
continuity” (ibid). This section examines this simultaneous reproduction and transformation of 
hydrosocial and political economic structures in Mozambique (i.e. in subsections 3.5.1 and 3.5.2), and 
how the bilateral water aid relationship developed in relation to these (3.5.3). The section ends by 
arguing that the rise of the novel capitalistic logic of liquid power in the bilateral relationship did not 
wither or fundamentally change the dominant territorial logic of liquid power of old, but rather 
became established alongside it (3.5.4).   
 
3.5.1 A new water architecture : formal design and legislation 
 
Swatuk (2005) examined the emergence of a ‘new water architecture’ in Southern Africa in the 1990s 
and 2000s. He argued that this architecture was driven by national reforms, novel water management 
ideas and frameworks in global networks, and changing hydrosocial conditions (ibid). In particular the 
preoccupation of governments and donors with water privatisation was strong in what McDonald and 
Ruiters (2005) call the “age of commodity”. Mozambique formed no exception to this; the 1990s saw 
the design, formal adoption and attempted institutionalisation of new water legislation (laws, policies, 
decrees, rules), public water entities, governance arrangements and management ideas and 
frameworks, including privatisation. This new architecture was erected prior to and after peace in 1992, 
meant to transform a waterscape ruined by war. This subsection briefly lists the key elements of this 
water architecture. 
 
In a nutshell, the chain of new water legislation and entities in the 1990s started with the Water Law 
adopted in 1991 (GOM 1991). This is a generic piece of legislation, and still the foundational one for 
water in Mozambique. It incorporates fashions of the time and created new entities, such as integrated 
and decentralised Water Resources Management (WRM) to be carried out by regional water 
administrations (called ARAs
58
) at the basin level. The next milestone, the National Water Policy of 
1995, had an emphasis on water supply and also included alleged ‘best practices’, such as recognising 
the ‘economic value of water’, reducing the role of the state to setting priorities, regulating and 
overseeing investments, and elevating the role of the ‘dynamic’ private sector (GOM 1995: 147). The 
national water policy was followed by various decrees on specific issues. One notable decree set up the 
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Delegated Management Framework (DMF), which separated ownership of and investment in urban 
water supply infrastructure from operations (GOM 1998a). Within the context of this DMF, a water 
regulator (CRA) and a public water asset company called FIPAG were created (GOM 1998b; 1998c). 
Thus, the formal structure that emerged envisaged a decentralised WRM at the basin level carried out 
by ARAs and an outsourced and regulated water supply in urban areas. Rural water supply continued 
to be managed by DNA based on a ‘Demand Responsive Approach’ (DRA) adopted in 1997, with 
increased participation of the private sector (GON and UNICEF 2006: 24; on the DRA, see Moriarty et 
al. 2013). DNA’s role was otherwise limited to policy-making and steering the new water architecture.  
 
The legislation underpinning this basic and formal water architecture was updated and extended in the 
following decades. The Water Policy was updated in 2007 and in 2016 to account for the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) respectively (GOM 2007; 
2016). The DMF’s juridical area was extended in 2009 to account for water supply and sanitation in 
small towns next to primary cities (GOM 2009a). This involved the creation of another public water and 
sanitation asset company similar to FIPAG, called AIAS, and the extension of regulatory power of CRA 
(GOM 2009b; 2009a). The DMF will be discussed in much more detail in the chapters to follow.  
 
These formal-legal legislations and entities that combined make up the new architecture receive much 
attention by Mozambican water professionals, aid actors and researchers alike. At the same time, 
interviewees indicated that the actually existing waterscape deviates in many respects from this formal 
architecture. The disjuncture between the formal-legal properties of the new water architecture and 
the actually existing waterscape is arguably best noticeable in the desired and persistent, but troubled 
application of market mechanisms to water supply. Indeed, this constitutes an important empirical 
entry point for envisioning and making sense of the contradictions I explore in this chapter and the 
next ones. As Cleaver and Franks (2005) argue, architecture is about design and institutions partly 
elude design; they are shaped not just according to design principles, but also and especially by 
broader structural forces, power struggles and contextual conditions. The next subsection briefly 
touches upon some generic ‘structural forces’ related to political economy in Mozambique that will 
help explain concrete instances of this disjuncture in the next chapters.  
 
3.5.2 Water architecture’s eluding design: politics and power relations 
 
In this subsection, I discuss three types of processes that help explain the disjuncture between formal 
design and representation of the new water architecture, and its actual manifestation ‘on the ground’ . 
These are processes pertaining to the political economy in Mozambique, foreign aid and the 
nonhuman environment.  
 
Regarding political economy, I find it helpful to use Pitcher’s argument on ‘transformative preservation’ 
(2002: 239). Thus, while many formal-legal aspects of the architecture are indeed new to Mozambique, 
tendencies that have rooted in the ‘socialist era’ have remained strong. I contend that two such 
tendencies are particularly relevant for the analyses in this thesis. Firstly, the tendency to maintain a 
highly centralised and hierarchical approach to water affairs and secondly, the tendency to preserve 
(more or less) tight relations between the Mozambican state and the ruling political party Frelimo. 
These have a causal relationship, I argue, with the first serving as a mechanism to keep relations 




Regarding party–state relations, these have always been tight, but the degree of tightness varied over 
time. Under president Machel (1975–1986), the state and party had virtually merged, with party politics 
presiding over the state technocracy. Chissano (1987–2004) loosened these relations and relied more 
on a technocratic approach (and state and non-state/foreign technocrats) to design and carry out the 
extensive (neoliberal) reform program in the economy, politics and state bureaucracy, but without 
compromising party interests (Macuane et al. 2017: 9-14). Chissano’s successor was Armando 
Guebuza, who served as president from 2005 to 2015. Macuane et al. (ibid) argue that he “...revitalised 
the party structures from the grassroots to the highest levels of state and parastatal companies”, 
promoted “party membership as a condition for access to public office” (ibid: 14) and increasingly held 
“those holding state positions accountable to the party” (ibid: 16).  
 
Two key interests have shaped these party-state relations, with considerable effect on the functioning 
of the (water) state apparatus. The first is political and refers to what Macuane et al. (2017) call the 
‘ideology of national unity’. As liberator of the country, Frelimo considers itself the only legitimate and 
most competent agent for shaping a unified nation-state in a country with a heterogeneous 
population (Funada-Classen 2012; Coelho 2013). This idea and associated claims to power pre-
eminently shapes political decision-making, in particular vis-à-vis the main opposition party and 
enemy of old, Renamo, and especially since general elections are held every five years. Important 
policy themes and reforms, also in the water sector, cannot simply be understood without taking this 
consideration into account. The theme of decentralisation illustrates this well. Chissano embarked on a 
course of substantial political decentralisation before the first general elections in 1994, confident it 
would not affect Frelimo’s monopoly to state power. When Renamo won almost as many seats in 
parliament as Frelimo, it immediately reconsidered and adapted this process (Orre and Rønning 2017: 
35). This incidence would turn into a structural tendency, with Frelimo willing to decentralise only 
insofar it does not jeopardise its own power position and mechanisms of control (Weimer and Carrilho 
2017). Whether decentralisation or other political processes and incidents, Frelimo is (in)famous for 





The second is primarily an economic interest. It relates to capitalist class formation and the associated 
private accumulation of wealth and social power. Castel-Branco (2014) argues that the era of structural 
adjustment and the period thereafter has involved a two-stage ‘expropriation’ of the state, which went 
hand in hand with the formation of national capitalist classes in Mozambique. The large-scale, heavily 
subsidised privatisation of state assets that was part of the SAPs was the first instance which triggered 
capitalist class formation and provided major new opportunities for personal accumulation (ibid; 
Cramer 2001). Coupled with a relaxation of party politics and control over the state and economy 
under Chissano, and a laissez-faire of the renowned party discipline and anti-corruption attitude 
propagated by his predecessor Samora Machel, an extensive system of rent distribution developed. 
Although Chissano’s successor Guebuza positioned himself as a fighter against corruption that had 
soared under Chissano, he tightened control of the party over the state and the main economic pillars 
precisely to tighten grip over the production and distribution of rents. These rents derive mainly from 
an economy that has become one-sidedly focused on the extraction of natural resources such as coal 
                                                          
59
 Despite different and even opposing factions that have made up Frelimo since its inception, and whom have 
frequently disputed over the party’s course and hence, over that of the country and state.  
61 
 
and gas. This ‘extractive economy’ has attracted large flows of foreign Direct Investments (FDI) to 
Mozambique. In a second wave of expropriation, Castel-Branco (2014) argues, members of these 
classes have become the key mediators between national and foreign capital for arranging FDI, making 
abundant use of the state apparatus (Macuane et al. 2017). This explains the highly unequal 
distribution of wealth in the Mozambican society, despite consistent economic growth since the mid-
1990s. It has also greatly narrowed down the space for public investments, Castel-Branco (2014) 
argues. 
 
These political economic interests, and agents attempting to safeguard these, extensively shape the 
social relations that constitute the Mozambican state (Sumich 2010; Sabaratnam 2017). They have a 
deep impact on the functioning of state entities and what they (can and cannot) do, and therefore also 
shape the politics of designing and implementing sector-specific governance/management 
frameworks, including those pertaining to water. From the (continued) use of water as a political 
instrument or as a potential source of rent; these are related behaviours that undermine any ‘rational’ 
water process or design. Many higher- and lower level actors inside that same state and party 




If state and non-state agents related to (certain factions in) Frelimo have eluded the design of the 
water architecture, then so have (changing) agendas, agents and tendencies of foreign aid—even if 
most of that architecture is de facto imported through aid. Aid dependency has become particularly 
deep in the Mozambican waterscape and not a single piece of the water architecture and associated 
legislation has been designed or implemented without extensive donor input. While this opened up 
windows of change in the sector and opportunities for individuals, it also created novel problems, 
including an aid next to state bureaucracy, water aid fragmentation and a strong tendency to “produce 
success” out of projects and experiments that have in fact been deeply problematic (Mosse 2004: 
645).
61
 The strategy of producing success is also noticeable at the national level, with many donors 
having long portrayed Mozambique as a successful aid-driven country. This claim was inter alia based 
on high rates of economic growth and a sustained period of relative peace and democratic space. Yet, 
a growing inequality, massive private accumulation, enduring poverty and more such structural 




Lastly, as in the past, these political economic and aid processes have ‘metabolised’ with adverse 
hydrological events, which further undermined the water architecture’s implementation. The floods of 
2000 in the Limpopo basin in southern Mozambique is but one example hereof. These were the worst 
floods in 150 years, according to Christie and Hanlon (2001), with devastating impact on people and 
things. One insider told me they used these catastrophic events to raise political awareness for water 
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 Joseph Hanlon is arguably the most outspoken on this issue; he calls this the “myth of the Mozambican success 
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 Interview employee MPOPHR, 18 November 2016. 
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In all, and to paraphrase Li (1999: 316), the new water architecture has been a ‘terrain of liquid power 
struggle’ between established and novel agents who operate in a political economic and hydrosocial 
context that had profoundly changed, but had also stayed the same in certain respects. How the 
Mozambican-Dutch water aid relationship developed in view of this broader context, is the topic of the 
next subsection.  
 
3.5.3 The bilateral water aid relationship’s expanding and changing structure 
 
In the post-civil war period, this section posits, the bilateral relationship’s structure expanded rapidly in 
terms of water aid volume and actors involved. It also saw some important, long lasting qualitative 
changes in approaches to water aid.   
 
After peace in 1992, the Dutch state quickly grew into the biggest bilateral donor in the Mozambican 
water sector in terms of aid volume (Van Woersem et al. 2007). After a visit by the Dutch Minister of 
Development Cooperation to Mozambique in 1994, the bilateral relationship was formally given a 
structural rather than temporary character
64
 and water aid to Mozambique received a boost after a 
period of decline during the last years of the civil war (GON 1995a). This coincided with a 
reorganisation of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs (BZ) in 1995, which involved the 
decentralisation of power from The Hague to the embassies. Embassies, including one established in 
Mozambique, became much more autonomous in agenda-setting and received more budget and 
personnel (GON 1995b; Hoebink 2010). By that time, quite a number of Dutch water professionals had 
already accumulated substantial knowledge on water affairs in Mozambique and had built a degree of 
authority in this domain. They had been particularly active in training Mozambicans as water 
technicians, many of whom would sooner or later assume management and leadership positions in the 
sector.
65
 Tight, trust-based relations between Dutch and Mozambican water actors had therefore 
developed and also on a political level relations had tightened.
66
 These processes combined had given 
Dutch aid agents a strategic position, and rendered them influential, in water decision-making 
processes in Mozambique (Alba and Bolding 2016).  
 
They were also therefore key agents in designing and implementing (parts of) the water architecture.
67
 
To name a few examples; the 1991 Water Law was made with input from Dutch actors and I was told 
that the ARAs therein conceived were inspired by Dutch water boards.
68
 A major project was set up to 
provide institutional support by DGIS experts to the first of five ARA’s that became operational, ARA-
Sul. Other ARA’s started to receive support by Dutch water boards later on. Were most studies 
previously carried out by the Dutch focused on surface water, a new focus on groundwater in the early 
1990s brought in the Dutch engineering company IWACO to carry out a big groundwater study.
69
 This 
also established the Dutch more prominently in the domain of water supply, where it had hitherto 
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 Interview former director DNA, 13 February 2017; interview former director DNA, 28 February 2017.  
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 Interview water consultant, 8 August 2016. 
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 Interview (former) Dutch water expert, 15 November 2016. This led to frictions between the ‘surface- and 
groundwater guys’, this expert said. 
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mostly focused on WRM.
70
 Another Dutch engineering company, DHV, carried out a comprehensive 
study together with a Mozambican consultancy, Consultec. They assessed the performance of water 
supply companies in the twelve provincial capitals, also in the early 1990s (DHV and Consultec 1995). 
This study formed a prelude to two large World Bank projects that started in the late 1990s, among 
other aimed at operationalising the DMF and preparing for water privatisation (WB 1998; 1999). The 
Dutch state actively supported these WB projects and co-financed the second which had set up the 
public water supply entity FIPAG. In 2004, the Dutch NGO Vitens-Evides international (VEI) became 
directly involved in the DMF by partnering up with FIPAG. This partnership was later (in 2013) extended 
to include support to AIAS.  
 
On a decentralised level, the Dutch embassy started a large rural development program in the 
province of Nampula in 1998, which involved subprojects in various sectors, including water. This 
support to the province was pledged for fifteen years, but was abruptly terminated after two years to 
make place for the new development fad: the Sector Wide Approach (SWAp). Indeed, SWAps were 
introduced in Mozambique and other partner countries as a “short, sharp shock”, concluded the aid 
Policy and Operations Evaluation Department in 2006 (IOB 2006: 37). A SWAp was introduced in the 
water sector by the Dutch embassy in 2002, implemented through multi-year programs called ASAS
71
. 
These ASAS programs entailed budget support to DNA. Although the idea was to have other donors 
join this SWAp, no one did, and the Dutch state has ever since remained the only donor involved. It 
proved to be a strategic instrument that brought Dutch state actors close to high-level Mozambican 
water bureaucrats. Despite this move to programme aid, aid projects very much continued, including 
at decentralised levels, with the GON partnering with UNICEF in the so-called “One Million Initiative”. 
This was the largest rural water programme in Mozambique when it started in 2007, has put strong 
emphasis on private sector involvement (IOB and UNICEF 2011: 50) and has been important in setting 




While this non-exhaustive overview provides an idea of Dutch involvement across the Mozambican 
waterscape and anticipated architecture, it also indicates a changing structure underpinning the 
Mozambican–Dutch water aid relationship. In line with the distinction made by Wuyts (1995), Dutch 
agents had become closely involved on a ‘programme level’ besides participating in projects, with the 
former pointing at decision-making (governance) processes at the level of the water sector as a whole 
and the latter at concrete activities in WRM or water supply. Projects by DGIS were abandoned and 
outsourced, and personnel from Dutch NGOs and consultancy companies gradually replaced DGIS 
water experts and cooperantes. As mentioned, the Dutch state assumed the central position of the 
EMS in the bilateral relationship, which was substantiated by the establishment of an embassy that 
made local representation of the Dutch state much stronger.
73
 This embassy was growing steadily in 
the 1990s and 2000s, and water became the embassy’s largest policy section, with a budget of around 
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€15mn. out of a total of €62mn. in 2010 (IOB 2012a: 51). In addition, more funding channels for water 




In all, the structure expanded and diversified in terms of budget/funding mechanisms, agents from 
both sides, projects and water topics. Particularly striking is the more or less subtle change from a 
state-led to a market-based approach to water aid, noticeable across the activities carried out as part 
of the bilateral relationship. The next subsection explains this change as instigated by a rising 
capitalistic logic of liquid power in the bilateral relationship, and in broader contexts in which this 
relationship is embedded. 
 
3.5.4 The rise of the capitalistic logic of liquid power in a context of neoliberal globalisation  
 
This subsection suggests that the capitalistic logic of liquid power could grow (and grew) more 
powerful in the bilateral relationship, due to this relationship being embedded in political economic 
and hydrosocial contexts that globalised and integrated in tandem with the rise of neoliberalism from 
the 1990s onwards. This logic did not, however, become all-powerful. Rather, it established as another 
major force next to the hitherto dominant territorial logic of liquid power.      
 
The most proximate context, with arguably the most direct influence on the relationship, is the 
Mozambican political economy and waterscape. The structural changes in these domains discussed 
above indeed created space for the capitalistic logic to prosper. However, this was not an automatic 
process, as the Dutch government (GON) was initially ambiguous about some structural changes in 
Mozambique. On the one hand, the GON moved along with the neoliberal reforms applied to water, 
driven as they were by the WB that had grown into the most powerful (water) aid agent in the 1990s. 
Dutch state agents thus operated within the neoliberal ‘parameters’ introduced and pushed most 
decisively by the WB and they supported specific neoliberal projects. On the other hand, the bilateral 
relationship was already historically anchored, and mutual relations were already structured in 
particular ways since independence, unlike many other bilateral relationships. Dutch water (aid) actors 
were strongly connected with their Mozambican public counterparts and together they had worked in 
an environment in which a territorial logic reigned. The hostile attitude that the WB espoused towards 
this territorial logic was therefore not shared by Dutch agents, but still exerted considerable influence 
in the bilateral relations. The SWAp that the Dutch state launched exemplifies this ambiguous attitude. 
It was set up to support broader state reforms in line with the BWI’s neoliberal Poverty Reduction 
Strategy Papers. But through the SWAp, the Dutch state committed itself to long-term and intensive 
cooperation with DNA, the central state water entity that the WB and other donors distrusted.  
 
Notwithstanding this ambiguous attitude, the neoliberal ideology was progressively embraced in the 
Dutch political economy and state. This gradually impacted the way Dutch ministers and state actors 
approached Dutch (water) aid and ways of working within DGIS/ BZ. A number of marketisation 
techniques, examined in the next chapter, have been introduced and increasingly applied to Dutch aid 
from the 1990s. This rising influence of neoliberal thought in Dutch aid went hand in hand with a 
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greater emphasis placed on water within Dutch aid from the late 1990s and later also within the Dutch 
economy at large. Water had always been part and parcel of Dutch aid, as discussed in section 3.1, but 
it had long been treated as a subtheme of broader agendas, such as the tied aid strategy or the 
poverty reduction agenda. Only in the late 1980s, a first aid policy document appeared specifically 
dedicated to water (GON 1989; IOB 2000). Water received a modest boost in the 1990s, but still as part 
of ‘the environment’ that became a cornerstone in Dutch aid (GON 1990).  
 
What really made water rise to prominence were major events and new water actors in the late 1990s 
and early 2000s. One such event was the second World Water Forum (WWF) in The Hague in 2000. 
This conference was well-attended and well-received, and it profiled the Netherlands globally with 
regard to water (Luchtenbelt 2015). Among the key organising actors was the Netherlands Water 
Partnership (NWP), which was established by state and non-state agents a year before the conference 
(GON 1999). The NWP is a network organisation with public, private and non-profit organisations from 
across the Dutch water sector as members. Its aim has been to unite an alleged fragmented Dutch 
water sector (DWS), aimed at a more effective profiling and positioning of the DWS abroad (ibid; Gast 
2008). The 2000 WWF conference itself led to the establishment within DGIS of a ‘Water Unit’. This unit 
has explicitly focused on water and development, the role of the Netherlands therein and the relation 
with the (water-related) Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), adopted by the UN in 2000 (Heun et 
al. 2003).
75
 The current king, then still prince royal, of the Netherlands had also assumed roles in 
national and international water governance frameworks, adding to water’s awareness in Dutch 
society.
76
 Lastly, several Dutch ministries strengthened their cooperation and produced a more 
coherent line in their international water policies. This inter alia led to ‘Partners for Water’, a funding 
scheme that has financed water aid projects and activities in countries like Mozambique (Gast 2008).   
 
This attention paid to water nationally reflected a similar trend on a global scale. Biswas (2004: 81) 
argues that water had “disappeared from the international agenda during the 1980s and 1990s” after 
the first water mega-conference in Mar del Plata, Argentina, in 1977.
77
 Only in the late 1990s did water 
reappear as a major theme, with the establishment of new global water institutions such as the World 
Water Council (WWC) and the Global Water Partnership (GWP), and the start of another series of 
global water conferences. This is not to say that water received no global attention in between, but this 
was not (nearly) as large as at the Mar del Plata conference.
78
 All this points at the growth and a 
growing significance, from the 1990s onwards, of so-called global water governance frameworks and 
networks. Combined, these have come to constitute a major terrain of liquid power struggle at the 
global scale in which new and established agents battle over the question how water (crises) ought to 
be imagined and managed (Goldman 2007; Mollinga 2008a; 2008b). In many and the most powerful of 
these frameworks and networks, a neoliberal perspective on water became dominant (Goldman 
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Principles (GON 2004: 12). 
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2007)—something water shared with other socionatures (ibid.; MacDonald 2010; Duffy and Moore 
2010; Neimark et al. 2016). 
 
This emerging global context, I argue, has become an increasingly important point of orientation for 
Dutch state and non-state agents since the late 1990s. These agents have become actively involved in 
many of these global platforms, and such platforms have in turn shaped the ways in which they 
conceptualise and approach water (aid). This, together with a growing and more integrated world 
market for water services and products, spurred the capitalistic logic of liquid power in Dutch water 
aid.  
 
In all, in the period under review in this section, a capitalistic logic of liquid power gradually gained 
strength in an expanding bilateral water aid relationship, triggered by hydrosocial and political 
economic changes in Mozambique, the Netherlands and globally. However, while this logic had 
increasingly framed the imagination and design of water institutions and (aid) projects in Mozambique, 
it co-evolved with an influential territorial logic of liquid power still predominantly characterised by 
extensive state involvement in water affairs. This process, of a capitalistic logic co-evolving with a 
territorial logic, very much continued into the next period.  
  
3.6 The (water) aid and trade period (2010s) 
 
This section focuses on the introduction of the aid and trade agenda in a context of crisis and austerity 
in the Netherlands and discusses the repercussions for the bilateral water aid relations. I argue that this 
agenda emerged from, and itself sustains and fuels, an already strong capitalistic logic of (liquid) 
power, but that this logic is also countervailed. This section starts with briefly outlining the context of 
aid and political economy in Mozambique prior to introduction of the aid and trade agenda, as it helps 
explain and understand the selection of Mozambique as a partner country in the aid and trade agenda 
discussed thereafter. 
 
3.6.1 Mozambique’s ‘resource frenzy‘ 
 
By 2010, Mozambique had become one of the most aid-dependent countries in the world, with the 
volume of aid in that year amounting to $2bn. A large share of it (up to half this amount) was being 
dispensed in the form of central budget support, which gave the donor group providing this 
considerable negotiating power and policy influence (Hanlon 2014). Aid dependency in the water 
sector has been higher still, with aid covering an average of 80% of all expenditures in the water supply 
and sanitation sector (UNICEF 2016: 17).
79
 The resultant donor–government/state relations are deeply 
political and involve at least as much frustration as ‘partnership cooperation’ (Hanlon 2014). Numerous 
donors and NGOs kept on offering, and Mozambique continued welcoming, aid since the late 1980s. It 
earned Mozambique the dubious nickname ‘donor darling’, all the while deepening and perpetuating 
these relations. This started to change by the late 2000s, albeit slowly, with donors increasingly 
frustrated by continued (allegations of) corruption and the lack of progress in domains such as ‘good 
governance’. Some donors responded by reducing aid and it even led to a short-lived aid moratorium 
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in 2009. The Dutch state was one of the first to pull out of the donor budget support group in 2013 




However, donors ending budget support and a change in government–donor relations were also 
driven by other national and global political economic/ecological events. The most notable event was 
the discovery of huge reserves of natural gas and coal in Mozambique in the late 2000s. According to 
Hanlon (ibid: 121), this led to a ‘resource frenzy’ in the country, “changing both government and donor 
attitudes”.
81
 Indeed, it provided the Guebuza-led government a strategic asset with which to confront 
and change its power relation with donors. In the early 2010s, the GOM started disregarding donor 
demands which led to a reduction in aid, but it partly compensated for this loss by increasing its own 
share to state expenditures (including water), made possible by raising its tax income. Donors, on their 
part, increasingly reflected on how they and companies they represented could become involved in 
the anticipated exploitation of gas and associated economic spin-off. Among these donors was the 
Dutch state that sought to change its relation with Mozambique from one based mainly on aid into 
one based predominantly on trade. This change was triggered by subsequent aid and trade agendas 
that the Dutch state adopted in the early 2010s. 
 
3.6.2 Adopting the Dutch (water) aid and trade agenda in a crisis context 
 
This subsection provides a background to the Dutch ‘aid, trade and investment’ agenda (GON 2013a) 
and a similar aid and trade agenda that preceded it (GON 2011a). The adoption of these aid and trade 
agendas should be considered in the context of the global financial crisis that broke out in 2007 and 
which lasted roughly to 2016 in the Netherlands. This crisis had hit the Dutch political economy and 
society particularly hard compared to many others, not least due to the large size of the Dutch 
financial sector relative to its economy (Engelen et al. 2010; Engelen 2017). The effectiveness and 
legitimacy of Dutch aid, already under increasing pressure since the mid-2000s (IOB 2012b: 61), was 
called into question by right-wing and nationalist parties who were in the ascendance post-crisis.
82
 
With the liberal party VVD winning two post-crises elections, in 2010 and 2012, and forming the 
coalition government with other parties, the crisis got tackled by a familiar medicine: austerity. The two 
governments led by the VVD embarked on austerity programs totalling some €52bn (Engelen 2017: 
66). These programs included significant tax increases and budget cuts in domains such as social 
security, health care and indeed, aid (Oxfam 2013).
83
 This deflationary policy went hand in hand with 
other programs aimed at restoring the competitiveness and growth of the Dutch economy, including 
innovation and export-stimulating programs.    
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The crisis context, I argue, provided momentum to reform Dutch water aid and better align it with the 
neoliberal hegemonic through the aid and trade agendas. The first post-crisis government (2010-2012) 
laid out the principles for a desired shift from aid to trade (GON 2011a). The succeeding government 
(2013-2017) adopted and reinforced these principles in the aforementioned ‘aid, trade and investment’ 
agenda (GON 2013a). This basically implied reinstating economic growth as the main driver of 
development and a shifting focus from social to economic sectors. The market, private sector and 
(private) finance were attributed (even) more importance than before, as these were seen as principal 
vehicles in achieving growth. The number of partner countries was reduced from 33 to 15. Relations 
with these countries were divided into two categories: an aid relationship and a transitional 
relationship based on aid and trade. Between the remaining fifteen partner countries and the 
Netherlands, the Dutch state expected ‘reciprocity’. Thus, in return for Dutch aid are obligations for 
partner countries, with Dutch commercial interests in and through aid—or ‘enlightened self-interest’—
once more becoming explicit goals. The agenda stated: ‘we fight extreme poverty out of solidarity with 
people, [whilst encouraging] trade mainly in our own interest” (GON 2013a: 7). 
 
The number of aid priority sectors in this agenda was limited to four, with water being one of them. 
Under the aid and trade policies, water was reframed as an economic rather than a social sector (GON 
2010). Next to being “relevant for poverty reduction”, water was expected to better serve “the 
Netherlands’ economic and other interests” (GON 2013a: 29). This emphasis on the economic value of 
water in Dutch aid linked up with a more general trend of emphasising the value of water for the 
Dutch economy as a whole. Water was proclaimed one out of nine ‘Top Sectors’, in a state-subsidised 
and innovation-stimulating programme for “the growth markets of tomorrow” (GON 2011b: 3). 
Moreover, an interministerial platform in 2016 launched the International Water Ambition (IWA), which 
profiled the Netherlands as a global water centre of expertise (GON 2016a). Although each of these 
different state projects-cum-accumulation strategies had their own niche, they also partly overlapped 
in terms of ‘target countries’, services and products on offer, and agents involved.
84
 Inside the state, 
the department of Foreign Economic Relations (BEB) was moved from the Ministry of Economic Affairs 
(EZ) to Foreign Affairs (BZ) in support of the shift from aid to trade.
85
 This meant that development 
specialists in DGIS, well-connected with the Dutch aid community, and economists of BEB who are 
predominantly linked to the Dutch private sector, were encouraged to work much more closely 
together.  
  
In all, despite the crisis had clearly indicated the problematic nature of contemporary capitalism,  
neoliberal ideas about development persisted and were even more forcefully applied to Dutch aid. In 
other words, the aid and trade agenda only fuelled a capitalistic logic of (liquid) power that had 
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3.6.3 Aid and trade in Mozambique, and the rise of the primary water aid and trade contradiction     
 
Unlike for instance Tanzania and Zambia, where the GON pulled out as donor altogether (IOB 2016), 
Mozambique was selected as one of the fifteen remaining partner countries. Mozambique’s economic 
prospects as sketched above, and the presence of Dutch organisations in its water sector, were among 
the reasons for Mozambique being selected (GON 2011a: 20). Dutch agents initially assessed it could 
rapidly move from a predominantly aid-based to a trade-based relationship altogether (i.e. within five 
years). Phasing out aid thus became the initial policy line, facilitated by a centralisation of decision-
making power from embassies to BZ bureaucrats in The Hague. This assessment and decision was one 
indication of the vigour with which the aid and trade agenda was promoted by BZ, and how some 
actors got carried away by the resource frenzy in Mozambique.  
 
The embassy’s so-called Multi-Annual Strategic Plans (MASPs) for Mozambique, written in the early 
2010s, clearly reflected this line as well as the opportunism about the foreseeable future in 
Mozambique. Although the MASP for the period 2012 – 2015 (GON 2011c) was still relatively mild in 
its ‘aid to trade’ discourse, an addition to this MASP in January 2013 (GON 2013b) specifically focused 
on ‘economic diplomacy’ and was much more outspoken. It observed that Mozambique “...is 
undergoing a dramatic transformation in its economic structure, which indeed can be named 
‘frightening and exhilarating’”, pointing specifically at the discovery of gas that could allegedly “triple 
Mozambique’s GDP”. The bilateral relations were expected to turn between 2013 and 2015 from “a 
donor-recipient one to a broad based mutually profitable relationship, in line with thinking ‘beyond 
ODA’” (ibid). This economically reductionist and speculative line of reasoning continued in part in the 
MASP 2014 – 2017 (GON 2013c). This document’s opening statement read that “all indications suggest 
that Mozambique will experience major economic growth over the next decade” and that “...Dutch 
firms are well positioned to play a significant role in Mozambique’s development”, but since 
“competition will be fierce”, the RNE
86
 “will continue and expand its activities in economic diplomacy to 
actively support Dutch trade and industry” (ibid: 1).  
 
At the same time, the aid to trade policy line was contested by a number of BZ employees 
knowledgeable on and/or closely involved with Mozambique. To them it was clear that aid could (and 
should) not be phased out in five years, given the still deeply problematic political economic and social 
context in Mozambique. A struggle on the policy line to follow resulted in a revised and milder version 
of this policy line. Mozambique was placed in the broad ‘transitional aid and trade relationship 
category’, meaning it would continue to receive aid whilst growing as a trading partner (GON 2013a: 
27).
87
 Notwithstanding this adapted, aid and trade course, BZ continued pushing to change the 
relationship with Mozambique into a more commercial one.
88
 Dutch companies had to be supported 
in getting business done in Mozambique. While not new, the aid and trade agenda took this 
‘economic diplomacy’ to a higher level, especially in the extractive industries. In response to the gas 
discoveries, Dutch state agents such as the EKN played a very active role in helping Royal Dutch Shell 
obtain a license to operate in the north of Mozambique (Van Beek et al. 2019). Heineken and other 
major and smaller Dutch companies also received extensive support. This emphasis on positioning and 
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attracting the Dutch private sector also applied to water in Mozambique. Even though Dutch state 
agents stated that the “Mozambican water sector is socially and economically underperforming”, they 
assessed that “ample opportunities for sector development and further Dutch (private sector) 
engagement exist” (GON 2013c: 5).  
 
This statement and the other ones from the MASP’s quoted in this section must in part be considered 
rhetoric, written in response to decision-makers’ calls to make the plans more market and business-
oriented (GON 2012). Many actors involved in the bilateral water aid relations whom I spoke or 
listened to considered these statements as displaying a considerable degree of wishful thinking. They 
pointed at official development charts on Mozambique that made clear that Mozambique was not 
going to be transformed in five  years in a “mutually profitable partner”, nor that its growth would be 
“inclusive” (GON 2013b).
89
 Yet, such statements cannot simply be regarded as empty or as having no 
effect. They actually did reflect a broader process or, as I describe it, a logic of (liquid) power at work in 
the very structure of the bilateral relationship. A logic, moreover, that urges agents involved to think 
and act in line with ideas and mechanism pertaining to contemporary capitalism. But I also emphasize 
that this process should not be considered as standing on itself, as something that is unique to the ‘aid 
and trade era’. While the aid and trade agenda did reorganise matters here and there, it merely 
intensified processes that were already set in motion in previous periods.   
 
Nor is the aid and trade agenda unique to the Netherlands or the bilateral relationship. One 
interviewee portrayed the Mozambican context in which the aid and trade agenda had to be carried 
out as a “wild wild west”. This person said that donors and aid agents in Mozambique have always 
been more or less driven by their own interests, which has rendered the aid context in Mozambique 
complicated and problematic. However, he posited that nowadays “...we all have aid and trade 
interests, from Saudi Arabia and China to Western donors” and because all “...are now primarily 
focused on money and economic interests, this [context] has become even more perverse”.
90
 Indeed, 
the Dutch aid and trade agenda(s) and the processes and behaviour it stimulates is not unique. Other 
DAC donors, such as the UK, had adopted similar agendas, argues Mawdsley (2015; 2017a; 2017b). 
According to her, this type of agenda  
 
...is not just deepening the existing poverty reduction-era focus on ‘bottom billion capitalism’ (including 
land titling, markets for the poor, microfinance, supporting Small and Medium Enterprises and so on), 
but extending towards new and expanding goals of large-scale public–private partnerships, donor 
support for major commercial investments, private equity initiatives and deepening financialisation.  
 
Mawdsley 2015: 343 
 
Indeed, this describes the form and ‘content’ of the capitalistic logic, as it has grown powerful from the 
1990s into the aid and trade era, particularly well.  
 
With the capitalistic logic now exerting an ever stronger and more noticeable pressure, it also became 
more obvious how this was countervailed rather than aided by the territorial logic of (liquid) power at 
work in the bilateral relationship and Mozambican waterscape. As already alluded to above, and as will 
be examined in much more detail in the next chapters, the Mozambican GOM and (central) state 
                                                          
89
 Interview Mozambican WB employee, 20 February 2017. 
90
 Interview EKN employee, 27 July 2016. 
71 
 
agencies have continued to play a decisive role in (hydrosocial) development. Sometimes they 
operated in congruence with agents motivated by the capitalistic logic, because it was in their benefit 
to do so or under pressure from powerful agents. Oftentimes, however, their actions thwarted rather 
than advanced the various aid and trade activities and objectives pursued in Mozambique. Also within 
the Dutch state itself, the relationship between the capitalistic and territorial logics of liquid power 
grew problematic. The contested nature and rejection of the policy line to replace aid by trade 
altogether in Mozambique attest to this, but it for instance also became expressed in power struggles 
between (water) representatives of DGIS and BEB who differed in their views of development—with the 
former often departing from use value considerations and the latter from exchange value 
considerations.
91
 Likewise, some critical (water) NGOs contested the aid and trade agenda and its 
underlying business-oriented approach and capitalistic assumptions (Oxfam 2013; Bakker et al. 2017), 
while others embraced it (see e.g. NABC 2017).  
 
In short, there is an influential, but varied territorial logic that tends to negate rather than harmonise 
with or complement the capitalistic logic. This is why I suggest the pursued (water) aid and trade 
course in Mozambique can more fruitfully be approached in terms of a dialectical, contradictory 
relationship. The next chapters substantiate this overarching argument and seek to unpack this 
‘primary’ water aid and trade contradiction. They do so by digging deeper into specific areas of the 
water aid and trade relationship, and how powers associated with, or derivative of, the capitalistic and 




This chapter examined how the territorial and capitalistic logics of liquid power each co-evolved with  
the historical development of the Mozambican-Dutch water aid relationship. It pointed out that in the 
first decade of this relationship from the mid-1970s to the mid-1980s, a territorial logic of liquid power 
dominated, one in which the central state was considered the key driver behind hydrosocial 
development. This territorial logic dominated in and through a broader political economic context in 
which socialist (GOM, EMS), and social-democratic (GON), development visions and objectives 
prevailed. The Frelimo-led GOM not just pursued a hydrosocial vision in which water served social and 
economic aims, it also ‘used’ water for political ends, as a way to keep or attract people into its sphere 
of influence. A capitalistic logic was not rejected, but neither did the socialist environment in 
Mozambique enable this logic to prosper or exert much strength. The mechanism of tied aid, still 
common in Dutch development despite rising criticism, was deployed in Mozambique, but the main 
Dutch aid ‘vehicle’ were experts and volunteers who worked as cooperantes in projects of DGIS or 
EMS.  
 
The contrast with the ‘aid and trade’ period from roughly 2010 onwards was in many ways significant. 
In between these periods, the structure had not only grown in size, it was also qualitatively different. 
The relationship had developed in a broader political economic context that had significantly changed 
due to the rising power of neoliberal and financial capitalism from the late 1980s onwards. 
Consequently, a capitalistic logic of liquid power had become deeply entrenched in the entire structure 
of the bilateral relationship. This had instigated change in terms of discourses, institutions and policies, 
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aid mechanisms and actors. Market discourses had replaced state discourses, cooperantes had been 
replaced by consultants and NGOs, the outsourcing of water (aid) projects had substituted the default 
‘in-house’ project and global water (aid) framework and concepts became increasingly important 
orientation points.  
 
However, from a perspective on development as a historical process of socio-environmental change, 
the aid and trade course followed in Mozambique must neither be considered a sudden, nor a radical 
process of change. This agenda, I posit, fuelled a capitalistic logic that had already grown powerful. It 
consolidated this power more firmly within the structure of the bilateral relationship, which translated 
in a more constrained policy space for Dutch and Mozambican actors implicated in the relationship. In 
other words, the pressure on them to think and act in accordance with this logic had become (much) 
stronger. This process was driven in particular, but not exclusively, by neoliberal and nationalists 
political parties and voices calling for a more effective and more market oriented aid that would better 
serve national economic interests, next to those of partner countries. This agenda produced a sharper 
line of separation between a group of actors within and outside of the Dutch state who welcomed this 
process, and another group that held slightly or radically different views on development. This was 
particularly prevalent in the contestation of the decision to phase out aid altogether in Mozambique, a 
sign that the economic reasoning of one group clashed with that of other actors emphasising extra-
economic conditions.  
 
This ‘fault line’ between capitalistic and territorial logics, to use Archer’s words (1995: 215), became yet 
more apparent in Mozambique itself. Here, the implementation of political economic and hydrosocial 
frameworks and projects, driven by a capitalistic logic, revealed that the Frelimo-led GOM and the 
central state still assumed a major role, with related actors trying to orchestrate and streamline 
processes in line with new political economic agendas and interests. These actors trying to keep 
decision-making power over water affairs centralised, I argue, represents a dominant territorial logic of 
liquid power in the bilateral relationship, one that stands in a particularly uneasy relationship with the 
capitalistic logic of liquid power. The next chapter examines this uneasy relationship in much more 








Chapter 4  
 
 
Water marketisation vis-à-vis  
state and bureaucratic power  
 
 
4.1 Introduction  
 
Some of my Dutch interviewees distinguished between ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’ water (aid). With 
traditional aid, they pointed at state-driven and/or state-financed aid. This is basically aid that counts 
as ODA, which is delivered by ‘official’, mostly public agencies and includes technical assistance (TA), 
concessional grants and loans, and various kinds of goods and resources (OECD 2021). Traditional also 
pointed at the way in which a water sector is organised, referring to the dominance of the state and 
public agencies in governing water affairs. With modern water aid, they pointed at aid based on 
market thinking and mechanisms, driven by private companies next to public agencies and/or in part 
paid for by private finance such as commercial loans. A modern water sector appears to be one in 
which ‘innovative’ (market- and private finance-based) concepts as well as Public-Private Partnerships 
(PPPs) are embraced or have normalised. According to one Dutch embassy (EKN) official, the aid and 
trade agenda pre-eminently reflected 
 
...the realisation that the traditional way of development cooperation has insufficient potential for the 
future. For a long time, the sectoral approach was hot within development cooperation, as well as general 
budget support, which relates to the Paris agenda. This was all about granting the state ownership. 
However, it is clear that this approach has not proved to be the engine behind development of a country. 




A Dutch water aid consultant agreed with this line of thinking, but also observed that the EKN in 
Mozambique still had a long way to go as they 
 
....do not have time and the capacity to work with such [innovative] concepts and therefore, traditional 
aid- and capacity constructions remain the norm. That is a pity, because they could have achieved more if 




He also depicts the water sector of Mozambique as very “traditional-minded, with an emphasis on 
public management” in which a great share of investments goes to “traditional development of the 
sector, that is, to FIPAG and AIAS as well as to the ARAs”.
94
 About FIPAG and AIAS, another consultant 
said that 
 
...if you look at the way those worlds work, how water systems are usually designed, that still reflects a 
very traditional way of thinking, the standard public way of thinking. First, they look for finance, usually at 
one or the other donor. When that is found, a tender is issued for design. Normally, a giant concrete 
system is designed that can last for so many decades. Then another tender is issued for construction and 
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He added that this last step, the outsourcing of water supply to private operators in the case of AIAS, is 
in fact quite innovative, but suggested the entire process could be significantly modernised 
nonetheless.  
 
The gist of these quotes is that both Dutch water aid and the waterscape in Mozambique are still 
traditional-minded and therefore, in need of modernisation. In this chapter, I take these statements as 
entry point and critically interrogate these against the historical background of the bilateral water aid 
relationship sketched in the previous chapter. I investigate the will and attempts to restructure what 
they label as ‘traditional’, namely [1] the public set-up of, and central state and bureaucratic power in, 
the Mozambican waterscape as well as [2] Dutch ODA-based water aid as a means to help transform 
this waterscape. I demonstrate that the latest ‘water aid and trade’ reforms, focused on water 
marketisation, stand in a longer tradition, with various market mechanisms having long ago been 
introduced and embedded in the bilateral relationship and the Mozambican waterscape. Attentive to 
this history, I argue that water marketisation has significantly transformed Dutch water aid and the 
Mozambican waterscape, in various respects, but often not in ways imagined or desired by their 
designers and implementers. I explain this disjuncture by water marketisation being dependent on, but 
standing in a very complicated and contradictory relationship with, state and bureaucratic power 
emanating from both sides of the relationship. 
 
I substantiate this argument in four sections. The first section starts with briefly characterising the 
‘target of change’, namely the state water bureaucracy in Mozambique as it has developed after 
independence and the role of Dutch aid within it. Section 4.2 then examines the ‘force of change’: 
marketisation. I unpack marketisation into three distinct, but related mechanisms that are each 
discussed in this section. I argue that few of these mechanisms have functioned as was originally 
envisaged, which I explain in section 4.3 by a countervailing force at work in the relationship: 
Mozambican and Dutch (aid) bureaucratic power. The conclusion in section 4.4 sums up and relates 
the contradictory relation between water marketisation and bureaucratic power to the primary water 
aid and trade contradiction.  
 
4.2 The target of change: the (Dutch) water (aid) bureaucracy in Mozambique  
 
After independence in 1975, the Frelimo-led GOM faced the tremendous task of building, under very 
challenging conditions, the new state. As outlined in the previous chapter, Frelimo had defined a 
socialist version of the hydraulic mission and its Leninist-Marxist inclination translated into a highly 
centralised and hierarchical water bureaucracy. Not that such a bureaucracy lacked in the colonial 
administration; the Portuguese had in the late colonial period built up a centralised water bureaucracy, 
with different departments overseen by Lisbon that designed and implemented grand hydrosocial 
plans. But since most of the Portuguese had fled the country upon independence, and had left the 
African population virtually uneducated, it was difficult to staff the postcolonial water bureaucracy. The 
few Portuguese who remained, together with a number of educated Mozambicans and foreign 
cooperantes, assumed the task of building it up from the colonial vestiges.  
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Subsection 4.2.1 characterises this water bureaucracy and argues that, despite obvious (ideological) 
differences, it reproduced some essential features of the colonial water bureaucracy, notably a 
centralised, state-led approach to governing water affairs. The Dutch aid bureaucracy, discussed in 
subsection 4.2.2, was small in relation to the volume of aid dispersed. Unable to exercise much 
bureaucratic power, it allowed ample space for water experts and cooperantes to organise and carry 
out their work in Mozambique as they saw fit. Dutch aid concentrated on the biophysical and technical 
aspects of water management carried out through ‘in-house’, loosely coordinated projects. 
 
4.2.1 The postcolonial Mozambican water bureaucracy 
 
After the Third Congress of Frelimo in 1977, the key pillar in the postcolonial water bureaucracy was 
formalised with the establishment of the Direcção Nacional de Águas (DNA), or the National 
Directorate of Water, as part of the Ministry of Public Works and Housing.
96
 DNA emerged from, and 
continued some of the activities of, its colonial predecessor that went by the name of the provincial 
directorate of hydraulic services.
97
 In line with Frelimo’s centralised approach, DNA as the key state 
water agency was charged with the majority of water affairs shortly after its establishment in 1977. As 
one document stated:  
 
...all problems related to water have been centralised. [DNA] is responsible for the drafting of master 
plans, the implementation of projects, the construction of [water] works, the exploration, maintenance 
and conservation of systems, aligning its activities to the guidelines of the National Planning Commission 
and the National Commission for Communal Villages. 
GOM 1978: 6  
   
Except for irrigation, DNA held responsibility for water resources management (WRM), rural water 
supply and it de facto oversaw two nationalised state companies responsible for digging wells and 
supplying water materials (Kop 1984).
98
 Urban water supply fell under the responsibility of municipal 
governing committees, whose members combined political roles in the Frelimo party structure with 
professional duties. As they were deemed unfit for the task, DNA also soon took over this task. DNA 
established urban state water services under supervision of the central state that enjoyed little 
autonomy, and created a unit called UDAAS to coordinate and assist them.
99
 A rural water program 
was set up, called PRONAR, which was administered by DNA and for which ‘provincial workshops’ 
(called EPARs) were created to assist them. Tariffs were set by the central ministry, with the National 
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Price Commission playing a crucial role (DHV and Consultec 1995: 69). During late colonialism, the 
construction and maintenance of water works such as supply systems and dams were done by private 
companies and some cities had private or public-private arrangements in place for water supply. After 
independence, these activities were taken over by the state. Private enterprise was limited to projects 
financed by aid partners, such as the management, maintenance and/or building of dams. 
 
As such, in the socialist period, DNA was ascribed an even bigger role in the Mozambican waterscape 
than its colonial predecessor. Yet, it had only a fraction of the human and nonhuman resources 
available.
100
 DNA’s mandate could therefore be depicted, in the words of Hall and Young (1997), as 
one of those “extremely ambitious programmes of transformation [that] was beyond the ability of the 
Mozambican state to implement, either materially or culturally” (ibid: 80). Moreover, this giant 
mandate was pursued during an expanding civil war. By the end of this war, in 1992, the physical 
waterscape was in a shape not much better than at independence. What had been achieved, such as 
the building of dams or other (waste) water works and water supply activities, were restricted to areas 
controlled by Frelimo, that is, the cities and various spatial pockets of strategic importance.  
 
The GOM’s statement on DNA quoted above also very well illustrates how social relations and politics 
were structured within the waterscape from independence onwards. It points at the predilection for 
centralised state planning and for supervision by the Frelimo leadership and water bureaucrats in 
Maputo. The connection between DNA and the National Planning Commission illustrates the strong 
links between water and Frelimo; this commission was among the most powerful institutions in the 
socialist period, staffed by Frelimo leaders. Its guidance of DNA (directly or indirectly via the ministry) 
was as straightforward as any other, given the one-party state form and the de facto fusion of the 
Frelimo party and the Mozambican state. Prominent party members topped the hierarchy in this 
centralised approach, followed by the top ranks of state bureaucrats. These bureaucrats were in turn 
supported by a small but slowly expanding operational cadre, most of whom were poorly educated.  
 
An important operational mechanism that generated bureaucratic authority was what Gonçalves’ 
(2013) calls orientações superiores.
101
 These are “...written and oral documents issued by figures and 
institutions of authority with the intention of advising on procedures for policy formulation and 
implementation” (ibid: 603). These include legal/official documents, but also other semiotic sources, 
such as public announcements, speeches and draft versions of policies. The ‘figures and institutions of 
authority’ are generally high-ranking party (i.e. Frelimo) and state officials. It was highly common for 
President Machel to give such orientations. No matter how ambiguous, his orientations were taken 
very seriously by subordinates and often got translated into bureaucratic procedures and institutional 
changes (Machava 2018: 133; Chabal 2002: 66). This mechanism, Gonçalvez argues, re-emerged 
strongly under former president Guebuza (2005-2015) and still informs practice today. I will argue 
below that this is also noticeable within the current Mozambican water bureaucracy.   
 
To sum up, the Mozambican water bureaucracy as it developed after independence is characterised by 
a highly centralised and politicised approach to water governance, with central state entities and 
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Frelimo leaders as key agents in imagining, guiding and implementing ambitious hydrosocial 
development plans.   
 
4.2.2 The Dutch water aid bureaucracy 
 
Frelimo needed and welcomed water aid, but not just from any partner. Frelimo quite successfully 
politicised aid in the first decade of independence. That is, the Frelimo leadership was selective in 
accepting aid (partners) as well as in setting the parameters within which aid was provided or in which 
aid workers worked. In other words, aid partners had to be at least sympathetic to, or outright 
supportive of, Frelimo’s political project. They also had to accept the centralised (water) governance 
structure through which aid was channelled. The Dutch government adhered to these conditions. It 
had turned sympathetic to Frelimo in the 1970s and supported independent Mozambique by and 
large on its own terms. This had structured the first phase of the bilateral water aid relationship (1975~ 
early 1990s) in ways outlined in the previous chapter, namely with aid consisting of financial (and 





While these cooperantes indeed worked within the confines of the governance structure sketched 
above, the situation on the ground left considerable space for Dutch experts to make their own 
decisions and to initiate activities, recalls the first Dutch water expert sent out by the Directorate-
General for International Cooperation (DGIS) in 1978. He arrived in DNA’s half-empty office in central 
Maputo, and could pick one of many vacant offices who had previously been taken up by a bureaucrat 
of the colonial hydrocracy. He was soon joined by another Dutch expert and together they set up and 
engaged in a number of activities, including training Mozambicans in elementary hydrometry, carrying 
out studies, setting up databases or joining in transboundary water negotiations. They were able to 
initiate and carry out a broad range of activities as these were simply among the numerous tasks that 
were deemed necessary, and because they were (initially) hardly guided or steered by DGIS or DNA 
management into doing a particular activity. “DGIS was not yet the well-oiled machine that it would 
later become”, he said, and “...they were already glad to see things being set up and carried out”. He 
even became head of the Department of Water Resources within DNA, as “...there was no Mozambican 
who could take up that position”. Such leadership positions having been taken up by cooperantes was 
not uncommon in those years, according to Hanlon (1991: 96), as it served an immediate need and 
was based on mutual confidence. 
 
That DGIS was not yet considered a ‘well-oiled machine’ had several reasons. Local representation and 
local support was minimal, as the coordination of aid was centralised at DGIS, within the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs (BZ) in The Hague. DGIS had to administer a quickly rising budget in the 1970s and 
1980s, with few personnel relative to this budget, resulting in severe coordination problems. Moreover, 
water was a domain within Dutch aid that had received little specific attention until the late 1980s, 
even though the volume of water aid had risen quite substantially. Water aid was mostly provided as 
Technical Assistance (TA), with little attention paid to water’s non-technical aspects. Training and 
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capacity building constituted a significant part of TA, but these activities also largely concentrated on 
technical subjects. Investments were generally ‘supply-driven’, with a couple of tied aid projects carried 
out by Dutch engineering companies focused on big water infrastructure. TA was typically provided 
through ‘in-house’ long-term projects in which, an IOB report noted, “...Dutch water aid assistance 
followed standardised bureaucratic procedures, characterised by an overriding concern to manage a 
‘project cycle’” (IOB 2000: 58). A formal project format was used, stating a “...preconceived (and often 
over-optimistic) solution to problems confronting the target constituencies and to dissect the aid 
intervention into discrete, consecutive stages”. The report concluded that 
 
In nearly all cases, this rather mechanistic approach conflicted with the ‘organic’ rhythms and dynamics of 
the unfolding institutional development processes in the sector. The result was a pattern of over-
ambitiously if not unrealistically formulated project documents, primarily serving the purpose of 
mobilising donor funds. 
Ibid: 58-59 
 
In all, the ‘target of change’ discussed in this section refers to the Mozambican state water bureaucracy 
and the Dutch (water) aid bureaucracy as they developed separately and jointly in the first phase of the 
bilateral relationship (1970~early 1990s). I conclude that a highly centralised, state-led and politicised 
approach to governing water affairs became effective in Mozambique. State and bureaucratic power in 
Mozambique was strong, centralised and directive in this approach, yet ample space existed on the 
ground or work floor to act as one saw fit. Dutch aid bureaucratic power was also centralised and 
increasingly directive, for instance in terms of complying to standard project requirements, but not yet 
very strong. This also made Dutch aid workers very flexible in arranging their work in Mozambique. 
Jointly, the two bureaucracies functioned under a state-led water governance regime that placed 
emphasis on the biophysical and technical aspects of water, on (big) water infrastructural projects and 
bureaucratic and project mechanisms to make this happen.  
 
The next section discusses why this water governance regime and its underlying bureaucracies became 
a target of change and how this ought to be changed. This must be considered against the 
background of a rapidly changing political economic context in Mozambique during the 1980s, 
discussed in detail in the previous chapter. To briefly recall, Mozambique had emerged out of the civil 
war in 1992 formally as a liberal, multi-party democracy, with a (still Frelimo-led) GOM intent on 
developing a capitalist market economy. These changes were instigated after the GOM had opened up 
its doors to Western aid agents in search of support to tackle massive socio-environmental problems it 
faced, such as rising debts, droughts and floods, and famine. The ‘parameters’ for development once 
set by Frelimo were now increasingly set by aid agents, according to the new development fads. In 
particular, the GOM adopted structural adjustment policies (SAPs) after joining the World Bank and 
IMF and thus committed itself to neoliberal reforms. In short, Mozambique had entered a process of 
integration into global capitalism, in which the Netherlands was already deeply integrated. However, 
like the GOM, the GON was undergoing a process of adopting the ideas and reforms associated with 
the neoliberal ideology that was growing hegemonic at that time. 
 
4.3 The force of change: water (aid) marketisation   
 
This section examines and unpacks marketisation as the ‘force of change’ in the bilateral water aid 
relationship, from its emergence during Mozambique’s transition to capitalism (1990s) up to and 
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including the aid and trade period (2010s). In the context of this chapter, marketisation refers to the 
market-based restructuring of ODA-based aid and subjects/objects in the Mozambican waterscape 
targeted by such aid (cf. Birch and Siemiatycki 2016). Marketisation is considered both a semiotic and 
political economic force. In semiotic terms, it urges agents to think in and/or express their ideas and 
actions in market-related terms, whether or not they ‘genuinely’ support or believe in it. In political 
economic terms, it propels agents to transform established water (aid) institutions, activities and 
projects as well as setting up novel ones in line with market imaginaries. Combined, this force serves to 
specify the imagination and policy/implementation space for change in line with the capitalistic logic 
of liquid power.  
 
I argue that marketisation in the bilateral water aid relationship is characterised by three key 
mechanisms that are intimately related, yet have a slightly different ‘sub-target’ of change. One is 
corporatisation, meant to change the structure of the public sector and attitude of civil servants. A 
second is outsourcing based on competitive tendering, meant to change relations between state and 
non-state actors and to increase the quality of water services. A third is what I will come to call the 
‘private sector/ private finance imaginary’, which sought to increase the role of the private sector and 
private sector involvement in water (aid) projects. The next three subsections each discuss one of these 
mechanisms, specifying some of the key processes and activities that relate to the mechanism, the role 
of Dutch aid and the politics and power struggles involved. Indeed, I consider these not as neutral 
mechanisms implemented in a technocratic fashion, but as value-laden mechanisms proposed, 
designed and applied in a terrain of liquid power struggles.    
 
4.3.1 Corporatisation  
 
Corporatisation is understood in two senses. First, corporatisation is an institutional change, whereby 
semi-autonomous public companies are created that (ought to) operate at an arm’s length of the 
central state. The second dimension, which may or may not be pursued simultaneously with the first 
dimension, involves the introduction and attempted sedimentation of values, ideas and mechanisms 
associated with the market and private enterprise inside a public entity. As McDonald (2014) argues, 
corporatisation is not new, and has historically been pursued under different ideological frameworks 
around the world, with different aims and operational principles. Yet the most common type of 
corporatisation of the last decades has been a ‘neoliberal’ one “...intended to create greater financial 
transparency, reduce political interference, and strengthen managerial accountability”, and in which 
“market operating principles such as financialised performance indicators, cost-reflexive pricing and 
competitive outsourcing” have become dominant (ibid: 2; McDonald 2016). This subsection examines 
the application of corporatisation in the Mozambican waterscape, a process in which Dutch aid played 
an important, but also at times contested, role. Deep Dutch involvement in this process indicates the 
influence of corporatisation on Dutch aid (actors) itself, a point also briefly covered in this subsection.   
 
A central objective of the new water architecture erected from the 1990s onwards was to reduce 
central state involvement and bureaucratic power in the governance and management of water, and to 
create a more market-oriented public water sector. DNA was a specific object of change, considering 
the fact that most water affairs were hitherto supervised and/or operationalised by this central water 




This was the time that the World Bank came in. They came in the water sector with quite some noise—
with new policies and strategies. One of the main things they wanted to do, was to turn DNA into a 
policy and strategy making entity, and leave operations to autonomous institutions and the private 




DNA’s decision-making power over water affairs thus had to be reduced as well as its involvement in 
operations.  
 
Regarding operations, reforms affected the domain of urban water supply the most. Urban water 
supply companies enjoyed little autonomy and were strongly directed by DNA prior to the 1990s. With 
the introduction of the Delegated Management Framework (DMF) in 1998, the framework for urban 
water supply became subject to ‘neoliberal corporatisation’, in both senses outlined above. This 
involved the creation of new, more autonomous water supply agencies, namely FIPAG and AIAS, as 
well as the water regulator CRA. Decision-making and regulating powers were transferred from DNA to 
these agencies, meant to diminish central state involvement. It also involved the immaterial, second 
dimension of corporatisation, in the sense of inculcating business and managerial thinking within these 
entities. 
 
FIPAG is the Water Supply Investment and Assets Fund, established in 1998. It was tasked with 
attracting money (via grants, loans) for investment in and maintenance of water supply infrastructure 
in the country’s primary cities.
104
 This money had to be repaid on the basis of cost-recovery. FIPAG was 
charged with ‘delegating’—that is, outsourcing—water production and distribution to independent, 
preferably private operators. This did not go well (see next subsection), but the DMF’s mandate was 
nevertheless expanded to include water supply in 130 ‘secondary’ cities and towns as well as sanitation 
in all these (i.e. 151) primary and secondary cities. AIAS was created in 2009 as the agency responsible 
for investing in and maintaining infrastructure for water supply and sanitation in these secondary cities 
and towns. CRA was established alongside FIPAG in 1998, and was charged with regulating water 
services first in primary cities, and with the establishment of AIAS, of water supply and sanitation 
services in all cities. The DMF and the creation of FIPAG, AIAS and CRA were among the major and 
most visible ‘material’ institutional changes as part of the new water architecture.  
 
Dutch state and non-state agents were closely involved in these processes. First, the Dutch state had 
financed a major study in the early 1990s on twelve water companies in the provincial capitals, and 
concluded that they were in a technically and financially poor condition. The study provided building 
blocks to change these water companies “into more autonomous entities, also financially” (DHV and 
Consultec 1995: xii). This study was a prelude to a major WB-project, co-financed by the Dutch state, 
whose task it was to design and set up FIPAG and CRA in 1998. On a project level, Vitens–Evides 
International (VEI)—the water aid organisation of various Dutch drinking water companies—partnered 
up first with FIPAG in 2005 and a decade later with AIAS as well, for the greater part financed by the 
EKN in Maputo. Next to providing technical support for drinking water production and distribution, 
these projects have focused on ‘organisational development’, which basically implied aspects related 
to the second dimension of corporatisation, ranging from business and financial management to cost-
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recovery techniques and minimising non-revenue water.
105
 This emphasis was in line with the former 
VEI director’s vision that not a lack of technology, but a lack of “good management” was the problem 
in water utilities such as FIPAG and that their “social engineering” deserved more attention.
106
 He said 
that the “typical Dutch approach” of combining corporate management with public ownership can 
help realise this (Van Tuijn 2010: 14-15).  
 
Next to handing over and ring-fencing urban water supply operations, DNA was also itself subject to 
reform. Dutch actors were closely involved in this process as well. As said, DNA was supposed to 
become the central strategy-making entity in a restructured public water sector. A key aid instrument 
that ought to stimulate this has been the Dutch state/ EKN-funded Sector Wide Approach (SWAp), 
operationalised in multi-year programmes called ASAS.
107
 The SWAp was a popular new water aid 
modality at the start of the new millennium, in which reforms desired by the donor were not so much 
pursued through input-based aid and associated conditionality anymore. Rather, the idea was to lend 
ownership to state agencies like DNA, while securing aid effectiveness through focusing on 
‘performance’ and ‘outputs’ on a sectoral level (IOB 2006; Adam et al. 2005). The first ASAS programs 
from 2003 onwards were partly used to support the reforms related to the new water architecture (e.g. 
support to ARAs, FIPAG). Another part covered debt repayments and operational costs of DNA, 
including incentive payments for staff.  
 
So-called ‘value for money’ audits were used to assess pre-defined performance indicators, even 
though these proved a major extra administrative burden for DNA (Van Woersem et al. 2007: 41). 
Follow-up ASAS programs hinged on the outcomes of these audits. Despite these audits being 
increasingly critical about DNA performance, ASAS funding continued and conditionality remained 
loose. One review concluded that ASAS “...functioned as ‘grease’ to let the DNA machinery work” (ibid: 
44), while turning it into a leading entity had proven difficult: 
 
The general institutional framework is not favourable with DNA not performing as an apex organization 
and having considerable structural problems. The DNA is still much engaged in implementation and will 
continue to do so in the future. 
Ibid: 34 
 
A lack of tangible improvements in the first four ASAS programs, combined with the introduction of 
the aid and trade agenda, motivated the EKN to tighten conditionality and to apply a more stringent 
results-based regime in the fifth ASAS program (or: ASAS V) that started in 2012. The EKN introduced a 
performance reporting framework that involved specified ‘milestones’ for activities and reforms. Traffic 
lights (green, orange, red) were used to assess progress.
108
 One milestone was considered crucial given 
previous, failed attempts, namely to create “...a new DNA operating as an autonomous entity”.
109
 
Towards this end, EKN (through ASAS V) funded the compilation of a strategic plan (Eurosis and 
Consultec 2014). For this plan to be implemented, it had to be approved by the Mozambican council of 
ministers. But the council did not approve the plan, which was a major reason why the EKN decided to 
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put ASAS V into ‘contingency mode’—that is, putting the program on hold, except for activities that 
had already started or been contracted.  
 
This aggravated tensions between EKN and DNA, tensions that had already risen due to the way ASAS 
V was managed, according to an insider: 
 
...the way ASAS V was managed also helped the relationship to get weaker. The Dutch 




Micromanagement involved, according to this person, “...paying attention to the smallest things and 
details, which takes time from people at both DNA and the embassy”.
111
 In short, relations had come 
under severe pressure during the implementation of ASAS V, which according to another informant 
indeed  
  
...proved to be very ambitious in terms of results. To get this program implemented depended on 
technical elements, but also on political willingness. I am a technician, not a politician. And if the 
politicians don’t want the program to be implemented, then I cannot do much about it. On the technical 
side I might be able to try and solve things, but if there is political unwillingness to implement a program, 





This event illustrates that corporatisation was not only applied to water objects and subjects in 
Mozambique; Dutch aid had also increasingly been influenced by it, particularly by the second 
dimension of corporatisation. In general, this stems from neoliberal reforms and principles of New 
Public Management that had already been introduced in the Dutch state from the 1980s onwards 
(Enders and Westerheijden 2017). Elbers (2014) lists how managerial approaches were increasingly 
applied to Dutch aid as well. This included the ‘logical framework’ and output-based aid, models that 
assume that highly complex realities can be rationally and linearly planned, and the spending of funds 
and implementation can be measured and controlled for (ibid). The BZ department of Financial-
Economic Affairs, recalls a former DGIS manager, had grown rapidly during this period as the new ways 
of working required more administrators and ‘controllers’.
113
 During the 2000s, the private sector and 
‘innovative’, market-based aid approaches such as water Public-Private Partnerships (PPP) and ‘smart 
finance’ (Singeling et al. 2009) gained popularity and became increasingly mainstream .  
 
The aid and trade agenda gave this trend another boost. Illustrative is a weblog that looked back on a 
one-day conference called ‘Aid and trade in a day’ for the Dutch water aid community, which opened 
with the following lines: 
 
Shall we audit your value chain and then look at what we can do with financial blending? For outsiders 
perhaps a remarkable opening statement, but for visitors of ‘Aid and trade in a day’ (...) perfectly logical. 
The annual update with regard to aid and trade in the water sector has by now become tradition. Those 
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internal affairs and aid projects and processes.  
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who have followed the language spoken on these days, will also have noticed the progress in this area. 
What was once called ‘WASH in a day’ is now ‘Aid and trade in a day’. The debate has shifted from 
whether aid and trade can be combined, to one that asks what opportunities these present and 




Especially the tendency to think in terms of ‘business cases’ or ‘revenue/business models’ had become 
stronger. New funding schemes asked from applying actors to present their project in terms of a 
business case or with a business model, but this proved to be a challenge for some of them who were 
not used to make this. A mid-term review of the Sustainable Water Fund that subsidises water PPPs 
concluded that “...the focus on business cases and business models is generally artificial” and that 
“...attracting risk-taking private capital into the sector has been modest” (Van Woersem et al. 2015: 5-
6). The water sector is not yet deemed attractive or suitable enough for realising concepts that aim at 
financial and operational self-reliance, while agents applying for such funds may have been inclined to 
simply respond to what financiers are searching for (FMO and NWP 2019). 
 
But whereas corporate and entrepreneurial water (aid) concepts had increasingly normalised in the 
Dutch water aid community, in Mozambique these resonated mainly with a small, educated group of 
water professionals who engage in international networks (see e.g. Alvarinho 2007). As one Dutch EKN 
officer stated: 
 
For me, aid and trade is also, or especially, about investing in entrepreneurship. But entrepreneurship and 
the feeling for entrepreneurship lacks in Mozambique. In the past, people wanted to work for the state, 




Another employee of EKN said that 
 
Especially in the field of water, we are approached by local entrepreneurs who have local solutions for 
local problems. But most of them have had no training and have no skills in how to set up a company, 




The EKN was therefore eager to fund or set up projects that help develop entrepreneurial zeal and 
innovative ideas. One generic such project is called ‘Orange Corners’, which intends to “turn smart 
ideas into sustainable businesses”. Another, specific water aid project was funded by the EKN and 
involved a work package focusing on developing water and sanitation business models. This project 
between AIAS and VEI will be explored in more detail in the next chapters, but suffice it to say now 
that this work package was included on instigation by Dutch agents rather than desired or asked for by 
AIAS. AIAS employees poorly understood the rationale and added value of this work package and 




Overall, both dimensions of corporatisation have gained ample attention in the bilateral relationship 
and the Mozambican waterscape. Most visibly, new public agencies were created in the Mozambican 
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waterscape that (formally) enjoyed more autonomy than DNA, thereby reducing central state 
involvement. This occurred with involvement of Dutch aid actors, who also paid attention to 
inculcating market-operating principles such as financial cost-recovery. Meanwhile DNA, again with 
Dutch aid involvement, was supposed to become ‘leaner and meaner’, and managerial and market 
thinking that had become entrenched in Dutch water aid was increasingly propagated within the 
bilateral water relationship. These processes, I contend, brought new dynamics into the Mozambican 
waterscape, yet many were deeply challenging if not outright troublesome, in the sense that they 
ignited deep tensions between Dutch and Mozambican actors. The next subsection zooms in on a 
particular market mechanism closely related to corporatisation: competitive tendering.  
 
4.3.2 Contracting out (outsourcing) and competitive tendering 
 
Contracting out or outsourcing based on competitive tendering is a longstanding (market) mechanism 
in the Mozambican waterscape. This mechanism should ensure that a tendered water (aid) assignment 
or project is awarded to agents with an offer that, of all competitors in a ‘free tender market’, best 
matches the assignment’s criteria. This process should then secure an economically more efficient 
(water) service delivery than if carried out by the outsourcing (often public) agent (Sayers 1997). To put 
it in market prose, competitive tendering should ensure optimal “value for money” (ibid). This 
mechanism aimed at a more efficient water (aid) service delivery. This was to be achieved by changing 
and tightening relations between state and non-state agents, particularly private sector actors, and by 
spurring the imperative of competition more generally within the Mozambican waterscape and in the 
delivery of Dutch water aid. This subsection traces the introduction and application of this mechanism 
in Mozambique and Dutch aid and zooms in on the peculiar politics that surrounds it. 
 
The use of this mechanism in Mozambique rapidly increased after the influx of Western aid in the 
Mozambican waterscape in the late 1980s. This was driven in particular by the procurement system of 
the largest water financier, the WB, but also by changing (international) trade agreements and 
procurement regulations to which donors and the GOM committed themselves. Was contracting out 
still the exception in Mozambique during socialism, it became the rule thereafter. The 1990s involved 
the production of numerous studies, assessments and the like in support of the water architecture, 
most of which were adverted on a quickly growing tender market. This process occurred in a context 
of growing hostility towards the state, triggered most prominently by the BWIs. Concrete measures 
such as capping state budgets led to deteriorating working conditions, and discouraged well-
educated, trained and/or experienced Mozambicans to continue working for public entities. As Jenkins 
(2000: 210) states, 
 
...structural adjustment, implemented from 1987 onward, affected employment in the formal sector by 
insisting on privatisation. But it more immediately affected state employment, making it very unattractive 
for the limited trained personnel who could be employed much more remuneratively by the international 
donors. 
 
Indeed, a former DNA director recalled that “...the future of civil servants was very dim; if we wanted to 
continue, we were almost forced to set up a private organisation”.
117
 Alternatively, as Jenkins indicates, 
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they could work for international organisations. Either of the two options was pursued by the majority 
of the educated cadre within DNA. Some of them set up water consultancy companies that (co-
)produced (with foreign consultants) many of the studies contracted out by DNA, the WB, donors and 
other aid agents. Others started working directly for, or in projects administered by, these international 
agents, or for private companies. This resulted in a process similar to what Sabaratnam (2017: 68) 
observed in the Mozambican public health sector, namely the “...loss of qualified staff—the brain drain 
to international organisations and/or the private sector, and often other professions altogether”. 
Within the public water sphere, it created a much stricter line of separation between domestic and 
foreign workers akin to what Blundo (2014: 71) and Bierschenk and Olivier de Sardan (2014: 26) typify 
as a ‘two-speed bureaucracy’, in which “...a ‘traditional administration’ financed by the single state 
budget and often condemned to inactivity and/or petty corruption coexists with an administration or 
‘projects’, sustained by development aid that offers its agents both better working conditions and an 
additional income.” 
 
As mentioned in the previous subsection, outsourcing was also applied to urban water supply 
operations, first in the late 1990s by FIPAG and later also by AIAS. DNA made use of the same 
mechanism for rural water supply later on. The first and biggest event in which this practice was 
applied involved the outsourcing of water supply operations in Maputo, based on a lease contract, and 
in four other cities, based on a management contract. FIPAG outsourced these services to a consortium 
of multinational and domestic private and non-profit entities from 1999 for fifteen years. This was a 
deeply problematic experiment, or as one brochure stated euphemistically, an experiment “...with 
increasing lack of success” (Davies 2013: 7). Next to the withdrawal of the leading multinational SAUR 
within two years, the shares of its successor Águas de Portugal were bought back by FIPAG in 2011, 
four years before the end of the contract and after intense struggles and disagreements between the 
parties involved (Club of Mozambique 2011; 2012; Lobina et al. 2014).
118
 In the next chapter, I will 
examine this in more detail and how, despite its problematic implementation, the practice of 
outsourcing to private operators was expanded and applied to water supply in another 130 smaller 
cities and towns, with AIAS as the responsible implementing agency. Although this latter process 
involves far more and smaller, domestic private operators, relations between these operators and AIAS 
are no less political. 
 
With regard to Dutch aid, a report on contracting out remarked that this mechanism had become the 
“official rule” in 1984, while DGIS being directly involved in aid activities had become the exception 
(IOV 1988: 1). However, exemplary for Dutch water aid in Mozambique was that much of this aid 
continued to be carried out by DGIS experts, or alternatively by EMS cooperantes, in the 1980s and to 
a lesser extent in the 1990s. These aid professionals and cooperantes were initially joined, and later 
replaced, by Dutch NGOs and increasingly by consultants from the late 1980s onwards.
119
 Major water 
aid projects and programs carried out by DGIS staff lasted until 2000, however, when the turn to the 
SWAp swiftly put an end to this. Surely, these ‘in-house’ water aid projects were not without their 
problems. But their relatively broad, autonomous and long-term nature did allow for the strong 
bonding between Dutch and Mozambican agents that provided the bilateral water aid relations with a 
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firm foundation. With increased outsourcing, contracts and performance-based models began to 
function more decisively as social relations. ‘Value for money audits’ were introduced and carried out 




Dutch water experts continued to be deployed in DNA and other water entities, but now as 
consultants on individualised and circumscribed TA tasks. One former Dutch expert, ironically, was 
tasked with training DNA technicians on writing Terms of References (ToRs) for tenders, which had 
become a major stream of work.
121
 He was not particularly happy with what Msimang (2002: 13) calls 
the ‘consultantisation of development’, triggered by the large-scale application of the new 
procurement schemes: 
 
The World Bank just pushed this through, this way of working. I have never been a supporter of it. This 
way, the DNA people are pushed to the side of supervision and no time remains for other things. All 
studies are carried out by consultants and little knowledge remains within DNA on the application of 
applied [hydrological] models. DNA becomes entirely dependent on consultants, while such a model can 




This trend continued over time; another Dutch expert observed that in the WRM department of DNA 
where he worked in the mid-2010s, pretty much all the work is outsourced—sometimes even DNA’s 





Contracting out of Dutch water aid thus increased, but during the 2000s, this was still often based on 
direct agreements with preferred partners, such as NGOs or international agencies.
 
Where it did 
involve competitive tendering, such as for assignments contracted through the SWAp, eligibility was 
open to all nationalities. Competitive tendering in Dutch (water) aid was increasingly applied during 
the 2000s, and became the norm in the 2010s. Schulpen (2016) notes how NGO funding schemes in 
Dutch aid had changed since 2001 and especially as part of the aid and trade agenda, when the “idea 
of competition between NGOs for subsidies on the basis of tendering” was introduced. Less funding 
was made available for an increased number of NGOs, who now had to compete for these ‘scarce 
funds’. Schulpen argues that this resulted in a ‘NGO funding game’ which reduced NGO’s autonomy, 
while pushing them to profile themselves and their projects increasingly in line with government 
policy—that is, in an entrepreneurial fashion (ibid: 33). An interviewee from the RVO, the executing 
agency that manages Dutch water aid funding schemes and projects, painted a similar picture. This 
person said that due to the scarcity of funds, NGOs were eagerly looking for fundraisers and they were 
pushed to become more business-minded. “But this is a transition”, the RVO employee said, as “they 
were not used to think this way”. Some NGOs, she continued, “...only employed development 
specialists who were not knowledgeable on business cases or business models. But for the funds it is 
required to present your idea or project in the form of a business case”.
124
 Therefore, some Dutch 
NGOs hired consultancy firms to do this for them.  
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But while competitive tendering fitted well with the aid and trade agenda, it made it difficult to 
increase the involvement of Dutch businesses in water aid projects and processes—something the 
agenda also desired. After the abolishment of tied (water) aid, said one DGIS employee, “the 
Netherlands was long at the top of the class” when it comes to following international procurement 
rules. “At the same time”,  she continued,  
 
...you can see that some explore how these rules can be circumvented. (...) RVO explores the limits of 
what is permitted within the procurement policy in order to privilege Dutch companies in tenders. Also 
some embassies are outspoken in that they rather contract Dutch companies for their activities”.
125
   
 
Indeed, some Dutch state actors became increasingly occupied with the question how to have (more) 
Dutch businesses win tenders, while complying with international rules and agreements. What makes 
this difficult, the DGIS employee said, is the quality and price differences between Dutch products and 
services compared to others; hiring Dutch professionals quickly adds up in terms of price which makes 
it hard to “...compete with the Indians, Koreans or Chinese or even some other Western nations. 
Conversations between BZ and the World Bank have therefore been going on for a long time to focus 
on quality in tenders rather than who delivers the cheapest service”.
126
 An interviewee from a NGO 
confirmed that Dutch companies cannot compete with certain foreign competitors that sell water 
products such as pipes and pumps far below the price level of Dutch companies:  
 
The Chinese, they are everywhere to be found, deliver that cheap stuff everywhere. [In African countries] 
you will not find the investments in sustainability in the Netherlands, you first need to develop ideas 
behind such investments. (...) That is what we can do: making them envious about the way we have 
organised things here [in the Netherlands] and show them that we can do that elsewhere as well.
127
   
 
In a water aid and trade conference titled “Money as Water”, one of the workshops was dedicated to 
‘procurement embassies’ and the question how to “optimise the process with regard to maximising 
Dutch water sector involvement” in tenders issued by Dutch embassies (Van Oppenraaij 2014). The 
report of this session stated that the Dutch state quite strictly abides by EU procurement rules for a 
‘level playing field’ and that the ‘formal procurement process’ leaves little room for privileging Dutch 
companies. The participants therefore agreed to investigate how other countries, such as Denmark, 
succeeded in having their own companies win contracts in public tendering processes. The session also 
paid attention to tricks to better position Dutch companies. These included the option to publish a 
tender in the Dutch language only or to involve companies in the trajectory prior to the tender 
publication, e.g. by having them co-produce the scoping document leading to the tender. Also, the 
question was posed whether ‘local rules’, that is, procurement rules of partner countries, can be used 
rather than those of the EU to better position Dutch companies in water aid tender processes financed 
by the Dutch state (ibid).  
 
This last question had already been answered in the affirmative, in the context of the bilateral water aid 
relationship two years earlier. In 2012, the Dutch and Mozambican governments signed a 
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) meant to intensify “cooperation in the field of water” (GOM 
and GON 2012). This MoU contains an article that restricts eligibility in the “procurement of goods, 
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works and services (...) by DNA as the contracting authority (...) to Mozambican and Dutch bidders 
(ibid: 4). Thus, unlike tenders issued by the embassy, tenders issued by DNA were not bound by EU 
procurement regulations or aid treaties and could therefore be used to privilege Dutch companies. 
However, an EKN officer said that this MoU did not help much in attracting more Dutch water 
companies and also 
 
...did not create a good impression of the Dutch with other agencies. In a competitive market, there are 
other ways of getting there where the Dutch wanted to go, and this MoU was not perceived as being 
transparent enough. This might also have been the reason why it proved difficult of involving the World 
Bank in our projects. It was believed that when a service was tendered, a Dutch company would get the 




Another EKN employee put this MoU in perspective and emphasised that such tender politics were 
common among other donors in Mozambique: 
 
Look at others: they do the same. The Koreans have a five million fund, but only Korean companies are 
eligible to tender on contracts. The same goes for the Japanese. At least in our fund, Mozambican 




A DNA director also compared the Dutch MoU with those of other nations and said he did not think it 
was problematic, because “...at least in this case, Mozambican companies can also apply”.
130
 Indeed, 
such tender politics were well-enough known by then and this was simply one odd reality Mozambican 
water officials had to deal with, if not pushed by donors, then by foreign or domestic companies and 
agents.
131
 So while the MoU was not considered a major issue, it did raise dilemmas among those 
responsible for its execution:  
 
One may say this is tied aid... perhaps it is a form of tied aid. That said, the Netherlands has a lot of 
knowledge on water. There is a big fund with which the water sector in Mozambique can be aided [i.e. 




Compared to the period of tied aid (1960s ~1980s), when stimulating trade or simply offering trade 
deals by public aid agencies was common practice, this practice had now become a far more delicate 
issue under a regime of competitive tendering. At the same time, the push to have Dutch companies 
benefit from Dutch aid had only become stronger in the aid and trade period. It thus called for new 
strategies, according to a Dutch NGO professional: 
 
Make no mistake: promoting trade is a discipline in its own right. It is all about making friends and 
making deals. As government you rather not want to be linked to this, you don’t want to be involved in 
such practices. At the same time, you know perfectly well that such practices are necessary to promote 
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trade. What you actually need is a deniable asset, a trader—preferably emigrated Dutch citizens who 




In summary, outsourcing based on competitive tendering was aimed at raising the efficiency and 
quality of water (aid) services delivery, by changing relations between public water (aid) agencies and 
non-state actors, and by increasing competition amongst non-state actors offering such services. This 
mechanism has indeed profoundly shaken up both the Mozambican waterscape and Dutch water aid, 
with many new (types of) actors becoming involved in the delivery of water (aid) services. Were ‘in-
house’ projects within DNA or DGIS once the norm, now projects and services are generally 
outsourced. These dynamics created opportunities for some actors and for some improvements, but 
they were not without their own politics and power struggles. This section suggests this practice did 
not diminish the administrative burden on Mozambican public water agencies, nor did it provide an 
incentive to improve labour conditions like salaries or investing in knowledge in these agencies. 
Applied to water supply, it led to deep tensions and sometimes outright antagonism between public 
agencies and private operators. And while competition was (supposed to be) increased, it was also 
actively circumvented, generating tensions and dilemmas between and amongst actors involved. The 
next subsection deals with the preferred type of agent to outsource services to: private sector actors.  
 
4.3.3 The private sector and innovative finance imaginary 
 
The aid and trade agenda gave a major boost to an imaginary that had already grown powerful in 
Dutch aid and the Mozambican waterscape, namely the private sector (including private finance) as the 
engine behind economic growth and hence, development. Here, I use the term ‘imaginary’ to refer to a 
“...semiotic system that frame individual subject’s lived experience” and which enables individual and 
collective agents to “...relate to their environments, make decisions, or engage in strategic action” (Sum 
and Jessop 2013: 165). The involvement of the private sector in Dutch (water) aid or in the 
Mozambican waterscape is not new and has a long history, as discussed in the previous chapter. Yet, in 
the past, the private sector was perceived to play its part in modernisation trajectories driven by the 
state and, argues Khan (2007: 6), in which market failures were corrected for by non-market 
mechanisms (see also Blowfield and Dolan 2014). In the Dutch aid and trade agenda, as in similar 
agendas of other DAC donors, the private sector has moved centre stage and is profiled as a key agent 
in bringing about growth and development (McEwan et al. 2017; IOB 2014a). This has led aid actors to 
focus on advancing the role of the private sector in development interventions. Based on Di Bella et al. 
(2013), I distinguish between private sector development (PSD) and private sector involvement (PSI) as 
ways in which agents in the bilateral water aid relationship attempted to harness the potential of the 
private sector.  
 
The latter, PSI, is about increasing involvement of the private sector in water (aid) interventions. PSI 
was already considered important before the introduction of the aid and trade agenda, but became a 
high priority after this agenda was introduced.
134
 One EKN officer recalled how BZ decision-makers 
insisted that “...we need a change in our relationship with Mozambique, it needs to become more 
commercial” and that they “...were rather direct in voicing their wishes, by saying we want to have 
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Dutch companies invest in Mozambique”. This puzzled this person, “because the private sector share in 




Various strategies to increase PSI were pursued. These included ‘market scans’ in which consultants 
assess the potential for Dutch companies in the Mozambican water sector (Worm 2006; Pietersen 
2011; Aidenvironment and Water is Essential 2015). Smaller and larger funding schemes also 
increasingly incorporated the criterion to involve a private sector actor and/or private finance, 
providing another push for increased PSI. Another way to advance PSI were ‘economic missions’ of 
Dutch ministers with a delegation of (water) business and other agents to Mozambique (EVD 2009; 
2011; RVO 2014). Visits of officials to Mozambique had been going on since the start of the 
relationship, but these were hitherto focused on aid rather than trade. New in the aid and trade era 
was the so-called ‘core advisor’. Core advisors were hired as consultants on behalf of the Netherlands 
Water Partnership (NWP), and were assigned to embassies in aid and trade partner countries so as to 




The EKN in Mozambique searched for a core advisor with a background in “business development” 
and “financial engineering”, because in the “...phasing out of Dutch government assistance (...) ODA 
transfers are expected to be replaced by other sources of finance” (RVO and NWP 2013: 1-2).
137
 The 
consultant who was hired as core advisor had such a background and he was specifically tasked with 
increasing Dutch PSI in the Mozambican waterscape. He therefore scanned business opportunities in 
the water sector of Mozambique and acted as a ‘liaison’ between Dutch water entities and 
Mozambican counterparts in Mozambique. He paid various visits to Mozambique to explore such 
opportunities, but concluded that Mozambique was still very “traditional-minded”, that is, one-sidedly 
focused on public water management. He found that PSI in the Mozambican water sector was limited, 
which he related to a poorly developed culture of water entrepreneurship in Mozambique compared 
to other aid and trade countries in Africa, such as Ghana and Kenya.  
 
The core advisor was also expected to scope and seize opportunities for innovative financing in Dutch 
water aid in Mozambique. He compiled a report and toolbox on innovative financing in support of the 
water aid and trade agenda (Van Bork et al. 2015) and indeed assessed such opportunities in 
Mozambique, but to little avail. Mozambique was, for instance, not deemed ready yet for 
implementing an innovative finance vehicle that the NWP and other agents had set up in Kenya, called 
the Water Finance Facility. This facility aimed at mobilising private finance for water infrastructure 
through a special purpose investment vehicle, but was deemed unfeasible in Mozambique due to its 
poorly developed financial markets. The ‘enabling environment’ for innovative financing, as for PSI 
more generally, was therefore in need of improvement, this core advisor and other actors concluded. 
This is where private sector development (PSD) focuses on (McEwan et al. 2017).  
 
The quintessential aid and trade instrument that targeted PSD (next to PSI) was called PLAMA, or the 
Mozambican Water Platform.
138
 PLAMA was established in 2013 as a public-private water network 
platform, similar to NWP, with (potential) members from across the Mozambican and international 
                                                          
135
 Interview EKN employee, 14 July 2016. 
136
 interview core advisor for Kenya, 8 December 2015. 
137
 The recruitment of this core advisor took place in 2013, when the policy line for Mozambique was still one of 
phasing out Dutch aid altogether (see section 3.5).  
138
 In Portuguese: Plataforma Moçambicana de Água. 
91 
 
water sector. It aims at stimulating dialogue between public and private companies in the Mozambican 
water sector, to disseminate ‘business information’ such as on tenders and to forge “...business links 
and match-making with water sector parties in the Netherlands and other partner countries including 
branding of the Mozambique water sector” (Lamoree and Manhique 2011: 2). It also lobbies the 
Mozambican government for making new laws and regulations, or adapting existing ones, such as on 
PPP arrangements. For example, water companies in Mozambique were not allowed to partner up with 
a Dutch/ foreign partner based on a commercial investment. A general PPP-law existed that would 
generally allow for this, but as this law was not yet specified in a bylaw for the water sector, 





PLAMA, too, stands in a longer tradition of reorganising the water sector intent on making it more 
business-oriented. Yet, as with previous efforts, this has proven notoriously difficult. A ‘mid-term 
review’ confirmed PLAMA’s relevance, but concluded that it has met few of its original objectives, has 
not been effective in realising benefits for its members nor managed to become financially sustainable, 
that is, independent of (Dutch) aid (Frade 2016). Various interviewees from both sides indicated the 
potential for PLAMA, but also the lack of commitment from Mozambican public entities to turn PLAMA 
into a thriving platform. And while PLAMA was also meant to stimulate Dutch private sector 
involvement, once more this proved difficult, said a Mozambican civil servant: 
 
I was expecting more trade in the water sector—but I am not sure if trade is the right word to use. By 
creating PLAMA, we should expose ourselves as the Mozambican water sector such that it would attract 
more Dutch businesses into it. When we signed the last ASAS, we assured that the money spent in that 
program could only be used by either Dutch or Mozambican companies. Therefore, I was expecting more 
Dutch companies to come in and make use of the business opportunities happening in the Mozambican 
water sector. Certainly with PLAMA, we thought this would happen. We now have a partnership with 
NWP and this can be an avenue to assure more Dutch businesses to invest in our water sector. [But] I 




An insider recalled there were doubts on the part of Mozambican water entities to start PLAMA in the 
first place. This had to do with a very recent experience with PSI in the Mozambican water sector, 
which had not been positive.
141
 This person referred to the (abovementioned) problematic experiment 
of outsourcing water supply operations in Maputo and other cities, which ended in FIPAG prematurely 
buying back the shares of Águas de Portugal in 2011. This experience, still fresh, had made some 
Mozambican state agents wary of intensifying efforts for PSI, but such objections were put aside when 
in an upcoming economic mission to Mozambique in 2011, led by the Dutch Minister for Agriculture 




Apart from PLAMA as a utilitarian aid instrument to improve the enabling environment for PSI, an oft-
heard argument was that ‘traditional’, ODA-based Dutch water aid could help raise the performance 
and trustworthiness of water agencies to a level that would instil trust on the part of potential investors 
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 Some explained the projects of VEI with FIPAG and AIAS this way; private 
investment could increase by VEI helping these agencies raise their technical operations, achieve full-
cost recovery or in the case of AIAS, obtain financial autonomy. This proved difficult, however. In 2016, 
FIPAG faced a debt overload and difficulties to even servicing existing debts, let alone taking on new 
ones for much-needed investments.
144
 AIAS, as will be explored in the next chapter, not even enjoyed 
financial autonomy, as did FIPAG, and it had a tiny (state) budget at its disposal relative to its giant 
mandate.
145
 Alternatively, at a PLAMA conference was proposed that Dutch aid could help render a 
‘pipeline of projects’ becoming ‘financially bankable’ in order to attract the attention of investors.
146
 
The Dutch development bank FMO was frequently portrayed as a potential such investor. But FMO was 
hesitant to invest in water projects, said one of its representatives, as these tend to be publically 
oriented, commercially unattractive and involve high risks on the part of private investors (Gietema 
2014). The core advisor for Mozambique added that, unlike similar banks in other countries, the FMO is 





There were yet other impediments in the Dutch water aid and trade framework that hindered (large-
scale) Dutch PSI in the Mozambican waterscape. For instance, the Dutch allegedly missed 
organisational capacity and legal options for offering ‘full-service solutions’ that other countries did 
offer. Such solutions integrate a number of services such as building, maintaining and operating water 
infrastructure in an integrated contract (FMO and NWP 2019: 10). The one Dutch organisation who 
could potentially offer this is VEI, said the core advisor, as it has ample experience and is well-
positioned in water (supply) sectors in countries like Mozambique. But as a subsidiary of (semi-)public 
Dutch water companies, VEI is not allowed to engage in risky water aid activities based on ‘full-service’ 
contracts. VEI nevertheless subscribes as a private company in partnerships with foreign counterparts, 
so as to allow these to be called a PPP and/or to comply to criteria, such as that a percentage of 
‘private money’ needs to be invested in a project next to subsidies (Davies 2013: 12).
148
 But this is 
merely a semantic game, argue the core advisor and other aid modernisers, who label the majority of 
VEI’s activities still as ‘traditional’, TA-type of water aid.
149
 They also did not have high expectations of 
EKN or BZ employees to take PSI and PSD further. Many of these employees, they claimed, are still 
stuck in traditional ways of thinking about water aid and lack an entrepreneurial mindset and 




Such different positions and ‘mindsets’ about the role of the private sector in water aid reflected 
politics within BZ. Within BZ, considerable struggle around PSI has taken place and this has caused 
ambiguity on the path to follow.
151
 That struggle is not so much about whether PSI is required at all—
there is broad consensus on that within BZ. Struggle rather revolves around the issue of a ‘variegated 
private sector’, that is, the question of what type of private company needs to be involved where, in 
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 Field notes, 2 November 2015. 
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what type of water (aid) activities. Some say PSI should focus on involving small-scale businesses from 
and in the Southern African region itself, while others emphasise that both big and small companies, 
and where possible the Dutch private sector, should be involved in Dutch water aid.
152
   
 
Notwithstanding these opposing positions, the scope for agency within the bilateral relationship was 
clearly narrowed down in favour of the private sector agenda. Increased efforts and additional 
resources have been put into scanning opportunities for and attracting the private sector and private 
finance in the Mozambican waterscape, preferably from the Netherlands. But while the materialisation 
of the private sector/ private finance imaginary in Mozambique proved difficult and full of obstacles, I 
conclude that it did not lose much strength and kept on being a powerful imaginary in the bilateral 
water aid relationship.  
 
4.4 Water marketisation meets state and bureaucratic power  
 
This last section juxtaposes the ‘target’ and ‘force’ of change as discussed in the previous two sections. 
The previous section indicated that marketisation has ruptured and transformed the water (aid) 
governance structure in multiple respects, but often not in ways foreseen or desired. Moreover, 
applying the mechanisms were deeply political processes; they involved power struggles and they 
raised as many new problems and dilemmas as they tried to solve. This section takes a closer look into 
what has generated the politics and power struggles that surrounded the application of these 
mechanisms. It  offers insights that help interpret these politics and struggles as well as why the force 
of marketisation did not yield many of the prospected outcomes. It argues that despite obvious 
changes in the bilateral aid structure and Mozambican waterscape, marketisation has not diminished 
or fundamentally transform state and (aid) bureaucratic power in ways that would support 
marketisation. Rather, I argue, the two must be seen as equally strong forces that collide as much as 
they complement each other. I substantiate this argument by examining state and bureaucratic power 
at the Mozambican and Dutch sides of the relationship respectively.  
 
4.4.1 State and bureaucratic power in Mozambique 
 
In section 4.1, I mentioned that a centralised and hierarchal bureaucratic structure was a sine qua non 
for good water management in proto-socialist Mozambique. In this section, I maintain that this 
centralised structure has very much endured in the succeeding decades, despite many attempts to 
dismantle it. Various reasons can be mobilised in support of this statement. One is the GOM’s 
preference for big water infrastructure that, Rusca et al. (2019) argue, has remained strong. This 
preference translates in a major role for the central state, given the amount of resources required for 
realising such infrastructure and associated projects (Parenti 2015). A continued strong central state 
involvement in governing water affairs is also explained by a lack of capacity to design and implement 
policies and plans at subnational levels (Uandela 2012). As one DNA employee stated: 
 
The move towards increased decentralisation (...) is a contentious issue if you ask me; I am not yet very 
comfortable with moving things quickly to lower levels. At the provincial and municipal levels, there is 
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always this issue of capacity, of human resources and other resources required to do the job, which are 




But the most powerful driver that has kept a centralised approach in place, I argue, are Frelimo’s 
determined efforts to mobilise the state apparatus and state agents in support of its party-political 
agenda (Weimer and Carrilho 2017). This has turned from a normalised state of affairs under proto-
socialism, into a politically sensitive issue thereafter for two main reasons. First, Frelimo-led 
governments have formally committed to an (aid-driven) agenda of (water) decentralisation and 
marketisation as part of neoliberal reforms in SAPs in the 1990s. Second, the reasons for mobilising the 
state apparatus by Frelimo had ever less to do with attempts to realise a national development agenda 
and all the more with maintaining political power (vis-à-vis opposition parties) and agendas of 
emerging capitalist classes.
154
 The effect of this has been that the state bureaucracy, which includes the 
public water bureaucracy, has developed in a direction akin to Bayart and Ellis’ (2000) description of 
“...on the one hand, a pays légal, a legal structure which is the focus of attention for multinational 
donors and Western states, and on the other hand, a pays reel where real power is wielded” (ibid: 229-
230). At least, that is what I conclude, based on what interviewees and informants told me.
155
 I explain 
this point and its repercussions in this section. 
 
Thus, one domain of the water bureaucracy has increasingly revolved around formal–legal elements 
underpinning the post-1990s water architecture. In this ‘formal-legal domain’, emphasis is placed on 
formal legislation, policies, institutions and agencies and on getting these right—that is, shaping them 
in line with the formally adopted development vision. It is this domain that has become the principal 
focus of aid agents such as the WB and those representing the Dutch state. Consequently, most of 
what I and others get to see in this domain has been produced with extensive involvement of aid 
agents. This part of the bureaucracy is well accessible to outsiders, such as myself, both ‘materially’, in 
the sense of being able to connect with water professionals and being allowed access to their offices, 
and ‘discursively’, in the sense of all kinds of formal documentation and images being made available. 
Naturally, attention of civil servants, aid actors and most researchers on water in Mozambique is 
mostly drawn to the elements of this domain, whether in public events and presentations or in written 
documents. Yet, this distracts attention from another domain that is at least as, if not more, significant 
in terms of state and bureaucratic power mobilised, or so I argue. 
 
This is the domain ‘behind the scenes’ where, in the words of one interviewee, ‘the interests of the 
party’ dominate—that is, where agents occupied with Frelimo party-political affairs exert considerable 
power and influence (see also Sumich 2010). Or, following Cahen (2016), this is the part of the state 
that has de facto “Frelimonized”.
156
 This is where the state apparatus gets mobilised for maintaining 
political power and advancing (private) economic interests. Frelimo actors gradually withdrew to this 
domain after donors and aid agents occupied the formal-legal domain. It is in the interest of Frelimo 
to keep water governance centralised, I posit, given water’s essence for the reproduction of the 
political economic system in Mozambique. Firstly, water is a crucial input for economic processes of 
importance in Mozambique, including industrial and agricultural production, and for producing 
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(hydro)energy and extracting fossil fuels. Secondly, in a country where half the population still lacks 
access to water, water serves as an important political instrument for profiling Frelimo, as it did in the 
socialist period. A third objective that water serves is that of private accumulation. Even though water 
is not as big a target as are other sectors (like coal or gas), the waterscape, with major investments in 
infrastructure, has not escaped the rise of rent seeking tendencies in Mozambique (Potter and 
Butterworth 2014).  
 
A range of strategies are deployed to exercise control over the state apparatus and hence, to keep 
water governance centralised. One interviewee pointed at keeping ministers in check. Ministers, this 
person said, are frequently called into Frelimo’s head quarters where they are given orders or 
instructions. Another informant mentioned the significance of selecting high-level bureaucrats. High-
level bureaucrats are key in mediating between the will of Frelimo actors on the one hand, and the will 
and pressure of other agents such as lower-level bureaucrats, subnational actors and donors on the 
other hand. The secret service, which falls directly under the president, is closely involved in the 
selection process of these top bureaucrats. It maintains lists of potential candidates and a network of 
informants who provide ‘intelligence’ on these candidates, prior to and during their appointment. 
Formal requirements such as education, experience and acceptability by aid agents surely matter for 
candidates to be appointed on top positions, but as important for the secret service is the 
(un)likelihood of such a person to thwart political interests and the extent to which the candidate’s 
plans and actions can be checked. 
 
Other strategies are (re)directing the distribution or targets of water budgets and nurturing the rigid 
hierarchy within the bureaucracy. The latter include the practice of orientações superiores, as outlined 
above, in section 4.1. According to Gonçalves (2013), this practice has re-emerged strongly under 
former president Guebuza (2005–2015), which some of my interviewees alluded to in the context of 
DNA. Not seldom do orientations from ‘figures and institutions of authority’—not least the president 
himself—trickle down to DNA employees, who are then summoned to pause their current work and do 
this or that urgent job.
157
 The president promising a water supply system in villages during party visits 
is among the most common such ‘orientation’. As one civil servant of the national ministry of public 
works and water explains: 
 
...sometimes, projects are set up due to political decisions. In these cases, the president visits a province 
and meets with people in a village, these people ask for a road or water connection and he says the 
government will put it there. That promised road or water connection is often not in agreement with 
what was planned, and that puts us in a difficult position. In such cases, we need to prioritize what the 
president decides and that means that projects that are already going on are put on hold or that other, 




Such practices have led interviewees to depict DNA as an agency that, even though not bad at making 
formal plans, never get to realise those as employees are often engaged in ‘extinguishing fires’: 
 
They work in these entities as fire extinguishers. They have beautiful plans on paper, but no timesheet 
indicating the planning and implementation of those plans. (...) Whenever there is a plan, employees are 
often asked to stop what they are supposed to do and to do something else, something urgent. They 
                                                          
157





would be sent to Nampula or whatever province to check out this or that. Everything that this employee 
had planned to do is then left on the table. And this is not only true for public entities in the water sector, 




The hierarchal structure that this practice conveys is coupled with a tendency on the part of civil 
servants to abide by formalised procedures and bureaucratic behaviour. For instance, authority is for 
an important part instituted in formal office. Those higher up in the formal bureaucracy, generally in 
leadership positions, exercise a great deal of decision-making power over lower bureaucrats. The 
former frequently give commands.
160
 The latter often address the former by their office and/or title 
and tend not to argue much with their superiors, unless asked.
161
 Lower level bureaucrats are generally 
reluctant to proceed in processes or activities when consent of their superiors is warranted and not yet 
given. One Dutch consultant portrayed it thus: 
 
Law is law, in the sense that it needs to be clear [for civil servants] what is legally allowed and what a 
policy prescribes for the implementation of activities. (...) A top–down structure applies here. In the 
Netherlands, civil servants often brainstorm over an issue for which no policy or formal decision has yet 
been made, and they design or even try out a certain method to see how it might work. This way of 
working gives Mozambicans a stomach ache.
162
   
 
All this sheds new light on the abovementioned attempts to ‘modernise’ the Mozambican waterscape 
through marketisation. On the one hand, the GOM allowed for various new public water agencies to 
become established as part of the post-1990s water architecture, including ARAs, FIPAG, CRA and 
AIAS. On the other hand, formal-legal powers (e.g. various degrees of autonomy) that corporatized 
entities such as FIPAG, CRA and AIAS enjoy are, in the words of one interviewee, “relative”.
163
 The same 
goes for the decentralisation of WRM to basin levels (in the case of ARAs), with an informant claiming 
that “...the authorities speak the language of decentralisation, but that is still much of a farce”. In other 
words, the politics and practices in the domain behind the scenes helps explain the disjuncture 
between the formal-legal elements of the water architecture and (processes in) the actually existing 
waterscape. 
 
This is not to say that formal-legal changes are meaningless. For instance, FIPAG as a corporatised 
entity with financial autonomy has more policy space than its predecessors had, such as in the area of 
income generation and personnel recruitment. This has allowed FIPAG to attract a better educated 
workforce and to realise improvements in service delivery. It does imply that any significant change is 
still (ultimately) subject to centralised decision-making in Maputo. And this has many and profound 
repercussions. For instance, major reforms or changes in strategy of state agencies will likely only be 
formalised if accepted by, and often attuned to the wishes of, powerful Frelimo actors. About the 
former minister of water (and public works), an interviewee for instance mentioned that 
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...his influence only reaches so far. He cannot just change the institutional set-up of the water sector, 
because this may thwart the interests of other sectors and ministries, such as agriculture. Those highest 
up in Frelimo, are the ones who decide. 
 
This may explain why the strategic plan to reform DNA, financed by the Dutch ASAS program, was not 
accepted. Yet, not much later, after the 2014 national elections, DNA was broken up into two 
independent directorates, one for water supply and sanitation (DNAAS), the other for water resources 
management (DNGRH).
164
 DNA employees and aid agents were surprised by this move, with one 
insider saying that “...this decision came like a bomb, nobody saw that one coming. And you wonder 
who advised the president to make this decision”.
165
 Many considered it an expansion of bureaucracy 
rather than an efficiency impulse. This points at a more common routine, namely that lower ranks in 
the state bureaucracy generally have very little or no knowledge on what exactly is being planned at 
the upper levels, or what the long-term plan for the department is. As a former state bureaucrat 
explained: 
 
In Mozambican institutions only the bosses know what’s going to happen, not the others. They will give 
you a bit of the plan, later another bit and still later another piece. People don’t have a clue of what is 
going on at the higher levels. But if you are a technician, you need to know what the plans are for the 
foreseeable future in order to do your work well, to see how your work fits in the bigger picture. 
 
More generally, the rigid hierarchy means that commitment from the top, i.e. ministers, is essential for 
plans to be taken further. PLAMA realised this: 
 
Particularly important is the commitment from higher levels in the public sector. The idea is to make up 
and sign a sort of Memorandum of Understanding between the ministry of public works and PLAMA, to 
formalise the role of PLAMA for the government so that public entities can work to enhance the business 
environment in cooperation with the private sector. Without the minister formalising PLAMA and its 
objectives, public entities like FIPAG and AIAS are never going to play a very active role in stimulating 
PLAMA’s objectives. 
 
In this domain behind the scenes, therefore, other than formal-legal aspects take centre stage, other 
type of social relations apply and other agents are key. It may be tempting to characterise this as a 
clientelistic system, as one interviewee did: 
 
The party Frelimo already exists for forty years, has been in power for that same period of time and is 
organised like a criminal organisation. With this I do not mean to say the party is criminal, but in the 
sense of dependencies, that everyone needs to march in step. And the system is organised this way from 
the highest to the lowest levels in society. Would the ranks open up and the system be organised 
differently, it will collapse.     
 
While indeed the party is well-organised from top to bottom across the Mozambican society, this must 
not be taken as that control is absolute and Frelimo is all-powerful (Pitcher et al. 2009; Sumich 2010; 
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Death 2016; Hall and Young 1997). Frelimo’s top has always been a heterogeneous group and 
intensive power struggles have always ensued between different Frelimo factions over the course to 
take (Orre and Rønning 2017: 28-32). Moreover, Frelimo faces critical or simply inimical (groups of) 
agents in society as well as powerful foreign agents (e.g. IFIs), whose demands it cannot always or 
simply ignore—although the party goes a long way in safeguarding its power and keeping its ranks 
closed in times of crisis.
166
 Moreover, there are many people inside the state/water bureaucracy who 
condemn these Frelimo-related politics and conduct as they, in the words of Hanlon (2014: 39), tend to 
“suffocate the work of the honest”.   
 
I do not therefore imply there is a one-directional flow of power from this domain ‘behind the scenes’ 
to the formal-legal domain. Neither do I agree with Bayart and Ellis (2000) that ‘real power’ is only 
wielded in the domain behind the scenes. Rather, attempts by Frelimo actors to mobilise state and 
bureaucratic power in pursuit of its own agenda is a balancing act. It requires strategic action on the 
part of Frelimo leaders, as they weigh social and political economic events, such as potential societal 
unrest or the continued inflow of aid money and associated conditionality, against vested (and not 
seldom competing) interests of various of its own factions. Yet, the point of this subsection is that 
many of the strategies that Frelimo-cum-GOM members use have a long history, and even stem from 
the socialist period. They are therefore just as institutionalised as, if not more than, the formal water 
institutions and policies that Mozambican civil servants and foreign aid agents focus on and 
continuously draw attention to. This is not to say that these latter actors are unaware of what I have 
come to call the domain behind the scenes. Many of these actors I interviewed expressed in more or 
less explicit terms that they do know. One informant even said that the exercise of power by ‘the party’ 
in this domain had reached such proportions that what one gets to see or hear in the formal-legal 
domain comes close to a “theatre show”. At the same time, this person said, “...it is difficult to discuss 
this [i.e. Frelimo conduct and politics in the domain ‘behind the scenes’] or do something about it, as it 
concerns the sovereignty of the country”. The ultimate implication, according to this professional, is 
that 
 
Booking progress in the development of the country is primarily a political issue; institutions, the 
government and the field of forces in which they act are more important than technical means or 
money—the latter can be arranged if necessary.  
 
My analysis corroborates this point. The three mechanisms of marketisation were not the force of 
change that they were projected to be, because significant changes are still very much up to 
centralised decision-making—precisely a key target that these mechanisms sought to change. And, I 
conclude, this is what makes water governance in Mozambique a deeply political and uncertain terrain. 
 
4.4.2 Dutch (aid) bureaucratic power 
 
This final subsection focuses on Dutch state and bureaucratic power in the bilateral water aid structure. 
It shows that, despite the deeply political and uncertain nature of water governance in Mozambique, 
the will on the part of Dutch state agents to reduce uncertainty, to be ‘in control’, to render water aid 
processes technical and predictable, and to rationally steer them into a desired (‘trade’) direction has 
                                                          
166
 As Orre and Rønning (2017: 30) put it: “...the party is united at the same time as it is marked by diversity and 
factional fighting”. See chapter 6 for an empirical illustration of Frelimo keeping its ranks closed.  
99 
 
become much stronger than in the period discussed in section 4.1. I argue that water (aid) 
marketisation went hand in hand with the extension, fragmentation and deepening of Dutch aid 
bureaucratic power, in two main ways. Firstly, as scholars such as Ferguson (1994), Mosse (2004) and Li 
(2007) argued long ago, aid bureaucracy is about pursuing improvement through “calculated 
programs for its realization” (Li 2007: 12). Such calculated programs have multiplied, I contend, not 
least triggered by water marketisation. Secondly, calculative behaviour in or applied to these programs 
has intensified, aimed at rendering water aid processes predictable and more market-oriented. 
 
About the first, the multiplication of calculated aid programs, a policy review on Dutch water aid in 
Mozambique in the period 2006 – 2016 observed “...a proliferation of delivery channels, instruments, 
funds, mechanisms and agencies” (Turner 2017: 17, 23). For instance, Mozambique featured as a focus 
country in various Dutch state programs. These include: the (water) aid and trade agenda; the so-called 
‘Water Mondiaal program’ that has focused on the application of Dutch hydrosocial concepts and 
innovations in ‘Delta countries’ like Mozambique; the Top Sector program that stimulates water 
(technology) export and innovation; and in the International Water Ambition (IWA) aimed at profiling 
the Netherlands as water Centre of Excellence (GON 2016a). While these programs had their own niche, 
they also overlapped and were all more or less concerned with increased water (aid) marketisation.  
 
In terms of money, established funding sources such as a delegated water budget at the EKN’s 
disposal and central budgets of DGIS/BZ were accompanied by new (and often small) funding schemes 
to spur water (aid) marketisation. These include Water OS, Partners for Water (PvW), the Sustainable 
Water Fund (FDW) and VIA Water. Water OS is an instrument used to support embassies in 
operationalising their water aid and trade strategies and in establishing links between the Dutch and 
the recipient water sector. PvW is a facility that supports various activities related to the Water 
Mondiaal program and IWA. FDW funded water PPPs in developing countries, and VIA Water targeted 
specific water supply (and sanitation) innovations through “a business-wise approach” and by “tapping 
into new sources of finance”.
167
 These schemes were managed by different The Hague-based entities, 
namely NWP (Water OS), RVO (PvW and FDW, later also Water OS) and a water NGO called Aqua for 
All (VIA Water). Other, generic funding schemes were used for water aid and trade activities in 
Mozambique, carrying names such as Design2Build and Private Sector Development apps (see RVO 
2016). These supplemented established water interventions financed and/or carried out by 
organisations such as Dutch water boards, drinking water companies and the Dutch national soccer 
association. 
 
Altogether, established and novel water aid (and trade) activities in Mozambique amounted to some 
35 in 2016.
168
 These included bigger projects financed and overseen by the EKN, but also a growing 
amount of centrally funded and managed projects. The water officers of the EKN were supposed to 
keep track of these activities, and where possible make ‘cross-linkages’ amongst these, and between 
these and other aid priorities such as health.
169
 With most activities outsourced or managed by other 
entities, this has turned these officers into ‘brokers’ who engage in ‘project engineering’, described one 
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 Such engineering means making connections between projects and actors that were 
somehow (interested in becoming) involved in Dutch water aid in Mozambique. This was no easy task. 
The abovementioned policy review on Dutch water aid in Mozambique concluded that even though 
“...the expanding set of modalities and mechanisms (...) are too complicated to be fully fit for purpose, 
(...) a small team of expert managers are able to fit the funding opportunities and instruments together 
constructively”. This, however, “...requires substantial administrative effort and leaves many 
stakeholders bemused or confused” (Turner 2017: 48). In other words, these officers were 
complimented by being able to successfully navigate the expanding and more fragmented water aid 
bureaucracy. However, actors not as closely involved indeed had a hard(er) time coping with it. It did 
not help one DNA director manage, what he called, ‘the forest’ that is, “...all these separate donors 
[who] bring their own planning and monitoring team with people for coordination, financial 
management and procurement of their programs”. It does explain why some actors depicted the 
implementation of the aid and trade agenda as an inherently instrumental affair. According to one of 





Besides the multiplication of calculated programs, calculative behaviour in or applied to these 
programs had also intensified. This is similar to what Hibou (2015) describes as the intensification of 
the bureaucratic processes of ‘abstraction’, which aims at 
 
...bringing a complex reality within general and formal categories, norms, and rules as they emerge from 
a way of thinking that rationalizes society and the government of goods, human beings, and territories 
on the basis of market and enterprise mechanisms.  
ibid: 27 
 
Such processes occurred at all levels of the water aid relationship. The ‘transitional aid and trade 
category’ applied to Mozambique, as outlined in the previous chapter, arguably best illustrates this at 
the most generic level of the relationship. The idea to phase out aid within five years and have it 
replaced by trade was so at odds with what some understood as ‘the real Mozambique’—the 
Mozambique outside of Maputo, where (water) poverty persisted and the future seemed not as 
bright—that this line could not possibly be maintained. Hibou (2015) argues that formal categories are 
characterised by their adaptability, allowing those who work with them scope for agency. However, this 
example illustrates that a category and its underlying abstraction can be taken so far that agents feel 
they cannot—for ethical, practical or other reasons—work with them anymore. It led to a struggle 
between different BZ actors, which was temporarily settled by the consensus to combine aid and trade. 
 
The categorisation of Mozambique as a Delta Country is a similar, problematic abstraction at this 
generic level. It sends out the message that Mozambique experiences problems similar to those in the 
‘Dutch delta’ and can thus be tackled using solutions that have been tried out in the Netherlands 
(NWP 2014). Those closely involved in Mozambican water management point at the absurdity of this 
thinking. A Dutch consultant with long experience in Mozambique for instance said that neither the 
scale of the river basins, nor the hydrosocial problems that Mozambique deals with, nor the political 
economic context in which these problems ought to be tackled are comparable to those in the Dutch 
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 Moreover, said this interviewee, it is imperative to understand the social and cultural 




At a more specific level, that of programs and projects, this process was best noticeable by the 
intensification of the ‘standardised bureaucratic procedures’ and the ‘overriding concern to manage a 
‘project cycle’ that were already common in the 1990s (IOB 2000: 58). Designing a water aid project 
according to rational planning models like the logical framework had institutionalised. One RVO 
employee, who was relatively new to the world of Dutch water aid, could initially still see the value of 
such models, but also soon realised its shortcomings:  
 
The logframe [logical framework] of the EU and the objective tree analysis, when I first learned about 
these methods I thought: great, this allows you to reduce complexity and at the end of the day you have 
a project with clear parameters and goals for which you can be held accountable. But say 50% of reality 
happens outside of the scope of project, but does considerably affect the project. So then you come back 




A former DGIS manager who had personally witnessed this bureaucratic intensification was outright 
sceptical. He argued development is simply difficult to grasp; development processes, according to 
him, essentially rely on the basis of trust and understanding ‘endogenous processes’. However, he said 
about current project proposals,  
 
…with 16 pages of ‘distrust’, that basis has completely disappeared. What happens now is that NGOs and 
consultants focus on formulating proposals based on one or another logical framework and the writing 





An EKN water officer acknowledged that a focus on results had only become more extreme, driven by 
global aid structures such as those associated with the SDGs and formerly, the MDGs. “It seems as if it 
ought to become ever more SMART”
176
, this officer said, giving a recent example that BZ now also 
wanted to know the number of people in an entire water basin benefiting from a project (co-)financed 
by the Dutch state. She continued: 
 
With an indicator, it appears as if everything is measurable. Who benefits from a dike or dam is a 
question for which The Hague has made an indicator, driven by parliament that wants to see results. They 





The centrality of results even translated into nudges to shift focus in the type of water aid; a country 
team that had reviewed the aid programme at the EKN said that “...it would be good to invest more in 
infrastructure, as that yields more measurable results”.
178
 Next to audits and reviews on programmes 
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and projects, comprehensive files had to be filled out on the overall effect of water aid processes in the 
Mozambican waterscape. Another EKN officer said about the influence of BZ head quarters that 
 
Previously, guiding took place mainly on the basis of development cooperation principles. Embassies 
were relatively autonomous institutes and were granted trust and confidence; the idea was that they 
knew best what should happen in a particular [partner] country. With the introduction of the aid and 
trade agenda, this has become much more turbulent. (...) As embassy, we have come to face the 




Indeed, this last subsection suggests that the will to modernise (water) aid and the Mozambican 
waterscape went hand in hand with a rising strength of Dutch aid bureaucratic power. In other words, 
the current state and desired progress of Mozambique and its waterscape had been increasingly 
framed and defined through the lens of agents based in The Hague (or elsewhere in the Netherlands). 
But while The Hague exerted stronger bureaucratic power to make the market mechanisms work, 
these could in the water governance structure sketched above not easily, if at all, be achieved. This was 
bound to lead to untenable situations or indeed, as discussed several times, to breeding grounds for 
dilemmas, frustration and even deep tensions within the bilateral relationship. These emotions 
cropped up strongest among and between actors most directly involved in the bilateral water aid 
relationship: the Dutch and Mozambican actors based in Maputo and engaged in the water 
bureaucracy’s formal-legal domain. They were the ones ‘squeezed’ between, and having to navigate on 




This chapter examined how the rise of the capitalistic logic of liquid power, as discussed in the 
previous chapter, became expressed in (Dutch) water (aid) marketisation. Marketisation served as a 
force to help transform the centralised governance and bureaucratic structure of the Mozambican 
waterscape and aimed at the market-based restructuring of Dutch water aid and subjects/ objects in 
the Mozambican waterscape targeted by such aid. It is argued that while these mechanisms had 
transformed the waterscape in various respects, it failed to curb Mozambican state and bureaucratic 
power and hence, the centralised approach to governing water affairs. In fact, the contradictory reality 
was that water (aid) marketisation attempts were often negated by these powers.  
 
I explained that the centralised approach in Mozambique could remain strong in spite of the market 
mechanisms deployed, through a growing division within the state water bureaucracy in Mozambique. 
One domain has come to revolve around formal-legal elements pertaining to the water architecture 
erected from the 1990s onwards. It is in this domain that (Dutch) aid agents have gained considerable 
decision-making power as a consequence of aid dependency, and it is here where the market 
mechanisms are designed and ought to have effect. The territorial logic of liquid power professed in 
this domain is that of a moderate, decentralised kind, with the central state creating the enabling 
environment for subnational, corporatized or non-profit/private entities to play their allotted roles in 
hydrosocial development.  
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The other, I posit, is the domain ‘behind the scenes’, where processes and actors in formal-legal 
domain are influenced and (re)directed by agents linked to Frelimo and/or the Frelimo-led GOM. 
These agents work hard to keep power centralised in order to ensure (water) state entities and their 
aid counterparts act in line with—or at least not against—their agendas and interests. These agendas 
and interests vary. Water is inter alia used as: a party-political instrument, e.g. by promising 
communities an improved water supply system in campaign rallies or party gatherings; a way of 
preventing societal unrest in times of crisis, e.g. by keeping tariffs low; a rent seeking resource; or as a 
necessary resource for (mega)projects in other state sectors. The strategies for keeping power 
centralised also vary. They include (re)directing the distribution or targets of water budgets; nurturing 
the rigid hierarchy within the bureaucracy; and the careful selection of persons for top positions in the 
bureaucracy—persons who know how to constructively engage in the politics of foreign aid while not 
posing a threat to the mentioned agendas and interests in the domain behind the scenes. In short, this 
domain knows key agents with agendas and interests, and operational and accountability mechanisms 
that differ from those in the formal-legal domain. Nevertheless, both domains are implicated in the 
bilateral water aid structure, even if the actors, strategies and agendas of the domain behind the 
scenes largely remain hidden to the outsider’s eye.   
 
During the Guebuza presidency (2005-2015), this domain behind the scenes had gained a stronger 
grip on the formal-legal domain, which allowed the centralised water governance structure to continue 
functioning. During that same time, prior to and especially during the implementation of the aid and 
trade agenda, the capitalistic logic became increasingly entrenched within Dutch (water) aid. This went 
hand in hand with other measures, such as a budget cut on the Dutch embassy (EKN) and a 
centralisation of decision-making power and (funding/project) initiatives from the EKN in Mozambique 
to BZ in The Hague. This resulted in the logics drifting apart and growing into an increasingly 
problematic and contradictory relationship, which became manifested within the bilateral relationship 
in different ways and in concrete events. Water topics deemed important to the Dutch state and the 
broader (water) aid community showed little progress and were recurring points of contestation. These 
were topics that the mentioned market mechanisms sought to address, including indeed water 
decentralisation, the reorganisation of DNA and (Dutch) private sector participation.  
 
As part of the aid and trade course, new tactics were applied to speed up these processes. A 
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on water cooperation was signed between the two states, in 
which eligibility for tenders financed by Dutch aid money was reduced to Dutch and Mozambican 
companies. During that same mission, a platform called PLAMA was established to help create a 
market-friendly environment and for promoting Dutch business in the Mozambican waterscape. By the 
time this research was carried out, both had not performed according to plan. The reduced eligibility 
had attracted few extra Dutch companies to Mozambique and had agitated other donors, while 
PLAMA was reviewed as having achieved few of its objectives and it enjoyed little commitment in the 
sector. A core advisor was appointed by the EKN to scope and exploit opportunities for (Dutch) private 
sector involvement and new finance and business models in the Mozambican waterscape, but came to 
the conclusion that the water sector was still too traditional- (i.e. public-)minded for these to prosper. 
Regarding ASAS, the Sector Wide Approach (SWAp) that the Dutch state had financed and facilitated 
since 2002, a much stricter accountability regime was applied. ASAS has been the Dutch state’s key 
instrument in helping develop the new water architecture in Mozambique and the desired institutional 
framework. In this framework, DNA was supposed to play a leading strategic and enabling role in an 
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increasingly decentralised approach to governing water affairs, leaving operations to subnational, 
corporatized or non-public/private entities. Ambitious milestones were defined, but these were 
managed and monitored in ways that did relations no good. Tensions aggravated after the most 
important of milestones, the acceptance of a strategic plan to reorganise DNA, was rejected by the 
Council of Ministers, which made the EKN decide to put a halt to the ASAS programme. The debt crisis 
of 2016, examined in chapter six, then still had to kick in and put a definite end to the once imagined 
grand aid and trade aspirations in Mozambique. 
 
The absence or delay in expected results demonstrated the difficulty and uncertainty involved in 
attempts to modernise a Mozambican waterscape that is still centrally governed by political actors. Yet, 
Dutch aid bureaucratic pressures had only intensified. With the desire to marketise water aid came 
additional funding schemes and additional state and non-state actors managing or implementing such 
schemes, leading to a more fragmented water aid portfolio. Moreover, the introduction and gradual 
extension of corporate and managerial methods applied to Dutch (water) aid has translated in an 
increased application of rational planning models and quantified norms and indicators. In other words, 
the will to render—the deeply uncertain—water aid processes in Mozambique calculable and more 
predictable had grown, in response to claims to make aid more effective. In all, state and bureaucratic 
power from both sides had remained strong, and while these were supposed to create an enabling 
environment for the market mechanisms to be deployed, I conclude this power very much ended up 






Chapter 5  
 
 
Powers and politics  
of water (aid) access  
 
 
5.1 Introduction  
 
In 2015, the UN proclaimed an ambitious goal, namely “universal and equitable access to safe and 
affordable drinking water for all” by 2030 (UN 2015: 18). This sixth Sustainable Development Goal (SDG 
6) was the successor of the eighth Millennium Development Goal (MDG) as the global development 
target for water and sanitation. MDG 8 aimed at halving the number of people without sustainable 
access to water and sanitation by 2015, but this goal was not met in Mozambique.
180
 In 2016, the GOM 
revised its water policy dating from 2007 in line with SDG 6 by setting the goal for universal access to 
water and sanitation to be achieved by 2030 (GOM 2016: 886).  
 
In 1977, the UN had launched the first of a series of global water and sanitation development goals, in 
the International Water Supply and Sanitation Decade that lasted from 1980–1990. The goal was the 
same as the current SDG, namely to provide ‘Water for All’. The GOM committed to this goal, but if this 
was already overambitious if not unrealistic considering the difficult conditions in the first decade after 
independence, the emerging civil war dashed any hope to realise this. A Dutch water aid policy 
document reviewed that this decade “...was intended to act more as challenge and stimulus than as a 
feasible objective”, because “...what was actually achieved by 1990 fell far short of this ideal” (GON 
1998: 16). This was further explained as follows:  
 
The state continued to be the dominating player, regulating and providing water, usually far below cost 
levels, usually without a coherent policy framework, through inefficient and fragmented institutional 
arrangements and often without sufficient regard for environmental aspects. It had become clear that 
most developing countries faced a dramatic shortage of skilled personnel, that cost recovery policies 
were often highly inadequate and that financial planning at national levels was weak. These factors, 
combined with deteriorating water quality in many countries, led to major shortfalls in the availability of 
safe water.  
IOB 2000: 14 
 
Such ‘state failure’ arguments provided the grounds for adopting a neoliberal approach in subsequent 
decades. Donors and aid agencies argued for more finance, better management and replacing a one-
sidedly technical focus with an integrated one, this time driven or inspired by the private sector and 
market mechanisms (see also Bakker 2003; 2010 and previous chapters).  
 
This neoliberal approach has been couched in a variety of aid paradigms, from ‘structural adjustment’ 
and ‘participation’ to ‘good governance’ and ‘poverty reduction’. Mosse (2004) characterised these 
paradigms as embodying the widening of the means of (intentional) development alongside a 
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 Estimate figures distinguish between urban and rural water, the former which had been met, but not the latter. 
Sanitation goals were not achieved (by far). See WHO/ UNICEF (2015; 2017). 
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narrowing of the ends of development, in terms of quantified (global) targets. Based on an analysis of 
subsequent WB policies, Bierschenk (2008) observed that these paradigms did not so much replace, 
but rather complemented, each other. He argued that the WB and other development agencies are 
characterised by high levels of “repressive tolerance”, that is, having a “...high capacity to integrate 
critics and critiques in their policy discourse with limited effect on practices” (ibid: 10). According to 
Mosse (2013), the result is that narrow technical approaches in the past of development have been 
replaced by an all-encompassing approach of technology plus good governance plus poverty 
reduction plus (private sector/community) participation plus innovative finance, etc. (ibid: 237). Yet, a 
neoliberal persuasion has continued to influence these overlapping paradigms and their attempted 
operationalisation. 
 
Approaching aid this way is still in vogue, judging from the Dutch state’s water and sanitation 
development policy (2016–2030) that was drafted by DGIS in accordance with SDG 6. This policy set 
the target of providing access to water and sanitation to 30 and 50 million people respectively, while  
 
...indirectly, however, Dutch funding will help provide access and improved service delivery for a much 
greater number, by driving change in the sector through better governance, mobilisation of domestic 
resources (financial and human) in target countries, addressing key human rights principles like equality, 
and through transparency, participation, accountability and sustainability, and stimulating innovation and 
supporting learning at all levels. 
GON 2017a: 10 
 
This suggests that in Dutch aid, water supply as mainly a technical concern had also turned into an all-
encompassing issue and, moreover, that Dutch state agency is considered influential and far-reaching. 
Sustainability in access illustrates this latter point well. In 1998, a Dutch water aid policy still concluded 
that “...new [water and sanitation] facilities rapidly fell into disuse as a result of poor maintenance and 
management” (GON 1998: 16). This criticism was anticipated on in the 2000s by incorporating a 
‘sustainability clause’ meant to ensure “service delivery for 10 years after project completion” (GON 
2017a: 7). The latest policy’s “main challenge” is said to be “the extension of this clause from 10 to 15 
years” (ibid: 1). An emphasis on enabling people to gain access to water is thus complemented by a 
stronger focus on maintaining and controlling access over an ever longer period of time (Ribot and 
Peluso 2003). In achieving universal and sustainable access to water, moreover, innovative, market-
based approaches are considered key in the water aid and trade agenda and in the SDG framework 
more broadly (HLPW 2018). A magazine published by the Netherlands–African business council 
summarises the problem and preferred solution succinctly in an interview with a Dutch water aid 
professional: “...the defunct water pump has become the main symbol of failing development aid” and 
“’is the most thoroughly researched topic in the development sector’. How can Public-Private 
Partnerships change this once and for all?” (NABC 2017: 32). 
 
This chapter critically engages this focus on increasing sustainable access based on market-based aid 
approaches, taking inspiration from Ribot and Peluso’s (2003) ‘theory of access’. Ribot and Peluso 
define access as “the ability to benefit from things—including material objects, persons, institutions, 





 by a claim or right on property, which was long the dominant focus in 
access studies. Access to resources hinges just as much, if not more, on political economic and cultural 
mechanisms, such as access to technology, capital, markets, labour, knowledge and social identity/ 
social relations. They consider such access mechanisms as “relations of power”, with power viewed as 
“...an effect that emerges from social relations and ongoing struggles within them” (Peluso and Ribot 
2020: 300). This view on power resonates with mine. 
 
In this chapter, I consider the persistent emphasis placed by influential water aid actors and the GOM 
on a particular market-based water access mechanism in Mozambique as an effect of the capitalistic 
logic of liquid power. This mechanism is called the Delegated Management Framework (DMF), which 
builds on Private Sector Participation (PSP) in the production and distribution of water. My reading is 
that despite a short and troubled history of implementing this mechanism in Mozambique’s major 
cities, these actors held on to it and even expanded its scope to minor cities and towns. The troubled 
implementation of this mechanism, I argue, stems from the economic and rational logics underpinning 
this mechanism colliding with various extra-economic and political logics in power struggles between 
the various agents involved in its implementation. I base this argument on, and will pay ample 
attention to these power struggles in, an analysis of a joint Mozambican-Dutch aid intervention aimed 
at implementing the DMF in small cities and towns in Mozambique. This intervention, known as ‘PO15’, 
was financed by the Dutch state. As part of it, Vitens-Evides International (VEI) and other Dutch aid 
agencies supported the public water supply and sanitation agency AIAS
182
 in implementing the DMF in 
at least 15 out of the 130 towns/cities that falls under its mandate. PO15, I posit, fulfilled an significant 
role in navigating and easing the contradictory dynamics between on the one hand the perseverance 
of making the DMF work and on the other hand, the politics and power struggles that often frustrated 
this work. Yet, their technical and technocratic tools did not alter the course of the logics that 
generated these contradictory dynamics, because these are inherently political.  
 
The next section starts with assessing why and how AIAS—and the intervention supporting it—became 
established around the DMF and Private Sector Participation (PSP) as the key access mechanism. 
Section 5.3 then delves into the implementation of the DMF by the joint efforts of AIAS and Dutch 
agencies. Section 5.4 discusses the various types of power struggles involved in this particular access 
mechanism. Section 5.5 takes stock of the DMF as access mechanism, and the role of PO15 in trying to 
make this mechanism work despite structural challenges. Section 5.6 concludes.  
 
5.2 The DMF and PSP as an overvalued idea 
 
This section argues that the DMF in combination with PSP (DMF–PSP) has become an idée fixe, or what 
physiatrists call an ‘overvalued idea’, in the Mozambican waterscape and the bilateral relationship. 
Overvalued ideas, argues Vaele (2002: 383), “...are associated with idealised values, which have 
developed into such an over-riding importance, that they totally define the ‘self’ (...) and are also 
characterised by the rigidity with which they are held”. I suggest this is an apt description of how 
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 Gaining access refers to the ways access is established, controlling access as “the ability to mediate other’s 
access” or the “checking and direction of action, the function of power of directing and regulating free action” 
(based on Rangan 1997) and maintaining access as processes in which resources and powers are “expended to 
keep resource access open” (Ribot and Peluso 2003: 158-159).  
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 AIAS stands for Administração de Infra-Estruturas de Água e Saneamento, literally translated as the 
‘administration for water and sanitation infrastructures’. 
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powerful aid actors (including the GON) and Mozambican water actors alike have held on to the DMF–
PSP as preferred market-based water access mechanism, despite deeply problematic experiences with 
its implementation. Subsection 5.2.2 substantiates this argument by deconstructing the expansion of 
the DMF’s scope from major to smaller cities and towns, and how AIAS became established in relation 
to this expansion. Subsection 5.2.3 examines the establishment of the bilateral aid intervention PO15, 
which has been set up around the same idée fixe, thereby reproducing it. First, however, the next 
subsection provides a general background on AIAS and the DMF.  
 
5.2.1 The design principles of AIAS and the DMF  
 
AIAS is a public entity established in 2009, charged with rehabilitating, maintaining and outsourcing 
the operations of ‘secondary’ urban 
water systems and all urban sanitation 
infrastructures in Mozambique. 




points at all urban water systems that 
are not primary, with primary defined as 
all systems in provincial capitals and 
other urban centers considered 
‘strategic’ by the government (GOM 
2009b: 98). Primary systems add up to 
21
184
, leaving 130 secondary urban water 
supply systems dispersed over the 
country, ranging in size from roughly 
2500 up to 200,000 inhabitants. The 
primary cities are the responsibility of 
FIPAG that was established in 1998, the 
secondary towns that of AIAS. Other 
than FIPAG, which only deals with water 
supply, AIAS is also made responsible 
for managing sanitation infrastructure, in 





AIAS was established in the context of 
the DMF, whose scope was expanded to 
cover secondary in addition to primary 
water supply systems as well as urban 
sanitation infrastructure. To recall, the 
DMF separates ownership of water and 
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 Decree 19/2009 (GOM 2009b). 
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 Of which 10 in the provincial capitals. 
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 The Decree literally states that AIAS is responsible for managing public drainage systems for residual water, but 
sanitation is interpreted more broadly, as we will see.  
Figure 5.1—Water and sanitation coverage rates in 2013 in the towns/ 
cities under the mandate of AIAS, per province. (Source: based on 




sanitation infrastructure from operations of these infrastructures. AIAS ought to invest in and 
maintains its infrastructures on behalf of the state, and promote their ‘efficient and financially viable’ 
operations by outsourcing these to private sector or other autonomous actors (GOM 2009b). The DMF 
stipulates the principle of cost-recovery. This means that water users should pay a price for water and 
sanitation that covers the maintenance and operational costs of the systems as well as a profit for 
operators. The scope of the water regulator CRA was also expanded in line with the expansion of the 
DMF to secondary towns. Was CRA previously responsible for regulating the water services and tariffs 
of FIPAG in the primary cities only, it now also became responsible for regulating the water services 
and tariffs in all secondary towns (as well as regulating an entirely new domain: sanitation, in all urban 
centres). Whereas CRA and FIPAG have been established as corporatised entities with financial and 
administrative 
autonomy, AIAS only 
enjoyed administrative 
autonomy. This means it 
depends on the central 
state for its budget and 
has to abide by state 







The original idea was for 
AIAS to operate as a 
support agency for so-
called ‘provincial water boards’. These boards were supposed to take the lead in investing in and 
overseeing the operations of secondary water supply systems in the provinces, supported by AIAS. 
However, for reasons explained below, this idea was soon revised and turned around by the GOM. 
Instead of AIAS supporting such new provincial entities, AIAS was turned into the leading agent, and 
provincial delegations were envisaged to represent and support AIAS at the provincial level (GOM 
2011). Four such delegations had been established by 2016, in the provinces of Cabo Delgado, 
Nampula, Zambezia and Inhambane. Moreover, provincial governments were to be advised on the 
local implementation of the DMF by yet another institution, the Provincial Councils for Water and 
Sanitation (CPAS). Two CPAS had been created, in the provinces of Cabo Delgado and Nampula.  
 
In short, AIAS is the entity responsible for increasing access to improved water sources in 130 small 
towns and to sanitation in 151 towns and cities, with low coverage rates (see figure 5.1). In line with 
SDG 6, it should attain universal water and sanitation coverage by 2030. Figure 5.2 shows how AIAS 
projected the realisation of this target in 2016. The three water marketisation mechanisms discussed in 
the previous chapter underpin the DMF and AIAS: it is built on the private sector imaginary; AIAS is 
meant to be a corporatized entity in a political economic and cultural sense; and (competitive) 
tendering is applied extensively. The following subsection deals with the politics of establishing AIAS. 
 
Figure 5.2—Projections for attaining universal water and sanitation access 
until 2030 (source: AIAS 2016).  
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5.2.2 Deconstructing the expansion of the DMF and the establishment of AIAS 
 
This subsection contends that the expansion of the DMF–PSP mechanism from Mozambican cities to 
towns, and the establishment of AIAS, has been a decision-making process driven by neoliberal 
ideology rather than based on a proven track record of this mechanism. This decision was nevertheless 
legitimised on the mechanism’s successful application in the past in Mozambique. Yet, I argue, this 
should be considered success produced by its key propagators, where in fact its application was 
deeply problematic. 
 
A number of Mozambican and foreign water actors told me that a water supply framework specifically 
for small towns in Mozambique was long overdue. They argued that the water systems now 
administered by AIAS previously fell between two stools, i.e. between the rural and urban water supply 
frameworks. As one actor summarises: “there was a gap; DNA carried out PRONASAR for rural water
186
 
and FIPAG served the major cities. There was nobody responsible for small towns”.
187
 Various ideas on 
suitable access mechanisms had been discussed among water managers and decision-makers. A 
promising idea, according to them, was to have FIPAG invest in ‘satellite towns’. That is, FIPAG would 
take care of water systems in towns close to the cities it served, something FIPAG already did on a 
small scale. But, as one interviewee said, “donors decide (...) if you want something done, you have to 
have a donor buying it”.
188
 According to this person, FIPAG and the DMF-PSP mechanism were created 
“because the World Bank wanted it” and the same pattern would apply to the expansion of the DMF 
and the establishment of AIAS.
189
 Thus, even though Mozambican actors had long voiced the need for 
a separate framework for water supply in towns, they relied on aid agents to make it happen, notably 
the WB. Conditionality would be part and parcel of the deal. 
 
By the mid-2000s, the WB (through its Water and Sanitation Program, WSP) had already intensified its 
interest in water supply and sanitation in small towns globally and in Mozambique (WSP et al. 2002).
190
 
The WSP was one among a number of agents in the global water aid community that had begun 
debating water and sanitation services in small towns since the early 2000s, and the WSP was 
particularly interested in linking this ‘small towns agenda’ to the role of the private sector and PPPs 
(Adank 2013: 11-12). This followed a period of what the WB had itself called a “rethink” on its one-size-
fits-all privatisation policies (Fine and Hall 2012: 54), including those applied to water supply in large 
cities across the developing world in the 1990s and early 2000s (Franceys 2008). Water privatisation 
was replaced by the less controversial and consensual term ‘PPP’ and more emphasis was placed on 
domestic PSP in small towns next to PSP in large cities. As part of the very first WB-funded water 
project in Mozambique (called NWDP I
191
), a pilot that experimented with the rehabilitation of small 
                                                          
186
 PRONASAR is the current rural water program in Mozambique, financed jointly by a number of donors and aid 
agencies. PRONAR was its predecessor, to which this person also referred to. 
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 Interview international water consultant in Mozambique, 8 August 2017. This quote is a short version of 
explanations given by various other interviewees: interview MPOPHRH employee, 18 November 2016; interview 
WB employee, 20 February 2017; interview former DNA director, 28 February 2017. See also Simone et al. (2016: 
6). 
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 Interview (former) FIPAG employee, 30 May 2016.  
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 Ibid.  Another Mozambican insider used the metaphor of the dancing place; if the WB wants you to dance the 
tango, you dance the tango—even if you can’t (field notes, 26 January 2016). 
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 “Small towns” has become the international designation for urban water supply in places that AIAS services. 
191
 This stands for the first National Water Development Project.  
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piped water systems in small towns, and outsourcing its operations to private companies, was already 
undertaken in 2006 (WB 2006; WSP 2010).  
 
By that time, the WB joined forces with another aid agency that had come to help Mozambique: the 
Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC). This US aid agency granted Mozambique a five-year aid 
program worth half a billion dollar in 2007.
192
 Of this total amount, more than $200mn. would be 
invested in a Water and Sanitation Program provided the GOM meets two key criteria, one of them 
being the creation of an “Asset Management Unit (AMU)” by “the end of March 2009” (MCC 2007: 20). 
This AMU became AIAS. The former AIAS director said that “...if this precondition would not be 
attended by the government, the 500 million dollar would not become effective”.
193
 This condition 
came about through intensive ‘donor consultation’ with the WB that was simultaneously setting up a 
project that followed up the NWDP I (called WASIS
194
), intent on helping DNA develop an AMU “based 
on the recipient’s delegated management model” (GOM and IDA 2007: 6).
195
 Shortly after, the GOM 
published a revised water policy in which it referred to the possibility of expanding the DMF to small 
towns (GOM 2007), laying the groundwork for formalising the condition agreed upon with the MCC 
(and indirectly, the WB). This suggestion in the water policy provided the MCC and the WB a legal 
basis to pursue plans of expanding the DMF and PSP in Mozambique and it allowed them to claim that 
this was principally a wish of the GOM.  
 
My reading is that this condition of establishing AIAS as an AMU and expanding the DMF suited the 
neoliberal agendas of the WB and MCC, yet it could not legitimised by neoliberal ideology. It had to be 
legitimised based on ‘evidence’. Thus, the expansion of the DMF to small towns and the creation of 
AIAS was legitimised by the alleged success of the DMF hitherto applied to primary water supply 
systems in Mozambican cities. 
 
How this success is portrayed is well illustrated in a WSP report (Simone et al. 2016). This report states 
that before the adoption of the DMF and the introduction of PPP in water supply in 1998, there were 
poor, mostly state-run water and sanitation services and no clear water and sanitation strategy. Then 
the (WB instigated) DMF was established in 1998, along with the entities FIPAG and CRA. By the end of 
the 1990s, PSP started in Maputo and four other cities in Mozambique. From then on, the report 
argues, “the targeted systems have been successfully turned around and achieved over 70 percent 
coverage (meeting the MDG [for urban areas]), as well as recovering costs, including (concessional) 
loan repayments” (ibid: 6). “Building on this success”, the report continues, PSP in a selection of small 
towns was piloted in 2006, i.e. in NWDP I. This pilot was only evaluated in 2009, with mixed results. By 
that time, however, the abovementioned conditions between the MCC/WB and the GOM had already 
been negotiated and agreed upon, and the GOM had already announced the possibility of expanding 
the DMF to small towns (GOM 2007). In other words, whatever the outcomes of the pilot, the DMF 
would in any event be expanded to cover small towns as well.  
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 The MCC was founded in 2002 by the former President Bush jr. in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, aimed at 
“reducing poverty through growth”. See Mawdsley (2008) and Soederberg (2004) for a critical introduction of the 
MCC and its neoliberal persuasion. 
193
 Former AIAS director, 24 February 2017. 
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 The Water Sector Services and Institutional Support project. 
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 Indeed, the WASIS evaluation document states that the proposal for WASIS was designed specifically with the 
MCC (WB 2016: 7). 
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This is problematic enough, yet the claimed success of the DMF and PSP in large cities that informed 
the decision to replicate the DMF in small towns was no less troubling. Rather, I assess the experience 
with the DMF and PSP in large cities as deeply problematic. Even the WB itself produced documents 
on the experience based on which it is difficult to label it a success (e.g. WB 2009). As mentioned in the 
previous chapter
196
, the consortium led by French multinational SAUR that entered into 
(lease/management) contracts for supplying water in Maputo and in four other cities had underbid 
and renegotiated their contract two years after they assumed operations in 1999. SAUR withdrew and 
Áquas de Portugal (AdP) took over as the lead entity. But between FIPAG and AdP, relations grew 
increasingly tense, rendering cooperation within their ‘partnership’ close to impossible and resulting in 
constant accusations about each other’s lack of commitment and failures (Triche 2009; WB 2009). As 
one insider explained: 
 
AdP had accumulated bad debts and they had also performed poorly. There were a number of 
expectations that AdP could not meet, including a better performance than did the state before them, 
reduced leakages and improved billing services. FIPAG on the other hand did not meet all their targets 
either; their investment program to upgrade the systems was delayed. AdP took that as one of the main 
reasons of not being able to perform according to plan.
197 
 
Relations became so tense that the GOM, through FIPAG, prematurely bought back AdP’s shares in 
2011, assuming a majority ownership in the consortium. By then, FIPAG had progressively taken over 
the management of systems in other cities and became, next to an investor in infrastructure, directly 
involved in its operations. It had also reorganised its organisational structure, with a FIPAG head 
quarter in Maputo delegating operations to regional FIPAG companies using performance contracts, 
thereby mimicking the DMF. FIPAG continued another partnership that it had entered into since 2005, 
with Vitens-Evides International (VEI). VEI is the aid agency of various Dutch public water companies 
that profiles itself as a private sector actor in partnerships such as these. Yet, this partnership was 
vitally different from the one sketched above; VEI provided technical assistance (TA) and investment 
capital to FIPAG in a number of cities in the south (and later in other regions) of Mozambique, but did 
not itself assume operations.  
 
The envisaged DMF, combined with international PSP, had not met expectations. A review by a water 
regulator association concluded that “...conceptually, the DMF embraced best practices and anticipated 
a bright future. The reality, though, has shown that those expectations were not achievable” (Wilson 
2016: 7). The review stated that with the withdrawal of the international private sector, “the DMF 
underwent major changes”, namely the expansion of the role of FIPAG, “...which began to play a much 
more active part in operations, distorting the model, but reducing the negative impact of withdrawals 
from the private sector”. Yet this new situation severely complicated the Mozambican water regulator’s 
(CRA) work, says one employee: 
 
Currently, if FIPAG is not complying by the regulatory rules, it is difficult to impose penalties, because at 
the end of the day, FIPAG is itself a public company. For the DMF to work well, it needs the private sector 
to operate the water systems. (...) FIPAG is doing the investments and operations. That is not right, it is 
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not what was meant when the government adopted the DMF. For CRA it is difficult to have FIPAG act in 
compliance with the service levels that are agreed upon.
198
  
All this is not to say that there were no improvements in the water supply systems in these cities. Yet, 
the above strongly suggests that this was not because of the DMF and PSP, but despite of it, and a 
better explanation for improvements are the many hundreds of millions of dollars that the WB and 
other IFI’s and donors had invested in the systems. As an insider put it: “the investments were OK, but 
the model of private companies making the operations sustainable seems to fail. They say it has all 




The ‘success’ of the DMF and PSP in large cities can therefore better be considered success produced 
by its propagators rather than based on firm evidence (Mosse 2004: 646), used for legitimising the 
DMF expansion and establishment of AIAS. It was not a question of whether or not the DMF and PSP 
worked well. At any cost this access mechanism had to remain in place. Alternative ideas such as FIPAG 
serving satellite (small) towns were not deemed acceptable, since this would basically mean cross-





The establishment of AIAS appeared in a MCC evaluation report as a ticked box stating “met on time” 
(MCC 2016), but only because, in the words of one interviewee, “it was created in a rush”.
201
 The MCC 
and the WB had prepared the legal and most operational documents for AIAS to be set up, in order to 
meet the deadline of March 2009. While MCC could and did report home that it delivered on its 
promise of policy reform (US Department of State 2009; 2010), AIAS had become another addition in a 
long history of “extremely ambitious programmes of transformation [that] was beyond the ability of 
the Mozambican state to implement, either materially or culturally” (Hall and Young 1997: 80). A small 
group of about ten DNA employees was transferred to AIAS and formed its staff. It initially received a 
tiny budget of a couple of million dollars a year.  
 
To get going, explained a WB employee, the WB and the MCC had made an “informal agreement (...) 
that if the MCC would invest in infrastructure, then the Bank would finance institutional support”.
202
 
Specifically, the MCC said it would invest in 28 systems in the northern provinces of Cabo Delgado and 
Nampula. The WB would then help AIAS and provincial delegations, through its WASIS project, in 
tendering these rehabilitated systems to private operators. But this was not to be: 
 
Although the MCC wanted to invest in 28 systems, this was narrowed down to 18 systems in the first 
mission. Then in the second mission they said that 18 would be too much, so they reduced the number 
to 12. In the third mission they said: no, 12 is too much, we don’t have budget for that, it can only be 6 
systems. But in the end, it turned out that they had no money to invest in any system at all. Thus we 
ended up in the situation that the World Bank had reserved budget for the linked WASIS project, but 
there would be no investment in infrastructure. 
 
Why these announced investments did not materialise, except for emergency works on the water 
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system in the town of Mocuba, was not explained. Only studies were carried out. But according to a 
DNA manager, these studies “....have never been used. And they had cost a lot of money. In fact, we 
cannot now use those, because whenever an intervention will happen now, they’ll need to do another 
study as the situation on the ground has changed since then”.
203
 Without rehabilitated systems, there 
was no point for the WB to provide TA. It decided to rehabilitate the systems of two towns in the 
provinces of Cabo Delgado and Nampula itself along with AUSaid, “so that the creation of the AIAS 
delegations [in these provinces] could be legitimised”.
204
 This event gave a clue of what AIAS could 
expect as an(other) aid-dependent water agency.  
 
Indeed, with very few resources, AIAS had to attract investment grants and TA from more donors than 
the WB and MCC, but this proved very difficult for two main reasons. Firstly, because prospective 
donors were still mostly interested in large urban water systems rather than small ones that were 
deemed technically poor, financially unviable and public sector driven. Secondly, AIAS did not enjoy 
financial autonomy and was therefore considered another central state entity rather than a 
corporatized entity such as FIPAG. This did not help in gaining trust and hence, support of donors. 
Consequently, AIAS was initially seen as existing “only on paper” and as a very weak entity.
205
 Only two 
years after its inception, and after the first director got replaced, did AIAS really become operational. It 
urgently needed institutional support as well as technical support for (potential) operators whom, the 
pilot of 2006 had made clear, lacked knowledge and capacity to operate the systems. Thus AIAS and 
its key partner WSP looked out for donors who, next to investments, could help provide TA for AIAS 
and operators. They found a willing ear at the Dutch embassy (EKN) in Maputo.  
 
5.2.3 PO15: a bilateral water aid and trade intervention set up around AIAS and the DMF–PSP 
 
The previous subsection tried to make clear how power expended by powerful aid agents in 
Mozambique resulted in the continuation and expansion of the DMF–PSP water access mechanism, 
despite problematic past experience with this mechanism. This subsection tells how Dutch state actors, 
after initial hesitation, became involved in taking this process further. I suggest that supporting AIAS in 
embedding this market-based access mechanism offered opportunities for the EKN to align its 
program with the (then) newly introduced Dutch aid and trade agenda. As such, this subsection 
explains how the process of expanding the DMF and establishing AIAS, once set in train but still very 
fragile, gains wider acceptance and becomes institutionalised.  
 
The Dutch state already supported various public water agencies in Mozambique, notably DNA 
through the ASAS programs and FIPAG through the partnership with VEI. The question whether the 
EKN would also consider providing support to AIAS therefore did not come as a surprise. The EKN 
initially lacked confidence in AIAS, said an insider, but it did not reject the option altogether.
206
 
According to the former director of AIAS, the legal framework for increasing water access (via the 
DMF) was clear by the time the Dutch state was approached and, she added, “the World Bank was 
already there, supporting AIAS, which I think gave some comfort to the Netherlands”.
207
 Indeed, what 
sparked the interest of the EKN was the combined DMF–PSP strategy that AIAS was meant to follow. 
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This blended in well with the aid and trade agenda that a newly installed Dutch government had just 
adopted by that time, the early 2010s (GON 2010; 2011a). It soon became clear that in this policy, 
water would be a focus area, a strong(er) emphasis would be placed on market-based water access 
through PSP, and that Mozambique would remain a partner country. Decision-makers within BZ 
increasingly pushed embassies to establish a more commercial relationship with aid partners. One 
consultant who did various ‘scoping missions’ to Mozambique indicated that during this time, the 





In view of this changing policy context, Dutch state actors began to see AIAS through a new lens; not 
just as another weak state agency, but one that offered opportunities for operationalising the water 
aid and trade agenda. In several missions from early 2011 onwards, the idea of providing support to 
AIAS was raised and it was also mentioned in a ‘water market scan’ (Pietersen 2011). However, 
prospective Dutch aid agencies who could provide such support were reluctant to engage, as they 
lacked confidence in AIAS. Their perspective changed when the EKN voiced the prospect of €9mn. 
becoming available for project support to AIAS. Following a formal request and talks at the 
Amsterdam Water Week in November 2011, a consortium of Dutch water aid agents started 
negotiations with AIAS, followed by several missions in 2012 in which it developed ideas for a four-
year project. While AIAS was continued being seen as a weak entity and doubts remained on providing 
support, its ‘aid and trade’ potential was evaluated positively. In November 2012, a ‘Water Mondiaal’ 
mission was undertaken “...to improve insight in market opportunities for the broader Dutch (private) 
water sector in relation to (future) investments in Water Supply and Sanitation in the small towns and 
villages in Mozambique” (RVO 2012). Those involved assessed that 
 
In general the opportunities for investments in the Water & Sanitation Sector in Mozambique have a 
positive outlook, given the current initiatives in Mozambique to address the uncertainties around 
protection of investments and supportive regulation to allow private operators to address the market 
demand currently un-served by larger water & sanitation service providers.  
Ibid 
 
A month before, Dutch and Mozambican politicians had already signed a Memorandum of 
Understanding in a high-profile economic mission, meant to intensify water cooperation between both 
countries (GOM and GON 2012). The contract for setting up the public-private water platform PLAMA 
was also signed.
209
 The foreseen intervention with AIAS fitted in this chain of new water ‘aid and trade’ 
activities, with the EKN branding the intervention as a vehicle to “increase the market for Dutch water 
technology” and which “will develop new concepts and models to finance, implement and operate 
small urban water supply and sanitation systems, with a strong involvement of the private sector” 
(GON 2013c: 12). 
 
In practice, the project involved a mix of ‘traditional’ TA-type and ‘modern’ market-based water aid 
activities. The lead implementing agent, VEI, basically copy-pasted the key aid activities it had carried 
out with FIPAG since 2005, namely ‘institutional development’ of AIAS in a first Work Package (WP) 
and ‘capacity building’ of water operators in another (WP2). VEI joined forces with three other Dutch 
aid actors: World Waternet (WWn), the aid organisation of the water cycle company of Amsterdam; 
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SNV, a large NGO; and BOP Innovation Center (BoP Inc.), a private entity specialised in ‘inclusive 
business models’ for the ‘Base of the Pyramid’ (BoP)—which refers to the poorest four million in the 
world who are seen as consumers, producers and entrepreneurs. WWn and SNV engaged in more or 
less innovative approaches aimed at building capacity among sanitation providers (also part of WP2), 
while BoP Inc. was responsible for developing ‘innovative water and sanitation business models’ and 
an ‘inclusive business incubator’ (WP4). The third WP concentrated on investments in water and 
sanitation systems. Among the investment vehicles envisaged was a ‘demand-driven trust fund’ in 
which donors put funds, which in turn can be applied for by water and sanitation operators. In all, the 
project amounted to €7.6mn., of which €7mn. was financed by the EKN.
210
 Figure 5.3 summarises the 
intervention’s ‘logical framework’, that is, how ‘input’ was expected to lead to ‘output’ and ‘impact’. 
The project became known as ‘PO15’, referring to its initial aim to support water and sanitation 
providers in 15 out of the 130 small towns AIAS was responsible for. 
 
The overall objective of PO15 was to increase access to sustainable water and sanitation services. 
Moreover, each of the WP’s had a strategic objective (which were in turn specified in measurable 
indicators): 
 
1. stable AIAS organization at central and provincial levels with a capacity to guarantee sustainability of 
services to attract more funding from third parties; 
2. sustainable operation of urban drinking water and sanitation services in 15 towns; 
3. mechanisms in place for extension of infrastructure and increased number of water and sanitation 
facilities; 
4. increased involvement of the private sector, contributing to sustainable services 
 
AIAS and Consortium 2013: 32 
 
The proposal was finalised early 2013, but it took another half a year before the intervention actually 
started, because of disagreements over activities to undertake and financial matters.
211
 The project 
eventually started early 2014 with an ‘inception phase’ of six months, followed by a ‘GO / NO GO’ 
decision to proceed, as Dutch agencies were still not confident whether agreements made with AIAS 
and the GOM were going to be met. The decision hinged on a ‘green light’ for 19 indicators, which 
ranged from hiring a PO15 project leader to gaining commitment of the GOM to cover most of the 
operational costs of AIAS by 2015 (AIAS and consortium 2014: 7-8).  
 
In all, AIAS and PO15 were established as permanent and temporary structures rooted in the DMF and 
PSP as principal access mechanism. This mechanism fitted the private sector (and private finance) 
imaginary of aid agents who took the lead in establishing AIAS and/or PO15, notably the MCC, WB 
and the EKN. Yet, I argue this mechanism should be seen as an ‘overvalued idea’, with actors rigidly 
holding on to it despite deep-seated problems. Therefore, a challenging context was to be expected in 
which to implement the intervention PO15. The next sections sketch this context and examine the 
implementation within it.  
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5.3 Implementing the DMF and PSP in a challenging hydrosocial context 
 
This section and the next examine the implementation of the DMF–PSP mechanism by AIAS and PO15 
in the project’s ‘target towns’. The target towns of PO15 are indicated by the arrows in the map shown 
in figure 5.4. While the project originally targeted 15 towns, during implementation, a number of 
additional towns whose water system had become operational were included. These towns, as well as 
the others falling under AIAS’ mandate, can briefly be characterised as follows. 
 
The 130 towns that AIAS is responsible for are dispersed over the country’s territory, and so are the 
15+ target towns of PO15. This means their demographic, ethnic, political economic, socio-cultural and 
material-biophysical contexts often vary considerably, particularly (but not necessarily) between towns 
in the different provinces/regions of Mozambique. Mozambique’s regions have different histories and 
have benefited from, or been affected by, Mozambique’s integration in the world economy and 
economic spin-off in highly uneven ways. At the same time, the development of these towns since late 
colonialism (from approx. 1890 onwards) are also comparable in a number of ways. In short, while 
some of these towns have ancient histories, e.g. as trading posts, many have developed or been 
Figure 5.3—Summary of PO15’s logical framework at the start (source: Schouten and Rundberg 2013: 6) 
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created by the Portuguese coloniser as military, economic and/or administrative posts from where they 
attempted to control and exploit the territory.  
 
These towns are characterised by what Andersen et al. (2015) call an ‘extreme spatial duality’. With this 
he refers to a built environment at the center of cities and towns known as the cidade cimento and, 
from the perspective of this cement city, peripheral urban environments sometimes referred to as 
cidade de caniço (cane city). Urban planning during colonialism applied to the cement city, but not to 
the peripheries, which led to the presence of modern infrastructure in the former and its absence in 
the latter. Water pre-eminently reflects this; all PO15 towns had a small and relatively simple piped 
water supply system in its centre that served the Portuguese population and a small number of 
privileged Africans. African people living in the peripheries were left to their own devices, and relied on 
sources varying from the most proximate surface water to hand dug wells (poços). A lack of (interest 
in) urban planning on the part of the GOM after independence has reproduced rather than 
transformed this uneven spatial development (Jenkins 2013). The water projects of numerous aid 
actors after independence, along with state and individual initiatives, has created in these towns what 
Schwartz et al. (2015) call a “meshwork of water service provisioning”. That is, a minority of the town’s 
population has relied on ‘formal’, piped water supply services and another part on (aid sponsored) 
public standpipes (fontenários). The majority (still) rely on any available and not formally recognised 
source that they can afford, such as poços and increasingly, private individuals selling water to 
neighbours.
212
 It is in these towns that AIAS and PO15 carried out their tasks. 
 
This section sketches the challenging hydrosocial environment in which the DMF’s implementation 
occurred and how PO15 dealt with the challenges it faced. The next subsection points out that the 
basic socio-material conditions considered essential for operationalising the DMF–PSP were deeply 
challenging or simply missing. In this disabling rather than enabling environment, subsection 5.3.2. 
argues that PO15 managed to (temporarily) address some of these conditions with considerable effect, 
although not necessarily according to plan. It did not fulfil some objectives, however, which happened 
to be (or were considered) crucial for the progress of implementation.  
 
5.3.1 Challenging socio-material conditions and the politics of aid dependency 
 
AIAS had a difficult time getting established. Interviewees indicated that the small staff (around ten 
employees) transferred from DNA to AIAS lacked capacity to operationalise the DFM and PSP.
213
 AIAS 
was thus set up as another public entity in which low-paid and mostly unqualified staff relying on a 
small state budget worked side by side with well-paid and experienced external advisors from, or hired 
by, the WSP and MCC. As a public entity without much autonomy and unattractive salaries, it 
furthermore had a hard time attracting or retaining qualified personnel. AIAS was provided with a tiny 
state budget, initially receiving only a couple of million US dollars a year. This budget increased to 
around $10-12mn. annually, but this was still (considered) miniscule in light of its huge mandate and 
objective. The head of AIAS’ technical department put this amount in context: 
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Figure 5.4—AIAS/PO15 ‘target towns’ drawn in a map of Mozambique. The red arrows indicate 
towns in which fieldwork was carried out by the author, the green arrows indicate towns that 










...consider rehabilitation works [on three water systems] going on in [the province of] Inhambane that are 
financed by the European Union: they already amount to 10 million US dollar. Another project we do 




Hence, the bulk of expenditures, as in the sector more generally, were to be borne by IFIs and donors, 
with all (familiar) aid dependency strings attached. Besides these internal issues, the (domestic) private 
sector that was expected to take up operations in water supply in the towns was small and 
inexperienced. The profit motive that was supposed to stimulate the private sector was questionable, 
given the specifics of the ‘market’, that is, the small size of most towns and their water systems, poor 




Considering this, AIAS and PO15 adopted a pragmatic and opportunistic course in implementing the 
DMF, in which it seized opportunities as they came and picked the proverbial low-hanging fruit. This 
meant building on initiatives that were already ongoing or planned, with the technical state of systems 
being particularly important: 
 
Given that operators cannot be expected to manage loss-making systems, a basic principle of delegated 
management is that the system must be in a viable operational state for delegated management to work.  
 
Simone et al. 2016: 8 
 
By the time the proposal for PO15 was finalised, in 2013, there were about 15 such systems/towns. 
Some of them were part of the WB pilot that started in 2006 (see above). Private operators had started 
in seven towns since 2006, but at least four of them had terminated operations before contract’s end 
due to poor performance of the operator (discharged by local authorities), the lack of profitability 
(operator himself quitted) and/or technical deficiencies in the system.
216
 PO15 included those towns in 
which new private operators or municipal entities had become operational. Systems that had just been 
or were planned to be rehabilitated complemented the list of PO15 towns, with the PO15 project 
manager explaining that “technical assistance simply follows investment paths”. He added that “this 




The process of bigger towns being served first is one of those ‘strings’ attached to aid dependency. In 
other words, where investments take place is primarily driven by the preferences of aid agencies (IFIs, 
donors) that finance the rehabilitation of systems. Increasing access is a, if not the, key objective of 
many donors. The potential to increase access through PSP the quickest is considered best in large 
towns. In large towns, essential conditions for the system’s financial viability are (considered) most 
favourable, including a high population density and high ‘ability’ and ‘willingness to pay’.
218
 The 
obvious consequence of this process is that AIAS’s activities (and those of PO15) followed donors and 
their investment preferences for towns and regions rather than the other way around, leading to a 
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patchwork of activities around the country not bound by an overarching strategy. This led one insider  
to argue that AIAS has to 
 
...better organise investments. They’ll have to strategically think about investments, ask themselves the 
question where they want to invest in and why. They might say that their priority is to invest in Nampula 
and Cabo Delgado, but then money becomes available for say a system in Inhambane, and the focus 
changes to there. This is due to a lack of capacity, and not having a funding strategy in place.
219 
 
Moreover, even if donors had pledged investments, it remained to be seen how much is actually made 
available, and exactly when, how and to what extent promised investments materialise. The 
abovementioned case of MCC funds that were agreed to be invested in some twenty systems in 
northern Mozambique, but in which only one system got rehabilitated (and then only partially in 
anticipation of full rehabilitation), poignantly illustrates the extent to which AIAS’ planning hinges on 
aid agencies’ agendas and peculiarities.  
 
How (well) a system is actually rehabilitated then depends on who does the construction. AIAS and 
local authorities that organise the tendering and outsourcing of construction works tend to award 
these works to the lowest bidder, such as Chinese companies. The idea behind this is that AIAS, 
according to one employee, supposedly “gets most out of the dollar spent”.
220
 But systems 
rehabilitated by Chinese companies were the prime targets of criticism by Dutch water aid experts with 
whom I spoke or did fieldwork with. “Everywhere they come, they deliver that ‘cheap crap’”, said one 
such expert.
221
 Another became agitated when inspecting a system in one of the towns rehabilitated 
by a Chinese constructor, saying they are the “perfect imitators”. System components appear to be of 
high quality, he mentioned, but it is mostly “shit”. Parts which last for decades in the Netherlands break 
down in a matter of years or even months. This may be due to poor quality of materials used, but also 
by AIAS lacking capacity and knowledge to supervise these works and ensure they are carried out well. 
Moreover, these systems were often not maintained well. And this was another one of his frustrations: 
the lack of maintenance on the part of operators. Criticism also targeted donors. Donors’ 
preoccupation with increasing connections results in ‘more pipes in the ground’, he said, but few are 
interested in making investments available for maintaining existing systems. Moreover, instead of 
replacing or removing obsolete systems dating from colonial times, these colonial systems are often 
the starting point for rehabilitation and extension. Old and new system parts thus become entangled, 




Another oft-heard challenge was that systems were not rehabilitated according to design, or according 
to a design that was ill-prepared for seasonal fluctuations or changing hydrological/ climatic 
conditions. In the town of Manjacaze, for instance, essential elements of water treatment were either 
missing or too small, forcing the operator to revert to boreholes with water of poor quality and slightly 
salinised. Later, a pump broke down, forcing the operator to reduce the number of hours of supply 
and getting the operator into a quarrel with AIAS over who is responsible for fixing it.
223
 In Mabalane, 
the river level was very low due to drought in 2016, and the water intake as constructed was clogged 
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and ill-suited to pump water to the treatment plant. The operator had himself placed another pipe and 
had diverted the electricity cables, so that he could resume water production, but treatment facilities 
were also suboptimal.
224
 In Mocimboa da Praia, a new treatment plant was unable to sufficiently clean 
water in the wet season; the turbidity tended to rise to such high levels after rainfall, that it eliminated 
the effect of chlorination, producing water of poor quality.
225
 Many systems therefore had problems 
due to an incomplete or poor design and/or construction, but not to the same extent—their overall 
condition and quality differed. What also differed were the elements included in the rehabilitation of 
systems, again depending on donor’s investment size and conditions. For instance, the system 
upgrade in Mocimboa da Praia included three cars made available to the operator and large-scale 
extension of the network and connections, giving it a head start not available to operators in many 
other towns. 
 
Notwithstanding these differences, and whether or not in a ‘viable operational state’, AIAS often 
proceeded with the step following rehabilitation: outsourcing operations to a private operator. With 
initially little choice between operators, and depending on place, AIAS again reverted to pragmatic 
behaviour. The tender invitation for operating the system in Mabalane, a small and isolated town 
without a paved access road, received a bid from only one operator, and he was contracted.
226
 In the 
town of Moamba, a private company had already assumed operations of its refurbished system before 
AIAS took effective control of it. This company, called Collins, had sold water treatment products as 
part of the system’s rehabilitation and was asked by the public authorities to also consider operating 
the system, which it did. Then AIAS took over control of the system from DNA and without other 
suitable operators, asked Collins to continue operating:  
 
AIAS knew we were operating in Moamba and asked us whether we could stay and continue operating. 
They said it was complicated to find operators and if we continued operations, it would mean a good 
solution to them. But they also said that a tender must formally be issued for contracting an operator. For 
AIAS this meant issuing a tender and for us to submit a bid. So we did. We won the tender and could 




Over time, the number of individuals and companies interested and willing to operate water systems in 
small towns was growing. Even in places where systems were not yet (fully) rehabilitated and in 
questionable condition, such as in Montepuez and Nametil, there were companies willing to operate 
these and they were indeed contracted by AIAS. In the case of Montepuez, the operator said that AIAS 
had ensured him that the system would soon be rehabilitated. However, the system in Montepuez was 
one of the 28 systems planned to be refurbished using MCC funds, which did not materialise. The 
operator in Nametil started operations despite obvious problems with the system, because he wanted 
to “get into the market”.
228
 He managed to do so, and assumed operations in two other towns shortly 
thereafter, Manjacaze and Espungabera. This growing interest on the part of operators was interpreted 
differently; for one Dutch consultant it meant a signal of trust by operators in AIAS, with operators 
feeling they are backed up rather than squeezed by the state in their attempt to invest.
229
 An AIAS 
employee welcomed this trend, but was critical of the parties showing interest: “...many of them are 
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part of a construction company and think: why not give water supply a try? But AIAS is not searching 





Most companies contracted by AIAS were indeed inexperienced in water supply operations, but their 
levels of professionalism differed. Collins, the company that entered the water supply market in 
Moamba, had soon built up a good name and managed to expand its operations in a number of other 
AIAS towns. It had professionalised, with local management and personnel guided from a head quarter 
in Maputo. It applied what its director called “engineering thinking” in selecting a system/town: it 
would generally only bid on systems that it itself assessed to be in a good condition.
231
 In contrast, the 
only party interested in and contracted for operating the system in Mabalane was widely discredited, 
with the director and personnel showing “zero ownership”, according to a Dutch expert.
232
 There were 
quite some individuals or companies in construction that entered the water supply market, while the 
tender for operating the system in Bilene was won by a lecturer in civil engineering, who had started 
his own small company next to his university position.
233
 While most of them were eager to succeed, 
they and/or most of their personnel lacked advanced and often basic knowledge, which did not help 
operating (often deficient) systems. What also did not help, was a sheer lack of capital for investments 
or maintenance on the part of operators. 
 
In all, this subsection pointed out that the basic socio-material conditions considered essential for 
operationalising the DMF–PSP were deeply challenging or simply missing. These included a lack of 
skilled AIAS personnel, knowledgeable operators and organisational or investment capital as well as ill-
functioning water supply systems in relation to place-specific biophysical conditions. Considering this, 
AIAS and PO15 adopted a pragmatic course, concentrating on towns with the best (or least-worst) 
conditions. It also made them follow aid agents willing to invest in systems and hence, conform to 
these agent’s preferences in terms of where to invest (in). While this is a well-known feature of aid 
dependency, I suggest it does not help tackle, but rather tends to reproduce, uneven hydrosocial 
development. The next subsection examines in more detail how PO15 dealt with some of the key 
challenges. 
 
5.3.2 Addressing challenges with PO15 support 
 
The challenges described in the previous subsection were not new; similar issues were experienced in 
the pilot that started in 2006 (WSP 2010). This was precisely why PO15 was set up: to address a 
number of what were considered ‘gaps’ in implementing the DMF and PSP in small towns. This section 
describes what PO15 did to tackle some essential such gaps.  
 
Firstly, a lack of knowledge was addressed by PO15 through providing TA to (the personnel of) water 
operators. This took the form of on-the-job training by water professionals from one of the associated 
Dutch drinking water companies making up VEI. Such professionals typically engaged in a three-week 
short ‘mission’, in which operators in three towns were each trained for a week in aspects related to 
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water treatment and distribution or in maintaining and operating the electric power system. Moreover, 
they were trained in financial and business management through classroom-type trainings, also 
delivered by short-term Dutch experts. 
 
Secondly, operators’ lack of investment capital prevented them from properly maintaining the systems 
and/or growing as a business. PO15 had an investment budget, which was used to buy IT-applications 
and various kinds of material for operators, such as an invoicing system, connection kits, water quality 
measurement equipment and office tools. It also covered emergency rehabilitation works of systems in 
a couple of target towns. A more structural way to tackle this lacuna was supposed to be the ‘demand-
driven fund’ of PO15. While a plan for this ‘Infrastructure Investment mechanism’ was written, 
proposed and discussed with the steering board of PO15, it was not accepted. “The word ‘fund’”, 
explained the PO15 project manager, “had a negative connotation” in Mozambique, referring to similar 
initiatives in other sectors that had ended up as slush funds. This was unfortunate, according to him, as 
it would have enabled the bundling of money from various donors into a fund that is managed 
separately from AIAS, thereby reducing overhead and bypassing the state bureaucratic procedures 
that AIAS is supposed to follow.
234
 A one-off alternative presented itself in the project’s final stage, 
when the EKN announced the availability of another €2mn. to be spent on investments before year’s 
end (i.e. 2017).
235
 Operators were asked to prepare investment plans and a list of materials they 
desired, and the amount was used to cover these relatively small investment needs, ranging from 
water meters and pumps to pipes.  
 
Thirdly, PO15 covered part of the operational costs of AIAS itself. Next to small items such as office 
equipment, it financed salaries of personnel as well as a Performance Based Incentives Scheme, in 
which the provision of incentives relied on employees’ quarterly evaluations. Such a scheme stands in a 
long tradition, with incentives being paid to water bureaucrats at least since the early 1990s
236
 and was 
based on a similar scheme that ASAS financed for DNA personnel in the 2000s and early 2010s. One 
former EKN employee said that such incentives were paid to make AIAS more attractive as employer. 
Without this scheme, this person said, “...people from FIPAG would never go to AIAS where they would 
be paid a state salary, which is much lower than the FIPAG salaries”.
237
 As with ASAS for DNA, the 
incentive scheme at AIAS was supposed to be a temporary facility. In other words, personnel whose 
salaries were covered by PO15 were to be included on AIAS’ payroll. As an EKN employee motivated it: 
“...it is like a child that has to grow; we cannot keep paying for their costs”.
238
  The plan was for the EKN 
subsidy that covered for this scheme to end in late 2015. This, in turn, relied on the ‘financial 
sustainability’ of AIAS.  
 
A fourth gap that PO15 helped addressing was thus AIAS’ lack of financial autonomy. In line with the 
DMF, AIAS was supposed to obtain a lease fee from water and sanitation operators, which should 
enable AIAS to cover salaries and part of its operational costs. But for AIAS to be able to fully use these 
fees, it required financial (next to administrative) autonomy. This, in turn, required proof that AIAS 
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could in fact cover two-thirds of its operational costs. Obtaining financial autonomy was a key aspect 
of the ‘organisational development’ component within PO15 (AIAS and Consortium 2014: 39), and the 
EKN was anxiously awaiting fulfilment of this aspect during the project’s implementation.
239
 To this 
end, PO15 paid for studies that investigated the needs and abilities to become financially sustainable/ 
autonomous. Were prospects to attain two-thirds of its costs still considered unfeasible in 2014, a new 
study conducted in 2015 concluded that it should be possible, even though this study was based on 
‘major assumptions’.
240
 A proposal was handed in at the Mozambican Ministry of Finance and the 
project anticipated a final (and positive) decision by late 2016, based on which AIAS’ statutes could be 
changed. Yet, the proposal was not approved. 
 
Even if it would have been approved, AIAS’ financial sustainability would still rely on the financial 
sustainability of water operators, who had to pay for the lease fees. None of the operators had yet paid 
fees, because most of the systems were not (yet) financially viable. A range of elements determine such 
viability, not least tariffs. Tariffs are set by the water regulator CRA. Newly contracted water operators 
were initially summoned to charge a singular tariff of 18 Meticais per m
3 
water distributed to 
customers.
241
 This singular tariff was set because of a lack of historical data on the systems, required 
for validating different tariffs. This tariff soon proved (far) too low for operators to recover costs, make 
a profit and/or to pay fees.  
 
Another significant activity of PO15, fifthly, was therefore to help AIAS develop a suitable tariff 
structure. Such a new structure was made and proposed to CRA in 2015. The tariff would have had to 
increase to an average of 23 MZM/m
3
, for operators to become financially self-reliant. CRA approved 
the tariffs by the end of 2015. This should have sufficed, were it not for AIAS to additionally ask the 
minister for approval of the revised tariffs. However, this approval and hence, these new tariff’s 
implementation, took a long time. Meanwhile, in April 2016, a major economic crisis had broken out in 
Mozambique
242
 and under crisis conditions such as rapid inflation, the revised tariffs had become 
outdated. This led to a revision of the revised tariffs, but the minister’s approval was still awaited for 
nearing the end of the intervention.  
 
In all, PO15 provided budget, institutional, financial-economic and technical support essential to filling 
major and minor gaps in the implementation of the DMF during AIAS’ first operational years. The 
project was widely appreciated as a result of this support and the way most of it was delivered. Yet, 
this subsection and the previous one already gave a glimpse into issues that kept on hampering 
implementation, issues that were considered essential for AIAS’ and the DMF’s long term viability. In 
order to better understand this, the next section examines the various liquid power struggles that 
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5.4 Shaping access in a terrain of liquid power struggles 
 
The implementation of the DMF–PSP mechanism, I contend, represents a terrain of liquid power 
struggles (cf. Li 1999: 316). In this section, I discuss three distinct, but connected types of liquid power 
struggle that AIAS and PO15 were implicated in, in their quest to operationalise the DMF–PSP 
mechanism. These are struggles at the national level with central state agencies and Frelimo-cum-
GOM members as key actors; struggles at the level of the towns with local authorities and citizens as 
principal agents; and struggles between AIAS and operators over various legal-administrative affairs. In 
discussing these, I make two points. One is that issues of which I said keep on hampering 
implementation of some of PO15’s activities are inherently political issues. These do not lend 
themselves to be solved by technical, non-political intervention, at least not structurally. Second, the 
three types of liquid power struggle discussed here show that access to water is inherently shaped by 
various kinds of territorial logics which tend to defy the very market-rational logics underpinning the 
DMF–PSP mechanism.  
 
5.4.1 Liquid power struggles at the national level 
 
I argued in the previous chapter that important and politically sensitive water affairs have remained 
subject to centralised decision-making and that water (supply) has been used by Frelimo as a political 
instrument ever since independence. This subsection contends that central state and GOM-cum-
Frelimo politics also very much affected AIAS’ development and attempts to implement the DMF–PSP 
mechanism. I discuss three specific instances of how this occurred. 
 
First, that AIAS did not develop as a support agency for provincial water boards, but the other way 
around, must be considered in this light. As mentioned above, the original idea was for AIAS to 
operate as a support agency for provincial water boards. But instead of AIAS supporting such new 
provincial entities, a revised decree turned AIAS into the leading agent, and provincial delegations and 
councils were set up to represent, support and advice AIAS at the provincial level (GOM 2011). This 
move, interviewees suggested, was intended to keep decision-making power over water affairs that 
AIAS was responsible for, centralised. One insider summarised the GOM’s reasoning in relation to this 
as “if I decentralise, I lose power and I lose control”. Having long worked in the Mozambican water 
sector, this interviewee had become accustomed to this type of politics: 
 
AIAS was created with a push from the World Bank and everybody was saying to decentralize the work of 
AIAS. Thus, in Maputo, there should only be a team of three to five skilled people to support the 
provincial level in their efforts to manage water and sanitation services in their towns. Their original task 
was to develop AIAS into an entity that empowers the provinces to manage their systems and to do 
fundraising. This empowerment of provinces by AIAS was the idea, but that is not the case now. Again 
you see that implementation is different. AIAS has even created delegations now. That is not 




Secondly and similarly, granting AIAS financial autonomy is in the first place a political matter related 
to (losing) control. The delay in decision-making, but even more so the difficulty in obtaining this type 
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of autonomy on which the sustainability of AIAS hinged, hindered or frustrated various actors involved. 
As one AIAS employee explained:  
 
You see, we basically work now as any state institution, we have the same legislation. But what we are 
trying to find out is whether we can have more autonomy as organisation, more flexibility, other rules 
than the ones we have now. Look at FIPAG; different rules apply to them. If they need a technician today, 





As mentioned, financial autonomy for AIAS was a key issue for the EKN who financed (the bulk of) 
PO15. That the request for financial autonomy was first rejected, then revised, handed in again and still 




Thirdly, water tariffs have equally been a deeply sensitive and hence, political issue since independence 
and therefore remained ultimately subject to decision-making by GOM members and central state 
agencies. That AIAS asked the minister for approval of the new tariff structure, even though this was 
not formally required, must be considered against this background. The DMF instead stipulates that 
approval of the water regulator CRA is sufficient. This “interference of the government” annoyed CRA 
employees, as did the decision of AIAS to ask for the minister’s approval in the first place:   
 
CRA already presents to the government new tariff structures every five years, in which is indicated what 
will be reformed. That is sufficient what the government’s role is concerned, and AIAS shouldn’t have 
gone to the minister on top of that. They were probably afraid to implement the tariffs without asking 
approval of the minister, but the consequence is that the process is already taking a year now (...) AIAS 




While these three are pre-eminently issues dealt with in Maputo (with implications on other scales), 
the GOM’s use of water as a political instrument is also prevalent locally. A local event I learned of 
during one of the short-term missions I participated in related to the inauguration of the water system 
of Mocímboa da Praia by President Nuysi in 2015. Inspections take place before such visits, and the 
water system was almost, but not yet fully finished. The system’s construction was quickly completed 
with parts that were at hand, but ill-suited for the task it was supposed to fulfil; in this case, a pump 
with a very small capacity was installed rather than a suitable, stronger one for pumping water into one 
of the neighbourhoods. It was promised that this pump would be replaced after the inauguration, but 
this promise was not met anytime soon. When we checked the pump, it evoked laughter, but the 





5.4.2 Liquid power struggles at the level of towns 
 
Another power struggle with major implications for the DMF’s implementation, unfolds at the town 
level. At the end of the day, water is or is not supplied locally to citizens, and this calls forth local 
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authorities, bringing them into a power relation with operators and AIAS alike. This subsection shows 
that local authorities and politicians are deeply involved in the implementation of the DMF–PSP, 
sometimes in congruence with the roles formally attributed to them, and often not.
248
 Yet, how power 
relations unfold differs, depending on place and specific actors.  
 
To start with, it matters whether a town is a municipality or not. Municipalities have local elections, a 
council and a mayor, and have more autonomy and decision-making power than towns that have the 
status of ‘administrative post’. The director of Collins, the operator serving various AIAS towns, 
remarked that it is easier to deal with the latter than with municipalities. Administrative posts directly 
fall under the central government and issues regarding water can therefore generally be dealt with in 
Maputo. This is often politically motivated, he says; they are mainly interested in ‘numbers’ and 
‘connections’, especially prior to elections. Municipalities are more difficult to deal with, in his 
experience. They do the planning themselves and deal with many issues that they preferably discuss 
with “the guy that gives the orders”—i.e. the director.
249
 The director of the operator in Bilene, called 
Águas do Bilene, likewise indicated the many challenges with the municipality he and his personnel 
had to deal with. Not everyone in the municipality was happy to see him as an external actor being in 
charge of operating the water system.
250
 Generally, a good relationship with the municipality, and in 
particular the mayor, is important; the mayors I met during fieldwork were said (and indeed appeared) 
to be powerful figures, with the operator’s managers often acting compliant in their proximity—careful 




In Montepuez, the operator was even discharged by the mayor. Although PO15 actors did not consider 
this operator very apt for the task of operating water systems, it operated a system that had not been 
rehabilitated.
252
 The system was in a dire state, and drought in 2016 only exacerbated an already 
troubled water production and distribution. Inevitably this agitates local authorities. The operator was 
constantly summoned to explain what goes wrong and what would be done about it, making him feel 
a “manager of political affairs” rather than a water manager.
253
 He was eventually discharged on the 
instigation of the mayor, who is a member of the national Frelimo Political Commission, and who was 
not much later charged with serious allegations of corruption. Among other things, this mayor was 
accused of making a borehole worth 300,000 MZM on his private premises, the water which he sold to 




Next to private operators, there are a number of AIAS/PO15 towns whose systems are still, or once 
again, operated by a municipal entity. Naturally, they are no less involved in local politics. The DMF 
allows a public entity to operate systems, as long as it is ‘autonomous’ from local authorities. But 
‘autonomous’ is a very relative concept, as the municipal operator in the city of Chibuto exemplifies. 
This operator had managed to open up its own bank account, allowing payments to be collected 
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independent of the municipality. However, local politicians still managed to frequently interfere in 
financial matters of the operator, to the general manager’s deep frustration.
255
 The head of planning 
explained that some local politicians had built up major debts with the water operator, which they 
refused to pay and they also still tried to influence decision-making in the entity. Because of this and 




In Nametil, the system was also in a bad shape, but the system’s operations were nevertheless handed 
over to a private company. According to the director of this company called PB Construções, AIAS did 
so under pressure of local authorities. “So to take away the pressure”, the director said, “AIAS put a 
private operator there, thinking that along the way, they would be solving the problems with the 
system”.
257
 Then cholera broke out in the wet season (December/January 2016), after which the 
provincial governor promised to organise capital for rehabilitating the system. This did not materialise, 
however. And as this town is situated in what the director called ‘the district’, notably in central 
Mozambique where not Frelimo, but Renamo won local elections, “...you cannot only look at the 
commercial part of supplying water, although this is not written in any document”. Instead, he said 
that “...we need to balance commercial goals with not making politicians feel they are in a bad position 
in relation to the people of Nametil”. Water in “the district” is thus a “social and political issue”, he had 
found out. He referred in particular to the large number of customers in Nametil not paying their bills:  
 
We discuss with the district governor and the worst ones, we cut [their connection]. You must know that 
such a district is very different from here in Matola. Here, if you don’t pay your bill, Águas de Região de 
Maputo
258
 will cut you off the next day. But in the district you need to treat this issue with much more 
caution, you need to deal differently with the problem. There was once a private operator before in 
Nametil, but he was thrown out because of this type of political situation. Therefore, we deal with this 
situation with care. 
 
A VEI professional acknowledged that there were many issues between operators and municipalities, 
but that the town of Malema, close to Nametil, topped the list, with its mayor having promised free 





But as said, the intensity of politics differs. The same company that operates the system in Nametil also 
operates the system in Manjacaze, but here   
 
...it is completely different. The way the authorities look at it is very different. They see we operate the 
system commercially. Manjacaze is not politicized. The only thing here is that they demand results, new 
connections, because if we do badly, that can reflect on the manager of the municipality. But if someone 
is not paying, I can go and cut—no problem. 
 
So, water is in fact also political in Manjacaze, but when the system runs reasonably fine, this is not 
(nearly) as salient as it is in Nametil. 
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(Not) paying for water is, next to (poor) water quality and (a lack of) network extension, a major source 
for liquid power struggles in towns. All operators, to a greater or lesser extent, deal with this. They 
indicate that especially public entities and figures, from hospitals and prisons to the police and officials 
such as governors, tend not to pay their water bill:  
 
It is very hard to cut them. Here in Mozambique, when you try to confront the government with such a 
thing like cutting their connection, you have a big problem. They will not help you anymore. They will say: 
this country is ours, if you want to do that [cutting the connection]  you are out of business. So we always 
fall back on having the conversation, that we really need the money. Then they’ll say: yes, the money 
comes, but it doesn’t come.
260
 
The most notorious debtors are local politicians, said one interviewee. They “...say things like if we 
don’t provide them with water, they won’t vote in favour of the company”.
261
 Consequently, some 




Not all citizens who are connected to the network pay their water bills either, but operators have 
generally (more) space to apply the power to exclude them. In other words, citizens can and often are 
disconnected when not paying their bills, after one or a couple of warnings. If they want to be 
reconnected, they often pay a fine. The strategy of operators, supported by AIAS/PO15, is to educate 
citizens into becoming modern, rationally acting customers—or in Portuguese, to raise customer’s 
sensibilisação or awareness. Citizens need to become accustomed to paying their bills, they say, 
understand that their money pays for the operations and maintenance of the system, or alternatively, 
to accept being disconnected/ excluded. Moreover, if they are unhappy with the operator’s services, 
they can or should be able to file a formal complaint with the operator. Yet, a strategy of citizens is to 
go to the local leader in their neighbourhood or directly to the municipality/mayor to complain. This 
frustrates operators, as municipality members and often the mayor himself put pressure on the 




Overall, local authorities and figures of power, as well as citizens, indeed play crucial roles in the DMF-
PSP mechanism, yet they have political agendas and (not seldom personal) interests that do not 
necessarily facilitate a smooth implementation of the DMF. In all towns, water is a deeply political issue 
and a source of struggle. Citizens demand water supply and put pressure on local leaders, who in turn 
put pressure on operators and AIAS. However, the intensity of struggle differs; in towns where 
operations run reasonably fine, not least because the system is in reasonable shape, struggles are 
often not as intensive as in towns with deficient systems and unreliable supply.   
 
5.4.3 Liquid power struggles over formal-legal affairs  
 
The third and last type of power struggle discussed here is that between AIAS and operators over 
formal-legal affairs, notably role division and contractual obligations. This subsection makes clear that 
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while the idea of PSP forces them to work together, under the conditions outlined above, they also 
stand in an uneasy and sometimes antagonistic relationship.  
 
A key element in the DMF–PSP mechanism is the contract, which grants private/autonomous operators 
the formal right to supply water in a designated area. In this case, relations between the owner (the 
state, via AIAS) and the operator of the infrastructure is formalised through a lease contract.
264
 The 
contract is a generic one, outlining responsibilities of both parties regarding investments, duration, 
performance, tariffs, rights and wrongs and role division of third parties. Generic contracts may be 
adapted and specified to town and system, with regard to performance or other contract items. The 
contract AIAS uses is based on a revised version of the contract used in the pilot that started in 2006. 
The current contract, argues WSP, 
 
...was designed to avoid the recurrence of previous incidents where systems remained out of service for 
weeks or even months due to disputes about responsibility, affecting the overall objective of increasing 
access to sustainable, affordable, and good quality water supply services. In the cases where the operator 
will make capital investments, the operator is required to submit adequate justification, such as records 
of operation, inventory, and the capital investment plan, as part of this request. It is subject to asset 
holder (AIAS) approval so that proper compensation can be established, mainly through extension of the 
contract duration. At the end of the extended contract period the assets are handed to AIAS.  
 
Simone et al.  2016: 11-12 
 
“Previous incidents” inter alia relate to conflicts that emerged over investments in the systems. This is 
one of the most problematic issues related to this (and many other) type(s) of PPP: the question who is 
responsible for what type of investments—“risk sharing” in WSP’s terminology.  
 
Time is a crucial element in relation to this. The duration of the contract is five years, which can be 
extended for another two years, provided that performance is satisfactory. Based on the 2006 pilot, the 
WSP already concluded that five years is a limited timeframe for operators to build up a financially 
viable business and to recover potential investment costs. This “cautious” timeframe was nevertheless 
maintained by the GOM, according to the WSP (Simone et al. 2016: 22), so as to avoid “being locked 
into contracts with dysfunctional operators”. Most of the operators I met were contracted by AIAS in 
2014 and 2015, so by the time I did fieldwork, they were about halfway their contracts. Two major 
options were available to render their systems viable in a short period of time. One is raising tariffs, but 
this option was formally not available as the minister had not yet approved of the revised tariffs (see 
above). Most operators did not charge higher tariffs. An exception was the operator in Mueda in the 
extreme north of the country. Without consent, the operator charged 125 MZM/m
3 
rather than the 
contractual 18 MZM/m
3
, given that water had to be elevated to the town that is situated on a plateau, 
which requires major volumes of (costly) electricity. Neither the regulator CRA nor AIAS was able to do 
much about this.
265
    
 
The other major option was to expand the customer base by increasing the number of household- and 
other connections. One operator mentioned that “there is a big need for this business as local people 
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all want connections. The systems have big potential to grow were it not for three factors or conditions 
that hamper growth and which are not within our control.”
266
 He explains the first as follows: 
 
A first such condition must be seen from the technical perspective. If you consider AIAS on the one 
side—they have to create conditions for the systems to be operational. They rehabilitate or build systems 
that usually only cover one part of the towns. But on the other side, there is us who have a contract that 
says we are entitled to supply water to all people in the entire town. Like ourselves, AIAS wants us to 
grow, to expand, but in order to do so, the system needs to be extended. And such extensions require 
extra funding, which AIAS does not have. So the situation now is that if we want to expand, we have to 
cover the costs ourselves.
267 
 
He found a bank willing to give a loan for such investments, on the condition he could somehow 
guarantee operations longer than the contract’s duration of five years. However, AIAS refused to issue 
a letter with the intention to prolong the contract and hence, he was refused the loan.   
 
A second factor related to the potential to increase the number of households along the existing 
network, which was hampered by the costs of connection. These costs range between 2000 (excluding 
materials) and 4000 MZM (including materials), an amount that many people in towns cannot afford.
268
 
The easiest way to increase connections is to buy and sell connection kits, he said, but “...there is no 
profit making involved in that. I am selling water, not kits”. Kits indeed formed an obstacle, which is 
why PO15 delivered to operators 500 such kits. The third factor 
 
...is about different visions. As Collins, we are a business. And in some cities we see directions in which we 
want to expand the system, as it would mean a good impact on our business. But this direction is out of 
the area that our contract prescribes. Still, we see opportunities. We then negotiate with AIAS whether we 
could develop into that direction that falls out of the contracted area. We have had some cases like that, 
but AIAS told us that there needs to be a legal framework in order to do so. It is good for them also, as it 




AIAS indeed tends to operate in a cautious and risk-avoiding way, careful to operate within legal 
boundaries. Yet, AIAS is under pressure from multiple sides, needs to reconcile diverging interests and 
is sometimes forced to operate in ways contrary to what the DMF prescribes. This is illustrated by 
those cases in which it, not least under pressure of local authorities, proceeds with outsourcing 
operations of systems that are clearly not in a ‘viable operational state’.  
 
A preferred strategy of AIAS therefore seems to be one of negotiating, making promises, buying time 
and hoping for solutions to pop up along the way. This was noticeable in the case of Mocuba, a town 
in Zambezia and the largest one under the mandate of AIAS, with over 200,000 inhabitants. This was 
the only town of the originally planned 28 systems that actually got rehabilitated by MCC funds, 
although these were just ‘emergency works’ in anticipation of full rehabilitation. When floods undid 
these emergency works in 2015, UNICEF and the WB stepped in to provide for yet another set of 
emergency repairs. AIAS then negotiated with Collins to assume operations of the system in Mocuba. 
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The system was not in a good state, so in this case, Collins took a “measured risk” and decided to help 
AIAS to “avoid a social problem in the city”, said its director. It took this risk because the system in 
Mocuba was potentially the biggest they could operate, meaning “the impact for our business could 
be big”.
270
 It agreed taking over existing staff, and in return, AIAS promised to improve the quality of 
the system among other things. Treatment appeared to be problematic shortly after Collins started 
operations, and it called upon AIAS to fix the problem. AIAS in turn called upon PO15 to see whether 
they could finance these works, and this request was honoured through extra funding by the EKN. Still, 
the system was supposed to undergo full rehabilitation, but this promise was not met. The system 
remained a loss-taking enterprise, and these losses were compensated for by the other, viable systems 
that Collins managed.  
 
While Collins and other operators were still halfway their contracts, there were a couple of towns that 
had participated in the WB pilot that started in 2006, and their experiences give an idea of how private 
operators and contracting agencies went about terminating or renewing contracts. One of them was 
Vilanculos, a touristic town of economic significance at the coast in the southern province of 
Inhambane, with some 45,000 inhabitants.  
 
Vilanculo’s water system dates from colonial times and was rehabilitated in 2005. A private operator 
was contracted in 2006, called EMA, which has a mother company Moza Business Corporation, 
headquartered in Maputo. AIAS did not yet exist in 2006, so a contract was signed first with DNA at 
the central level after which the municipality took over as contracting agency. The first five-year 
contract was renewed in 2011 for another five years, which expired by the time I arrived in 
Mozambique, in 2016. With financial support from third parties, EMA had invested in more than half of 
the current length of the distribution network, which amounts to 31 of the total 56 kilometres in 
2017.
271
 While the network only reaches into parts of neighbourhoods, this extension and that funded 
by others allowed EMA to increase the number of domestic connections from approx. 250 to 3000 in 
the period 2006 – 2015. EMA had a new office built in the centre of town and had it furnished with all 
equipment needed for carrying out its role as operator. It gained support of an EU project until 2015, 
which paid for laboratory equipment for analysing water quality as well as an administrative and billing 
system.  
 
A conflict already appeared over the issue of investments between EMA and the municipality prior to 
the first contract extension in 2011. EMA had invested in the system’s extension bit by bit, each in itself 
small investments, but combined, it added up to a considerable investment. This raised the question 
who should pay for these investments, given that the contracting agency (i.e. the municipality) has a 
contractual obligation for large investments (WSP 2010). The contract was renewed for another five 
years
272
, but prior to the second contract’s expiration, in May 2016, a similar conflict occurred. A new 
municipal administration and mayor had been installed in the meantime and this changed the 
relationship between EMA and the municipality. The new administration/ mayor did not want to renew 
the contract, but EMA could continue operating until a new operator was contracted. EMA listed the 
investments and its properties as well as its debt of four million MZM, and demanded that these would 




 Interview Regional Director EMA-Vilanculos, 6 March 2017. 
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be compensated for. The municipality, on its part, claimed that EMA never asked for approval of their 
investments in the system, which it was obliged to do. The conflict escalated to the level of the 
provincial governor, who had to make a decision in this conflict, but EMA was prepared to go to court 
if that decision would mean it would not be compensated.
273
      
 
Although AIAS played a minor role in this particular conflict, it illustrates a (if not the most) prominent 
struggle between ‘partners’ over contractual obligations vis-à-vis ‘territorial realities’ on the ground. All 
operators spoken to dealt with this, to a greater or lesser extent. As mentioned, many systems 
experienced problems, which became the subject of discussion of who should pay for solving them. It 
became sufficiently clear that rehabilitation was often incomplete or flawed, which meant that AIAS 
had to take up responsibility. But operators’ knowledge and capacity to operate and maintain the 
systems were often considered poor. This raised the question whether a problem was either due to 
poor construction or poor maintenance, and hence, whether AIAS or the operator is in charge of 
solving it. Both parties generally lacked capital, which provided an incentive to hive off responsibility to 
the other party.  
 
AIAS and operators are thus stuck in a complicated relationship that unfolds under challenging 
hydrosocial conditions. They depend on each other, have congruent objectives such as extending the 
network and increasing connections, yet the different nature, scope and characteristics of the two 
types of organisations also turns it into an antagonistic relationship. In particular AIAS’s spatiotemporal 
properties are fundamentally different from that of an operator; AIAS is a state entity and bears 
ultimate responsibility for all systems in the country, for an indefinite period of time (or for so long it 
exists). An operator’s responsibility is limited to the system(s) under contract, for a limited timeframe. 
This is not to say that an operator’s intention or commitment is necessarily with short-term profits. 
Some operators entered to make quick money, but soon quitted, such as the one in Quissico. In that 
case, it is AIAS who is back in charge. Most operators I spoke are well-aware of the difficulty of making 
a system financially viable and profitable. They are in the game for the long term, hoping to expand 
their business by operating more systems in the future. To achieve that, however, they rely on AIAS 
and hence, they need to build a track record as well as a degree of trust and confidence with this state 
entity that they do not fully trust. 
 
In all, this section pointed out that the DMF–PSP’s implementation is an inherently political affair, 
involving power struggles that play out at different scales and between different actors. The section 
highlighted various types of territorial, i.e. extra-economic, political and state, motivations that play a 
key role in these power struggles. These not only mediate access to water and to various resources 
required for the mechanism to work; I conclude that these shape access to such an extent and in ways 
that often tend to negate the market-oriented principles that the mechanism ostensibly requires to 
work well. The next section takes this point further and assesses the role of PO15 in this process. 
 
5.5 PO15 as a mediating device and the question of sustainable access 
 
Any water access mechanism is built on working principles and assumptions. In this section, I contend 
that the DMF–PSP is built on generic principles and assumptions rooted in the Post-Washington 
Consensus (Post-WC), but these principles stand in a dialectical and contradictory relationship with the 
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logics and principles outlined in the previous section. PO15, I argue, has functioned as an important 
mediating device in the abovementioned power struggles and associated clashes of logics, allowing 
the intervention and the mechanism’s implementation to move on and expand. Yet, it could not take 
away fundamental issues related to sustainable access.  
 
The introduction of the DMF and PSP in Mozambique stems from the time that the Post-Washington 
Consensus (Post-WC) informed key development programs and GOM policies, i.e. the late 1990s. 
Rather than that markets flourish and spur development by themselves, the Post-WC has centrally 
revolved around ‘getting the institutions right’ as a prerequisite to market-led growth, development 
and poverty reduction (WB 1997; 2002; Burki and Perry 1998). The problem that the DMF and PSP 
faced in small towns, in the perspective of the WB/WSP and other agencies, is precisely a deficiency in 
institutional performance and market- and growth-enhancing governance.   
 
Therefore, firstly, the task ahead was to get formal-legal aspects related to the water bureaucracy 
‘right’, in this case, the organisation AIAS as well as legal documents such as contracts and operational 
frameworks and mechanisms. This functionalist line of reasoning applied to institutions is especially 
well noticeable in the aforementioned WSP report on the DMF in towns (Simone et al. 2016). Table 5.1 
filters from this report some principal problem perceptions (the left column), which should lead to their 
‘photo-negatives’ (right column). 
 
Table 5.1—Problem perceptions and solutions for a smooth application of the DMF in secondary towns in 
Mozambique according to the WSP (derived from/ based on Simone et al. 2016) 
Problem perception  Solution 
AIAS as a weak, state-dependent entity  AIAS as a strong, autonomous entity 
Messy procurement (tendering) process(es)  organised procurement and tendering 
Unclear division of responsibilities for 
investment between AIAS and operator 
 clear division of responsibilities 
Unclear role division between different 
agents involved 
 clear role division 
Undefined mechanisms and structures for 
regulation and monitoring 
 defined mechanisms and structures 
 
The logical conclusion in this line of reasoning is that 
 
...given the right institutional and legislative environment, the domestic private sector can emerge, and 
become interested in, the water supply business for the benefit of consumers—even in a country where 
water is not a traditional business and the private sector in general is weak. 
ibid: 21 
 
The second prerequisite for the DMF to work well is getting the market and private sector right. In the 
words of the WSP: 
 
If the PPP seeks to take advantage of the private sector’s business dynamism and technological 
knowledge, it is essential for the operators to have these characteristics.  




But as outlined, many operators lacked these characteristics and the domestic private sector was small.  
 
PO15 was therefore designed to address a number of lacunas in both domains, the water bureaucracy 
and the market. In particular, its objective to ‘stabilise’ AIAS and to increase and improve the quality of 
PSP ought to address the problems sketched above. In doing so, PO15 was intended to help develop 
and ‘connect’ the two domains such that they work in complementary ways. This depoliticised 
problem-framing and technocratic problem-solving is, I argue, typical of the Post-WC. But it is at odds 
with my understanding that the implementation of the DMF–PSP is an inherently political affair, due to 
the ‘territorial’ nature of water that calls forth (sub)national state agencies, politicians, citizens and who 
are motivated by various types of extra-economic reasoning and agendas. How, then, to assess the 
role of PO15 in the terrain of liquid power struggle that the DMF’s implementation is? 
 
My assessment is that PO15 assumed a role not unlike ASAS fulfilled for DNA
274
: it functioned as 
‘grease’ to let the AIAS and DMF machinery work (cf. Van Woersem et al. 2007: 44). To sustain the DMF 
and PSP in spite of deep-seated problems, PO15 served as social lubricant for both the water 
bureaucracy (AIAS) and the private sector (operators). Many of the access mechanisms of which Ribot 
and Peluso (2003) argue influence one’s ability to benefit from water were concentrated in and applied 
by PO15. This notably included access to various types of knowledge (technical, managerial, financial) 
and mobile and fixed capital investments (e.g. finance, various kinds of equipment, water system’s 
attributes). These types of investments were often (relatively) small, compared to the large sums of 
money that other donors made available for rehabilitating one or more water supply systems. But 
notwithstanding the size of PO15 investments, they were many, and they were provided over a longer 
period of time. They therefore covered essential smaller or larger cracks and gaps in the entire DMF–
PSP chain that have kept popping up, inter alia related to legal and regulatory issues (lack of financial 
autonomy, unsuitable tariffs), labour (AIAS as unattractive employer), ‘business dynamics’ (lack of 
financial-economic and technological knowledge on how to run a water supply business) and 
investment (lack of private capital, often even for small items). 
 
Considering this role and the way key actors within PO15 fulfilled it, the water-related activities within 
PO15 were widely appreciated, not least by operators. Operators had to deal primarily with AIAS 
regarding technical problems or contractual issues, but, said one of them, “...AIAS is a governmental 
organisation, they have problems that are typical for any governmental organisation in Mozambique. 
That is also why PO15 is there to help them”.
275
 In other words, as they knew AIAS often lacked the 
resources and sometimes the flexibility to help them solve problems, operators stood in close contact 
with PO15’s project managers, who were accessible and whose material and immaterial support 
helped many of them through critical moments. Operators discussed with PO15 actors not only project 
activities such as trainings, but also (daily) operational matters, potential pathways to follow and they 
often asked to help them fix a problem or for other support. PO15 therefore not only used technical 
means to (temporarily) fix problems, but also applied diplomatic skills to ease the tensions that arose 
between AIAS and other agents, notably operators. To put it differently, PO15 handsomely mediated 
the contradictory interplay between the capitalistic and territorial logics of liquid power as they 
became expressed in the implementation of the DMF–PSP—by being more or less deeply engaged in 
the power struggles that ensued (of course, behind the cloak of technical and institutional assistance).  
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PO15’s main financier, the Dutch embassy, used PSP in PO15 to brand the project favourably in 
relation to the aid and trade agenda and the SDGs, as the social media clipping in figure 5.5 (see 
below) poignantly illustrates. But this clipping exemplifies the problem that this chapter started with, 
the emphasis on access (‘for all’) through modern, market-based approaches. Especially the phrase 
that “...this result would not have been possible without the involvement of the private sector in water 
delivery” is an obligatory and problematic statement. In view of the broader structure, dynamics and 
politics of the DMF discussed in this chapter, we should rather rephrase it as that without PO15 and 
other aid interventions, PSP would not have been possible. The same goes for the suggestion that 
AIAS delivered equipment, tools and training, which in fact came from PO15. AIAS largely lacked the 
means to take care of these services, while its relations with operators like Collins were often much 
more tense than this message make-believe.   
 
 
Figure 5.5— Social media (Facebook) clipping of the Dutch embassy in Mozambique referring to its support to the 




Not less problematic, and just as illustrative, is the clipping’s causal inferences between PO15/ EKN 
support and increasing access to water. It is very plausible that the intervention helped increasing 
access in Moamba and other towns.
276
 But while it is already challenging to quantify increase in access 
in towns, it is certainly difficult to causally relate PO15 with increased access. Increasing access in 
towns is attributable to a mix of elements, in which PO15’s share has generally been indirect. While the 
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EKN and project partners realised this
277
, both had to adhere to an accountability regime that had 
become increasingly focused on quantified results and indicators (see previous chapter). They 
therefore engaged in creative writing in informal and formal accounts (GON 2017) as they did in the 
clipping below, by listing access figures and the project in one and the same text, suggesting a causal 
link that is in fact rather fragile. To respond to a growing desire for quantified results, the EKN also 
searched for activities that were better suited for quantification, notably ‘investments’: 
 
...thus far we have mainly provided institutional support to AIAS and FIPAG, but with this type of support 
you cannot indicate how many more people have gained a tap. It is mostly other organisations, such as 
the World Bank, who profit from that. The country team that reviewed the [water] program here [at the 
embassy] also already said it would be good to increase investments in infrastructure, because these 
deliver measurable results. But for measurable results, you need to search for big amounts [of money]. 




But even more challenging than this issue of increasing (or in Ribot and Peluso’s account, gaining) 
access, is the objective of sustainable (long term) access which has become a prominent element in the 
DGIS water and sanitation policy quoted in the introduction above (GON 2017a). Sustainable access 
suggests ensuring conditions to maintain and control access that has allegedly been gained since the 
project’s start. Conditions that the project itself considered crucial for this included the ‘stabilisation’ of 
AIAS by helping it obtain financial autonomy and bringing personnel on the organisation’s payroll, 
among other processes. These were not fulfilled, nor was the projected sustainable investment 
mechanism put in place. Instead, AIAS and operators kept relying on ‘one-off’ investments by PO15 
and other donors. The dependence of operators on PO15 for training furthermore calls into question 
the sustainability of operations of systems. Inside the intervention, the vision on how to ensure 
sustainability also differed between project partners. The idea of WWn was that AIAS personnel should 
be involved in PO15’s capacity building activities for operators and itself be capacitated to take over 
these activities. An AIAS employee agreed, saying that even though PO15 did a good job training 
operators, “...it is us who need to fulfil that task in the future, not PO15”.
279
 This vision was 
acknowledged by the PO15 project manager, but he argued that AIAS was understaffed to fulfil even 
its regular tasks, let alone join technical training missions to the towns. For WWn this was a major 
reason to withdraw from the water activities in PO15, early on in the project. 
 
External factors that are “beyond the control of AIAS” and other PO15 partners were mobilised as 
reasons why the intervention as yet failed to achieve several essential “GO/ NO GO indicators” and 
other objectives in support of sustainable access (e.g. AIAS et al. 2014: 6; Bouman and Beete 2016). The 
GOM and state agencies other than AIAS were mentioned as key in preventing AIAS from gaining 
financial autonomy, setting up the investment fund and approving new tariffs. The way I assess it, is 
the factors that throw up obstacles for sustainable access are not external to AIAS or PO15, but are 
inherently part of their structure and internal to the implementation of the DMF–PSP mechanism. The 
contradictory logics are therefore also internalised. Technical intervention sufficed to smoothen the 
contradictory interplay between these logics as they played out in the implementation, but it did little 
to change the form of these logics, political as they were rather than technical or economic. Rather 
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than actively directing AIAS and DMF onto a path of equality, sustainability and the like (see GON 
2017a), I suggest AIAS and the intervention were set up and taken along a familiar path designed, 
financed and driven by aid actors according to their imaginaries, but steered and adapted to the 
wishes of the GOM and, in this case, local state agents. 
 
This tactic of blaming external factors did allow the project to continue, however. While non-fulfilment 
of essential goals led to deep frustration on the side of the EKN, a follow-up intervention known as 
PO35 opened up space and time for another endeavour to stabilise AIAS and operators alike. Once 
more, tensions were eased, for the moment. The orientation could once again become, in the words of 




In the first part of this chapter, I argued that despite a short and problematic first experience with the 
DMF-PSP as water access mechanism in some of Mozambique’s main cities, this mechanism was 
maintained and its scope even expanded to water supply in the country’s small cities and towns. In 
connecting this chapter with previous ones, I explain this event as an effect that emerged from a 
strong capitalistic logic of liquid power at work in [1] the Mozambican waterscape and in [2] the 
bilateral relationship. Regarding the first, powerful water aid agents, notably the WB, were intent on 
reproducing and expanding the scope of this mechanism and successfully expended money and 
power towards this end. While this move was legitimised based on an alleged successful application of 
the DMF-PSP in the past, I assessed this application as deeply problematic. My findings suggest that 
this decision was rather ideology-driven, rooted in the neoliberal idea that water supply by private 
operators trumps that by public agencies. But even though established on fragile grounds, it had been 
installed as formal policy nonetheless, around which AIAS as a new public water agency became 
established. In relation to the bilateral relationship, the need to bring the DMF-PSP further coincided 
with the introduction of the aid and trade agenda. This agenda spurred Dutch state agents into 
embracing market-based and private sector-driven aid processes and interventions. The DMF-PSP 
mechanism in towns offered an opportunity to align the Mozambique water aid program with this 
agenda. Even though the fragility of the process was clear, PO15 as a bilateral water aid intervention 
was set up to help implement the DMF-PSP in small towns.  
 
AIAS faced the difficult task to implement this ideal-type market-based access mechanism in a very 
difficult socio-material environment. A conducive material environment was essential for the 
mechanism to work, but the technical state of water supply systems in many towns was poor. Many 
systems were ill-suited to cope with the particular biophysical conditions in towns and hence, unable 
to produce and supply a sufficient quantity and quality of water year-round. The market was no less 
fragile; there were few private or other ’autonomous’ operators with know-how, equipment and/or 
investment capital. Moreover, AIAS was itself struggling with its own organisational development. It 
lacked personnel and budget to make significant strides. It thus relied, like other public water agencies, 
mostly on aid agents like those in PO15. In essence, PO15’s task was to help develop the ‘institutional’ 
environment (i.e. AIAS and the formal-legal roles it had to fulfil) and the market (i.e. private operators) 




However, I contend that PO15 rather acted as a mediating device in the contradictory interplay 
between the capitalistic and territorial logics, as they became expressed in this implementation. These 
became expressed, firstly, in power struggles between AIAS and operators. They inherently relied on 
each other, but also often collided. AIAS had to create an enabling (material and legal) environment in 
which operators could expand their networks and customer base, and thus render their systems 
financially viable. But with very few resources, this proved difficult and often not possible. Operators on 
their part generally lacked investment capital and not seldom know-how. This inevitably led to 
tensions. More than once, PO15 eased tensions by fixing small, often technical problems while it 
addressed a lack of capacity by training. Secondly, this contradictory interplay was noticeable in power 
struggles between AIAS and operators on the one hand, and the GOM and central state, local and 
national state actors as well as citizens on the other hand. The latter actors were crucial to make the 
DMF work, but their involvement was not always—or often not—according to their ‘formal roles’. 
Political agendas of the various state actors and local politicians often made them become more 
deeply involved than desired by operators and AIAS, and in ways that undermined rather than 
facilitated implementation and operations. These struggles were arguably far more difficult or indeed, 
simply impossible, for PO15 to settle; technical or technocratic solutions could not solve issues that 
were inherently political, whether on the local or national level. PO15 actors could and did prepare 
documents for essential formal-legal matters to be arranged, such as for AIAS to obtain financial 
autonomy, the approval of new tariffs and arranging investment funds. However, these were deeply 
political matters that, once more, hinged on centralised decision-making.   
 
On the whole, I conclude that PO15 very much functioned as ‘grease’ to let the AIAS and DMF 
machinery work. This is not to say that its role as discussed here was insignificant, on the contrary. It 
allowed the implementation to move on and helped the overall goal of increasing access to water in 
quite some towns. Yet, AIAS and PO15 were themselves established in what had already turned out to 
be a problematic terrain of liquid power struggles. The contradictory interplay between the two logics 
was clearly noticeable in previous implementations of the DMF-PSP mechanism, and was ‘exported’ to 
the towns that AIAS became responsible for. These contradictory logics were therefore internalised in 
the set up of AIAS and PO15. While it could technically ease some of the tensions arising as a result of 
these logics clashing, the nature of these logics and the way they operated was very much left intact; it 
could not render them ‘complementary’. And this, I suggest, calls into question the sustainability of 







Chapter 6  
 
 
Powers and politics  






This chapter’s focus is on what Hall et al. (2011) call ‘powers of exclusion’ in the Mozambican-Dutch 
water aid relationship. Hall et al. (ibid: 7) inverse Ribot and Peluso’s (2003) definition of access to 
natural resources that informed the previous chapter, and refer to exclusion as “...the ways in which 
people are prevented from benefiting from things”. In this chapter, I examine three empirical events 
that, I argue, produced exclusionary hydrosocial effects and reveal powers of exclusion at work in the 
bilateral (water) aid and trade relationship.  
 
The first event, examined in the next section, is the debt crisis that broke out in Mozambique during 
my fieldwork in 2016. This crisis, which coincided with a politico-military and environmental crisis, 
produced immediate and longer-lasting exclusionary effects in the Mozambican waterscape. This crisis 
poignantly illustrates the workings of the political economic system as it has developed vis-à-vis global 
capitalism, and how the Dutch and Mozambican political economies are connected other than through 
its aid relationship. More specifically, the crisis illuminates once more how class power and state power 
in Mozambique have become deeply intertwined, in the sense of Frelimo-cum-GOM members having 
been able to deploy the state apparatus in pursuit of political agendas that have benefited a few 
economically to the expense of the majority.  
 
The second and third events, discussed in sections 6.3 and 6.4, embody so-called ‘ambient exclusions’. 
These are powerful construals driven by Dutch state and non-state agents, meant to spur bilateral aid 
and trade processes and interventions. One such construal is an idealised representation of the ‘Dutch 
water sector’, which is extensively promoted in global water networks and in foreign countries like 
Mozambique. It is aimed at selling hydrosocial concepts, products and services ‘made in Holland’ to 
foreign agents. The other is the concept of water and sanitation ‘business models’. These models are 
portrayed as innovative, financially viable ways to increase access to water and sanitation. I argue that 
these events reveal ethnocentric tendencies, in the sense that they take the own political economic 
and hydrosocial context rather than that of the host as point of departure—despite market pundits’ 
claims to the contrary.  
 
These events, rooted in a capitalistic logic of (liquid) power, have narrowed down rather than opened 
up agent’s imaginaries and pathways for hydrosocial development. I show that these were therefore 
contested events and countervailed by agents based on social, political and environmental, rather than 






6.2 Capitalist crisis and its hydrosocial repercussions 
 
In chapter 1, I mentioned the debt crisis that broke out in Mozambique in 2016 and discussed some 
methodological implications this crisis had for my fieldwork. This crisis not only had implications for 
my fieldwork, but much more importantly, for citizens and water (aid) agents in Mozambique. In this 
section, I show how this capitalist crisis, which coincided with a politico-military conflict and a water 
crisis, not only had major hydrosocial repercussions, but also severely restricted the agency and 
strategic options of various actors involved in hydrosocial development. This crisis illuminates how the 
production of the Mozambican waterscape is inextricably linked to that of the broader political 
economy and how it has incorporated a tendency to produce exclusionary effects. This crisis had major 
repercussions and triggered fierce criticism aimed at the economic and political elites and their 
international allies that combined created the conditions for this capitalist crisis to occur. 
 
6.2.1 The debt crisis as capitalist crisis: background, origins and contestation 
 
The debt crisis in Mozambique broke out in April 2016, around the same time that I arrived in the 
country for a yearlong fieldwork. It was triggered not so much by the then receding global financial 
crisis of 2007-2008 as by the disclosure of hidden debts. The latter related to loans contracted for 
three newly established private companies managed and controlled by state agents and which were 
backed up by government guarantees. One loan worth $622mn was borrowed from Credit Suisse and 
VTB Bank in the first half of 2013 for a state company that was just established, called Proindicus. 
Second, an amount of $850mn was raised by the sale of Eurobonds for another state company, 
Empresa Mocambicana de Atum (EMATUM), set up in August 2013. A third loan of $535mn was 
provided by VTB Bank to Mozambique Asset Management, set up in May 2014. All three loans were 
secretly negotiated and illegal, in the sense that neither the Mozambican parliament nor IFIs and 
donors were informed or asked for consent. The EMATUM loan was already disclosed in 2013, and met 
with mild criticism by some donors and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The two others, worth 
$1.2bn, were kept secret until April 2016, when the Wall Street Journal (WSJ 2016) was the first to 
disclose their existence.  
 
From then on, events rapidly succeeded each other. After the disclosure, the IMF, the World Bank and 
the major bilateral donors all suspended financial aid to the Mozambican state. What followed was a 
rapid devaluation of the country’s currency, downgrading of its credit rating to junk level and 
significant inflation. The government’s debt-to-GDP ratio increased from 88 per cent to 112 per cent 
between 2015 and 2017, while interest on debts and future loans rose sharply. Economic growth fell to 
an average of 3.8 per cent annually. Next to reduced tax income, the government also missed some 
$400mn. of donor aid, impacting on the state budget and state expenditures. Despite this, the state 
budget has been expansionary since the crisis, ironically with the deficit between income and 
expenditure financed by more debts (Francisco and Semedo 2017). A growing part of the budget has 
been used to service debt, while other government investment expenditures fell from 870bn MZM to 
some 55bn MZM
280
 between 2014 and 2017 (CIP 2018). Meanwhile, the state resorted to austerity 
measures. Among these were the lowering of budgets for social expenditures and a moratorium on 
hiring new state personnel. It also reduced or eliminated subsidies, including on basic goods such as 
wheat flour.  
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Living and working conditions for many Mozambicans further deteriorated under the crisis conditions. 
This led to great unrest in Mozambican society. In particular, domestic and foreign civil society 
organisations demanded that the burden of the debts should not be shoved onto the Mozambican 
people.
281
 But this is precisely what happened, with the illegal debts made legal through inclusion in 
the state budget. This fuelled unrest and contestation. Increased oppression and (threats of) violence 
were tactics used to prevent major protests (C.H. Büscher 2019a). 
 
A critical discussion followed within and outside Mozambique on how to interpret and explain the 
debt scandal and the resultant economic crisis. In particular, the question who was and must be held 
responsible for the debt scandal was widely discussed. Members of the previous, Guebuza-led 
government (2010-2015) and certain actors within the state are generally held primarily responsible. It 
is widely shared that the illegal contracting of such huge loans would not have been possible without 
the centralised and exclusive political structure created and maintained by Guebuza and his allies 
(Africa Confidential 2016). One news item quoted Rui Baltazar, one of the “founding figures of 
Mozambican law” saying “Mozambique is currently plunged into ’a deep political, economic and social 
crisis’, with the country shrouded in ‘corruption, nepotism and social exclusion’” (All Africa 2016).  
 
Hanlon (2017) lays part of the blame on the role of IFIs and donors in Mozambique’s integration into 
global neoliberal capitalism. According to him, “...the US$2.2 billion deal was the direct result of 
conditions carefully created by the same lenders and donors during four decades” (ibid: 753). Most 
donors made their aid in the 1980s and 1990s conditional on acceptance of IMF and World Bank 
programmes, notably the SAPs outlined in chapter three. As a group, he argues, they have had a major 
role in making the GOM embrace a development trajectory rooted in contemporary capitalism. The 
political and economic elite in Mozambique were incentivised to rapidly open up its economy to 
foreign business and investments, which it did in often obscure ways. A secretive and rent-seeking 
culture gradually developed, for a long time condoned by donors. Massive flows of FDI have typically 
been negotiated between the domestic ruling class and international agents such as industrial and 
financial capital, a process which also underpinned this debt scandal, according to Hanlon (ibid). 
 
Castel-Branco and Massarongo (2016a; 2016b) do not causally relate this crisis to conditions imposed 
by donors in the past, but they do argue that this crisis stems from the way in which the Mozambican 
political economy has developed vis-à-vis contemporary (neoliberal and financial) capitalism. That is, 
they point at how domestic and international elites have come to organise, and reap the benefits of, 
an economy increasingly focused on mineral extraction and associated financial speculation. Debt 
accumulation has been part and parcel of this system, and according to them, the latest debts must 
therefore not be considered isolated incidents. Even before the illegal loans were contracted, the state 
had already tripled its total public debt between 2006 and 2015 from $3.5 to $10bn. The share of 
commercial debt, with higher interest rates and shorter payment periods, had increased eightfold over 
the same period to $2.4bn (ibid). This and the extractive economy had spurred the development of a 
speculative financial system—the fastest growing sector in Mozambique at the time (Santos et al. 
2017: 4)—in which financial assets were given preference over real investments (Castel-Branco and 
Massarongo 2016a; Castel-Branco 2014). 
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Indeed, as both Hanlon and Castel-Branco and Massarongo suggest, there are always at least two 
parties involved in debts, i.e. creditors as well as debtors. The banks that made possible and supplied 
the debts, Credit Suisse and VTB Bank, have also been subject to fierce criticism and sued for alleged 
loan pushing and odious debts. Moreover, there have been various intermediary agents servicing the 
debts, including a so-called Dutch brievenbusfirma or letterbox company, which enabled the EMATUM 
deal. Letterbox companies are used by companies and investors as a special purpose vehicle for 
channelling investments to evade paying taxes. EMATUM BV, established and managed by trust office 
TMF in Amsterdam, issued bonds worth $850mn., which Credit Suisse and VTB Bank sold to investors 
worldwide. The money raised was subsequently lent to EMATUM SA in Mozambique. Later, these were 
turned into government bonds, thereby socialising these debts.  
 
Mozambican newspapers rarely dedicate space to events happening in the Netherlands, and neither 
do Dutch newspapers on Mozambique, but this event was widely covered in both Mozambican and 
Dutch news channels (see e.g. Canal de Moçambique 2016 and NRC 2016 in figure 6.1). Questions 
were asked in the Dutch Parliament about this case, as trust office TMF was accused of not having 
carried out due diligence in the EMATUM deal (GON 2016b). The Dutch central bank promised an 
investigation into this deal, but so far it has not reported on progress or outcomes. This letterbox 
company may have been a minor player in the overall debt scandal, but it illustrates, in my view, the 
interconnectedness between Mozambique and the Netherlands, through a financialised capitalist 
system. 
 
This crisis can thus be considered a capitalist crisis. A question that keeps scholars in political economy 
and political ecology busy is how state and non-state actors respond to crises and whether these crisis 
responses reproduce or change the status quo (Ekers 2015; Ekers and Prudham 2017; 2018). On the 
one hand, with the GOM resorting to austerity measures and socialising the debts, it chose not to 
radically change the political economic situation. On the other hand, this crisis triggered many actors 
in countervailing these measures and the forces that have co-produced this crisis. This pressure from 
civil society, as well as IFIs, donors and many other agents, intensified friction among the ruling elite. 
However, political power in Mozambique remained firmly with this elite (Macuane et al. 2017). As 
aforementioned, Frelimo goes a long way to settle internal frictions in order to remain in power and to 
protect established patterns of rent distribution. Thus, instead of critically investigating the scandal and 
perhaps holding some of its own group members responsible, the GOM attributed the crisis to adverse 
global economic conditions. Only under intense pressure of aid and civil society actors did the GOM 
agree with an international audit into the illegal loans, but then it frustrated the work of the auditor. 
And when the GOM had the chance to challenge VTB Bank and Credit Suisse in the courts of London 
for loan pushing, it chose not to do so, since it then would have to disclose information on the deals 
that could jeopardise the ruling elite’s unity (ibid: 22).  
 
This leads me to conclude that even though the specific capitalist development route has been subject 
to fierce criticism after the debt crisis, it did not lead to a fundamental rupture in power relations or in 
the workings of the political economy in Mozambique. The next section replaces this political 
























Figure 6.1—Front page and page 2 of Mozambican newspaper Canal de Moçambique of 8 June 2016. The heading on the 
front page (Apanhados) translates as ‘Caught’ and the three persons below the heading are, from left to right, the former 
President Armando Guebuza, the former minister of Finance Manuel Chang, and the former minister of Defence and the 
current President Felipe Nyusi. They were thought to be central figures in organising the illegal loans. 
 
The section on the right side of the front page (see extension) has three bullet points: the first mentions the letterbox 
company headquartered in Amsterdam, the second mentions that questions were asked by Dutch parliamentarians to the 
Dutch minister of Finance about his viewpoint of Dutch involvement in the ‘theft of 750 million euro from the Mozambican 
people’ and the third mentions one Dutch newspaper that states that EMATUM was a symbol of the largest frauds on the 
African continent. The title on the second page reads ‘The tuna that the Dutch do not accept’ and a picture of the article in 
the Dutch newspaper NRC titled ‘Robbery worth millions in Mozambique was partly channelled through Amsterdam’. 
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6.2.2 Repercussions for hydrosocial development and water aid relations 
  
This subsection examines the profound impact the crisis had on the governance and management of 
water in Mozambique and on the bilateral water aid relations, and shows how it confined the agency 
of actors on both sides of the bilateral relationship.  
 
To start with, austerity measures impacted heavily on state water budgets. This was in spite of the 
government’s promise that investments in social sectors would not be affected post-crisis and despite 
water being a priority sector in the government’s five-year Economic and Social Plan (CIP 2017). When 
it revised the budget in response to the crisis in 2016, the government significantly reduced its water 
budget. It even reached “...an all-time low in the 2017 budget (...) as a consequence of the 2016 
economic crisis” (UNICEF 2017: 7). According to UNICEF, the government contributed 0.9bn MZM to 
the water sector in 2016, which represents 12 per cent of expenditures in the sector. While the state 
contribution to the water sector budget had always been low, 2014 and 2015 were different in that its 
contribution amounted to some 35 per cent of total expenditure (UNICEF 2016; 2017). In light of this, 
the decrease in 2016 and 2017 is substantial and has considerably affected public water activities. As 
one employee of the central state agency for water supply and sanitation DNAAS explained in 2017: 
 
We have two types of budgets, an external one and an internal one. The internal budget, from the 
government, went down, down, down. I am concerned for this year, especially regarding the overall 
management of the department (…) Management is not going to be easy this year, in terms of making 
things work, in terms of paying for energy, fuel, security, operations and maintenance of the department, 




AIAS, the public water supply and sanitation agency discussed in the previous chapter, faced the same 
problem, said its technical manager: 
 
Our budget for this year has diminished and for next year it is going to be even worse. If I ask the 
financial department about our debts to contractors, then they say that the debts of this year will be 




Thus, activities in the new year were already compromised before they had started, as their debts had 
to be covered by the following year’s budget. It made AIAS rely more, not less, on its aid partners, 
among which those in PO15. On top of this, it remained to be seen whether, and when exactly, public 
water agencies would receive the lowered state budgets allocated to them. This uncertainty played its 
part in postponing, delaying or abandoning projects, and contributed to already low project execution 
rates in the water sector—the lowest of social sectors (CIP 2017: 8).  
 
The deteriorating macro-economic conditions as a result of the debt crisis had various other kinds of 
hydrosocial implications. The government stopped providing guarantees, making it nearly impossible 
to contract loans or to attract investors for major water supply
284
 or other types of water infrastructure: 
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 Interview DNAAS employee, 21 February 2017. 
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 Interview AIAS employee, 7 November 2016. 
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 Interview DNAAS employee, 9 August 2016. 
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For the infrastructure we need to build, such as small and medium dams, dikes and basin plan studies 
that would indicate what kind of infrastructure is needed in each of the basins, there are not enough 
resources. And even for big dams we need to go out and look for funds. In the actual environment no 
one is able to give us support, not even the private sector. All ask for guarantees, which the government 
cannot now provide. But this is what funders ask for, they want to know whether they get their money 
back in case they finance infrastructure.
285 
 
With regard to PO15, the crisis conditions made it more difficult to meet some of the project’s 
objectives, which were deemed important for the sustainability of AIAS and the DMF. First, the GOM’s 
moratorium on new state personnel complicated the inclusion of personnel funded by PO15 on the 
payroll of AIAS. Second, the crisis may help explain why the proposal for changes in the tariff structure 
received no approval from the GOM. People faced price rises for all kinds of essential services, 
including bread and transport. Such price rises for essential services had led to massive unrest and 
protests in Maputo and elsewhere in the past, and the GOM was keen on preventing protests this time, 
inter alia by regulating prices for essential services. However, as discussed in the previous chapter, 
water operators required tariff increases to make their businesses viable even in ‘normal’ times, let 
alone during the crisis. Indeed, the crisis created additional obstacles for operators that aggravated 
their already precarious situation. Of these obstacles, inflation was arguably the worst. Especially 
electricity prices had risen quickly, but also prices of chemicals and other goods and materials had 
gone up, significantly raising operational costs. This provided an incentive to save on costs by not 
paying the electricity bill, reducing the hours of water supply, lower the use of chemicals or deter 
paying staff.
286
 Moreover, PO15 supplied operators with materials for fixing and maintaining the water 
systems, but these materials had to be imported. Such imports required foreign currency, which the 
Mozambican Central Bank temporarily stopped issuing, leading to goods delivered with a severe delay 
or not at all. 
 
The debt scandal also led to an ‘aid crisis’ or ‘trust crisis’ between the Mozambican government and its 
international partners (Orre and Rønning 2017). Given that these partners finance over 90 per cent of 
the water sector’s expenditures (UNICEF 2017), such a breach of trust had profound hydrosocial 
impacts. Financially, donors suspended direct support to state water entities and common funds. This 
translated into water projects and programmes being put on hold, delayed or even called off entirely, 
all under severe time pressure: 
 
I am frustrated now; due to the money problem resulting from the national debt, everything will change. 
The whole rationale will be changed again. And because some donors have already decided to reduce 
their investments, we don’t have time to think strategically about how to move forward under the current 





The GON cut €5mn. of its €34mn. budget for 2016 entirely and redirected another €5.2mn. that was 
meant to be spent through the national treasury to programs not financed this way (GON 2016c). The 
contribution of the Dutch embassy (EKN) for DNA through ASAS V (the fifth program of the Sector 
Wide Approach funded by the Dutch state) was frozen as a result. Still, the impact on the Dutch water 
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aid program was relatively small, as the EKN had already suspended part of the ASAS V budget as a 
result of the bilateral frictions discussed in chapter 4.
288
 The Dutch state had also already pulled out of 
the common fund for rural water supply after the introduction of the aid and trade agenda in 2013, 
and it considered AIAS and FIPAG corporatised water agencies not directly under state control (ibid), 
allowing the projects with these two agencies to continue. 
 
But the impact was not just financial. It also affected power relations between Mozambican water 
agencies and donors. When donors suspended direct funding to the state after the debts were 
disclosed, senior water civil servants at once had another mission to fulfil: making sure donors were 
kept on board. Endless meetings and negotiations followed about how donor support could continue. 
This was a frustrating and tiring process, according to one of them: 
 
The pressure on us became too big and reached a point that somehow, you feel that you have lost the 
energy to fight any further. But as a team we tried to follow, to respond and to run, run, run—donors 




Building trust and keeping donor budgets somehow available shaped the everyday management 
within DNAAS, but this stifled aspirations for a more autonomous, less donor-driven course: 
 
...we now need to develop trust and that could perhaps best be gained by hiring external staff accepted 
by donors. The course we were on was actually to gradually free ourselves of this relationship—one in 





Negotiations between civil servants and donors often led to changing aid modalities. Instead of direct 
money transfers, for instance, a third partner had to become involved. The latter, on behalf of donors, 
would receive and distribute aid money to (projects of) water state entities, and take care of project 
management and accountability matters. While on the one hand this ensured a continued flow of aid 
money into water activities, on the other hand, it further complicated already complex water 
governance arrangements in Mozambique. According to one EKN employee: 
 
The crisis has caused such a shock that things are profoundly changing again. You could say we go thirty 
years back in time; we [donors] all carry out our own projects again and some hire UN organizations for 
the implementation of projects, which means putting a lot of money in overhead. The IMF and the G19 
speak of a fundamental breach of confidence and are no longer doing business with the Mozambican 
government. They first want to see trust restored. Financially, the country is pretty much bankrupt.
291 
 
In a letter to the Dutch parliament, the (then) Dutch Minister of Foreign Trade and International 
Cooperation stated that “there can be no ‘business as usual’” and that “in the short term, confidence-
building measures are required that demonstrate that the Mozambican government takes this matter 
seriously” (GON 2016c: 1). In short, the debt crisis had immediate and far-reaching hydrosocial 
implications and also complicated the bilateral water aid relations.  
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As if this were not enough, hydrosocial development was further compromised by two other ‘crises’ in 
2016/ 2017, a politico-military conflict and an environmental/water crisis due to the El Niño effect. The 
politico-military conflict ensued between the ruling party Frelimo and its political rival of old, Renamo. 
It escalated into armed attacks and periodic fighting in Mozambique’s central region in 2016, 
effectively isolating it from the rest of the country. The El Niño effect caused very little rainfall in large 
parts of the south and in some parts of the north of the country, while other areas received above-
average rainfall, leading to severe droughts and floods. These events aggravated the uncertainties 
caused by the debt crisis, argued Francisco and Semedo (2016), and synthesised into very dire 
hydrosocial conditions. These conditions manifested themselves unevenly over Mozambique’s 
waterscape, as did some of the GOM’s interventions to mitigate its effects. The isolation of 
Mozambique’s central region as a result of the conflict prevented water aid activities from being 
carried out here, such as in towns that were part of PO15, while it is here where (water) poverty levels 
are highest (WB 2018; 2020).  
 
What arguably best illustrated this unevenness, was what Mozambican newspapers and state agents 
spoke about: a water supply crisis in the capital of Maputo. Due to a lack of rain, the Pequenos 
Libombos dam, which is the main source for water supply in Maputo, reached critical water levels in 
2016. So much so, that the Maputo water supply company had to drastically reduce its supply. It 
implemented another supply schedule, with neighbourhoods officially receiving water on alternate 
days. In practice, water supply was much more random and unpredictable, with low-income 
households suffering most since they largely lacked equipment such as tanks to store water. A 
temporary group of high-level (water) bureaucrats was formed, led by the minister of public works and 
water management, to deal with this crisis and to come with emergency solutions. Among these 
solutions was the reopening of abandoned boreholes, to increase water capacity on the short term. 
The minister and high-level water bureaucrats visited donors to help finance these works, among 
whom the Dutch embassy, which contributed approx. €2mn.
292
   
 
Surely, this proved to be an exceptional situation for those parts of Maputo that have direct or indirect 
access to piped water services. But that this event was called a crisis, and received such special 
treatment, was quite at odds with the rest of the country. Many more places suffered as much, or 
more, from drought (or floods) and a majority of Mozambican people have always lacked access to 
piped water services, or even to reliable water sources. A similar criticism was voiced at a meeting of a 
donor group on water and sanitation, that is, why so much effort was put into solving this water ‘crisis’ 
as opposed to the many other places in Mozambique that were at least as much suffering from 
drought (or floods) and received little or no extra help. The director of DNAAS replied to this criticism 
and legitimised the emergency measures referring to Maputo as the national capital, which is home to 
many people and important institutions such as ministries and the foreign diplomatic corpses.
293
 While 
not downplaying the severity of the situation in some parts of Maputo, this event clearly illustrates the 
selective behaviour of agents in what is and is not called and treated as a crisis.   
 
In all, the debt crisis in Mozambique in 2016 and 2017—the time that I did fieldwork—provided a 
startling but unique insight into the workings of the Mozambican political economy and how 
hydrosocial development is implicated in this system. The debt crisis may have been an exceptional 
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event, but was generated by processes that are structural rather than exceptional; they illustrate how 
the Mozambican political economy has been organised in ways that provide a small elite access to 
many resources, not least those of the state apparatus, excluding the majority. Even before the debt 
crisis, Castel-Branco (2014) stated the following in an analysis of the Mozambican political economy: 
 
The levels of porosity, the direction and the high capital costs of the current development strategy, the 
volatility of commodity markets and the role of the debt in restricting development options through its 
impact on the capital market may all pose challenges to Mozambique’s future macroeconomic stability as 
great as or greater than those of the second decade after independence, which resulted in two decades 
of IMF-driven stabilisation programmes. The present strategy may be contributing to limiting the options 
of future generations, since future resource inflows are already earmarked for financing the ups and 
downs of indebtedness in the present. 
Ibid: S39-S40 
 
The 2016 debt crisis corroborated this statement. He also argued that this system “crowded out other 
development options” (ibid: S39), a point that this section confirmed for water. Indeed, it restricted the 
agency and strategic options of various state and non-state actors involved in hydrosocial 
development, from both sides of the bilateral relationship. Yet, this section also showed the deeply 
contested nature of this crisis and its origins, and how it triggered actors to call for a fundamentally 
different hydrosocial development course, one that opens up rather than narrows down access to 
resources like water. 
 
6.3 Ambient exclusions I: “Bring in the Dutch” 
 
This section and section 6.4 investigate ‘ambient exclusions’ (Hall et al. 2011) prevalent in the 
Mozambican–Dutch water aid relationship. With ambient exclusions, Hall et al. refer to the 
management of socionatures according to an approach that has become “ubiquitous” and which is 
often legitimised by “notions of the common good”, all the while having “quite uneven social effects” 
(ibid: 20). In the context of this thesis, I refer to ambient exclusions as influential, but contested 
construals (or a set of construals making up imaginaries) on how water ought to be seen, treated and 
managed. This and the next section each take one construal, driven by Dutch agents and both rooted  
in a capitalistic logic of liquid power, as departure point.  
 
This section focuses on attempts by Dutch state and non-state actors to render powerful supposedly 
‘Dutch’ hydrosocial construals, through a process I call ‘imagineering’. The next section (6.4) focuses on 
the concept of ‘business model’ applied to water and sanitation, which has popularised in the aid and 
trade era. Both sections aim to make the ostensibly ambient (or familiar) character of these processes 
strange, by unveiling the ethnocentric tendencies that underlie them. Ethnocentric in this context refers 
to an “uncritical preference for one’s own mores and culture” (Bidney in Lemaire 1976: 93). In line with 
this, I argue that these ambient exclusions motivate Dutch aid actors to take the own political 
economic and hydrosocial context rather than that of the host as point of departure for hydrosocial 
development. This makes these processes contested and has spurred agents at both sides of the 
relationship to countervail these tendencies and to offer alternative ways of thinking and doing in 
relation to water and sanitation services. 
 




The emergence of what Heun et al. (2003: v) dubbed the Netherlands as “a ‘champion’ in water 
management” was discussed as part of the historical background given in chapter 3. To briefly recall, 
section 3.5.4 argued that from the late 1990s, the Dutch nation-state was increasingly profiled as a 
domain of global water expertise. As part of this, Dutch state and non-state agents were positioned as 
experts in tackling problems pertaining to the ‘global water crisis’. This process occurred in a 
globalising water governance context and was driven by an expanding world market for water 
products and services. The Netherlands Water Partnership (NWP) was established to help position and 
profile the Dutch water sector abroad. Elsewhere (C.H. Büscher 2019b) I use the term ‘imagineering’ to 
describe and analyse this process of positioning and branding the Dutch water sector (DWS) abroad, in 
order to increase the competitiveness of Dutch water agents in the world market and to strengthen 
their power position in global water governance networks. Imagineering is a portmanteau of imagining 
and engineering. In relation to the DWS, it involves construing an imaginary of (parts of) the Dutch 
waterscape that should help persuade foreign agents to “bring in the Dutch” (Stravens 2018) and to 
help ‘engineer’ foreign waterscapes using hydrosocial concepts and products invented in the 
Netherlands. This subsection examines what this process entails. 
 
The DWS imaginary connects to a grander project of state-building and building a national identity, 
with the Netherlands portrayed as a quintessential ‘water nation’ (Ovink in Dijkshoorn et al. 2018). The 
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imaginary emphasises the historical link between water and the country, evidenced by statements such 
as that “Delta management has been core business in the Netherlands for centuries” (NWP 2014: 9) or, 
as part of “the story of water technology”, that “water treatment is just as much a part of our DNA”.
294
 
It creates subject positions of other, supposedly similar waterscapes such as Mozambique that lie at 
the downstream end of rivers, which are labelled ‘Delta countries’. These Delta countries are said to 
face similar problems, notably population growth, urbanisation and climate change, and ‘building 
blocks for a sustainable delta’ allegedly apply to all of them, including ‘innovation’, an ‘integrated 
approach’ and the ‘anchoring in legislation and depolitization’ (ibid: 6-12). Dutch hydrosocial 
approaches such as ‘Room for the River’, artefacts like the Delta Works, or ‘smart’ water technologies 
function as material support for these discursive claims. Producing this imaginary links up with a place-
branding project of the Netherlands as a whole. The label ‘Holland’ and a logo in the form of a tulip 




The Dutch state is a major driver behind, and financer of, this process of imagineering the DWS. It also 
fits especially well with Dutch state policies, projects and accumulation strategies launched in the 
2010s.  
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 See “Dutch water technology; our story” at the website www.dutchwatertechnology.com.  
295
 The Holland and tulip logo was recently replaced by a new logo, but had long been used for national branding 
purposes.  
 
Figure 6.2—The picture above shows promotional items on the Dutch water sector, handed out at the WISA 
biannual conference in 2016 and Aquatech Amsterdam in 2017. The pictures below and on the next pages show 
the Holland Pavilion at the Aquatech Amsterdam and a Dutch company branding itself and its products (under 
the slogan “turn your (waste)water into profit”) as part of the Dutch water sector. The rest of the pictures show 
other states branding their water sector, including Great Britain, Scotland, Denmark, Korea and Taiwan. (Source: 

























Whether the aid and trade agenda, the proclamation of water as a so-called economic ‘Top Sector’, or 
the interdepartmental ‘International Water Ambition’
296
, these state initiatives were more than before 
driven by a capitalistic and nationalist logic, or so I argue. They emphasise the importance of water for 
domestic economic ends, the need for market approaches to solve water crises and water as a national 
symbol and pride. Construing the DWS occurs online, through various websites
297
, as well as in 
physical spaces such as international and national water conferences and associated trade and 
exhibition fairs. At such fairs, Dutch water organisations typically display their products and services in 
booths situated around a central, so-called ‘Holland Pavilion’, coordinated by the NWP. Information on 
the DWS is displayed, meetings and cocktail events are held here, and NWP personnel hand out 
various kinds of DWS-related promotional items, from leaflets to buttons (see figure 6.2).
298
 Incoming 
and outgoing aid and trade missions are other ways of forging relationships and displaying what the 
DWS has to offer. 
 
The Dutch state appointed a ‘Special Envoy for International Water Affairs’, who personifies the project 
of imagineering the DWS. The current Special Envoy, Henk Ovink, was appointed in 2015 with 
economic diplomacy defined as his key task, which means “...to reinforce Dutch ambitions in the water 
domain [and to] contribute to boosting the international market position of Dutch know-how and 
expertise” (GON 2015). He took over from the King of the Netherlands, Willem Alexander, who fulfilled 
various functions in global water governance networks when still a prince
299
 and who was also widely 
considered an icon of the DWS. As the DWS ‘ambassador’, Ovink has travelled the world extensively 
and has been an invited guest and/or speaker at many water meetings and conferences.  
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and watertopsector.com. 
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 Field notes WISA, 15 – 18 May 2016; field notes FACIM, 31 August 2016; field notes Aquatech Amsterdam, 2 
November 2017. 
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and chair of the United Nations Secretary-General’s Advisory Board on Water and Sanitation (UNSGAB). See Royal 
House of the Netherlands website: https://www.royal-house.nl/members-royal-house/king-willem-





Among these was the biannual conference of the Water Institute of Southern Africa (WISA) in May 
2016 that I attended for fieldwork purposes. One session I participated in illustrated Ovink’s approach. 
He delivered a flashy presentation from a ‘global perspective on water’, listing numerous water 
problems that combined make up the number one ‘global risk’, in line with reports published by the 
World Economic Forum (WEF 2015; 2016). He summarised this global risk as ‘a clear business case’, 
based on calculations of the economic damage caused by water problems. He presented a multi-
dimensional ‘transformative approach’ as the way forward, at the core of which is water pricing. If 
implemented across the globe, he argued several times, water pricing will improve water security.
300
 
His insistence on water pricing did not emerge out of the blue. Under the more common label ‘valuing 
water’, it was put forward as a panacea by another global water network of which he was part: the 
UN/World Bank High Level Panel on Water (HLPW 2017: 2). The HLPW was launched at the 2016 
World Economic Forum and Ovink functioned as ‘sherpa’ to the Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte, who 
was a member of the panel. This was another platform used to promote the DWS in more or less overt 
ways (NWP 2019; HLPW 2018). 
 
The message that Ovink and other Dutch actors sent out did not go unnoticed; a New York Times 
article, for instance, talks at length about how the Dutch see “climate change and rising seas as 
opportunities for, rather than drags on, its economy”, and that “the world is watching” the Dutch 
(Kimmelman 2017). A magazine called strategy+business, in an article titled “Water Experts for the 
World” reports on how “The Dutch turned adversity into a compelling economic opportunity” and 
suggests that “other countries could do the same” (van der List 2019).  
 
Other countries in fact do the same; various platforms similar to the NWP have been established to 
imagineer (parts of) their waterscapes.
301
 One platform, the United Kingdom Flood Partnership (UKFP), 
was even launched in order to “...compete with the Dutch in improving the UK’s flood skills narrative” 
and, in doing so, to gain a bigger share of this “commercial market worth billions of pounds” (UKFP 
2017). At the aforementioned biannual conference of WISA, I learned about and observed how 
Denmark imagineered its water sector in relation to its development policy which is similar to the 
Dutch aid and trade agenda. The Danish state had just closed its embassy in Mozambique to focus 
entirely on South Africa, and at the conference, it organised a reception to launch and celebrate a 
‘Strategic Water Sector Cooperation Program’ between the Danish and South African governments. 
This programme aimed to 
 
...facilitate institutional relationship building, knowledge sharing, exchanges of experiences and capacity 
building, while paving the way for public-private partnerships, with the possibility of introducing Danish 
know-how and technology that underpins a social, economic and environmentally balanced development 
of the water sector in South Africa.
302 
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In an accompanying speech, the Danish ambassador 
said that countries like South Africa could very well 
copy the Danish water supply system. This system 
follows a corporatised model with publically owned 
water companies that are run in a financially 
accountable manner, as if they were private 
companies.
303
 A statement like this could have just as 
well, and has in fact, been uttered by Dutch actors.
304
 
It reveals how imagineering waterscapes other than 
the DWS are rooted in state policies, projects and 
accumulation strategies similar to the ones 
propagated by the Dutch state in the 2010s, 
increasingly focused on ‘the self’, trade and market-
based approaches. Moreover, this semiotic terrain of 
power struggle on the global scale seems to be 
dominated by (actors from) industrial and emerging 
economies. A walk across the 2017 edition of 
Aquatech Amsterdam, self-proclaimed “the world’s 
leading water trade show” that accompanies the 
biannual Amsterdam International Water Week 
(AIWW), illustrated this well. A large Holland Pavilion 
was accompanied by pavilions and booths of other  
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 Such as by the former director of VEI who praises Dutch water supply companies with a “mix of public 
ownership and private sector operations” and which according to him, also appeals to water supply companies in 
developing countries (interview in a DWS promotional booklet, undated). 
Figure 6.3—Above: booklet promoting Dutch water 
technologies for the Mozambican water sector. Below: the 
Netherlands Water Pavilion at the WISA, South Africa. Next 
page:  a session on innovative water technologies at the 
Holland Pavilion, part of the national trade event FACIM in 







Western countries and by water agents from large Asian economies like China, South Korea and 




Precisely because of this domination of industrial and emerging economies at global water 
conferences/ trade exhibitions, said a BZ employee, specific water aid and trade events are organised 
for partner developing countries like Mozambique. These events were known as ‘Country Platform 
Days’, organised by the NWP. They were set up in a market-like manner, where representatives of 
organisations/ businesses in the DWS could find out what the problems and challenges are in the 
Mozambican waterscape and how they could potentially become active there with their innovation, 
technology, service or product. A civil servant from BZ who opened one such Country Platform Day on 
Mozambique said that development cooperation is losing relevance and that developing countries 
increasingly look for developing trade rather than receiving aid. The Netherlands is responding to this 
change by better linking water aid to trade through the water Top Sector program, he continued, 
which requires looking at the ‘demand side’ of developing countries.
306
 He referred to a ‘Market 
research and positioning survey for the Dutch Water sector’ (Aidenvironment and Water is Essential 
2015) that had assessed this demand (‘pressing needs’) in the Mozambican water sector as well as the 
‘interest and skills (supply)’ of the DWS, which combined made up ‘Product-Market Combinations 
(PMCs). The study concluded that “...Mozambique is (becoming) an attractive country for doing 
business for the Dutch Water Sector” (ibid: 5), but that support from the Dutch state and platforms 
such as the NWP and PLAMA are crucial. The imagineering of the DWS also occurs at events in 
Mozambique itself, such as those organised by PLAMA or at more generic trade events such as FACIM, 
the biggest annual trade exhibition in Mozambique (see figure 6.3).  
 
This process of imagineering the DWS, I argue, epitomises two things. Firstly, it is a process very much 
driven by industrialised countries. This is not to say that Mozambican water actors are not present at or 
involved in discussions, meetings, conferences, trade events and the like on the global scale. Indeed, 
what Alba and Bolding (2016) call the ‘elite’ of the Mozambican water sector is very internationally 
oriented, and members of this group travel extensively to participate in water-related events around 
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the world, such as the AIWW. Yet, ‘at the end of the day’, one Dutch water consultant said, ‘it is the still 
the North’ where the driver behind this process comes from.
307
 As a corollary, it is also a process in 
which the Dutch political economic and hydrosocial context rather than that of the host is taken as 
point of departure for hydrosocial development. Low-income countries like Mozambique tend to 
figure as targets and recipients of ideas, concepts and products made in wealthier countries, even 
though they are discursively configured as demanding those. Secondly, this process emphasises 
depoliticised understandings of water problems and stresses technological, market-based and/or ‘win-
win’ solutions (C.H. Büscher 2019b: 831). Altogether, therefore, it reflects the neoliberal and 
increasingly self-interested agendas of the previous Dutch governments. Or, as another Dutch 
consultant involved in water aid and trade processes in Southern Africa phrased it, it reflects “the 




This process is both supported and contested. In other words, this process represents yet another 
terrain of liquid power struggle.  
 
6.3.2 Power struggles around imagineering the DWS 
 
A growing emphasis on ‘the self’ and on trade in imagineering the DWS, which linked up with the 
water aid and trade agenda, was subject to fierce discussion among various Dutch agents, and among 
them and Mozambican counterparts. Exemplary was a presentation on an alleged innovative water aid 
and trade concept at the Mozambican Country Platform Day mentioned above. The Dutch water aid 
professional that delivered this presentation stated that the most important thing for Mozambican 
water actors is to ‘vocalize your needs’. He then turned directly to the Mozambican delegation, 
consisting of senior and experienced water professionals, and asked them rhetorically whether “you 
guys know what your needs are?”, followed by a moment of silence, then continuing: “I know this is 
key, and I also know that you don’t know what exactly your needs are”. When he was done presenting, 
one member of the Mozambican delegation was clearly annoyed by the patronising tone and 
reclaimed that “...we don’t need [an innovation] in which others say what we need, we need 
[innovations] of Mozambicans. We don’t need to import know-how from abroad, we need to create it 
ourselves”.
309
 The tone of the presenter was strongly objected by some other participants I spoke to, 
but it illustrated an extreme form of ethnocentric behaviour and its contested nature. 
 
Overall, this process is both supported and contested. On the one end, a group of actors may be 
identified that by and large welcomes this trend. These are actors engaged in the water Top Sector-
structure, in which the private sector and their representative bodies are deeply involved. Within the 
state, the Directorate-General for Foreign Economic Relations (DGBEB), who moved from the Ministry 
of Economic Affairs (EZ) to BZ as part of the aid and trade agenda, by and large supports this emphasis 
on trade and commercial solutions to water problems, where possible with Dutch private sector 
involvement.
310
 On the other end are actors who are outright critical. One former civil servant from BZ 
denounced the emphasis on ‘exogenous’ thinking and technologically oriented solutions and 
emphasises the need to depart from an understanding of ‘endogenous’, country-specific conditions 
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and to focus on social relations.
311
 Some Dutch researchers very much agreed and said it was high time 
for a dissenting voice, pointing at a major ‘The Hague-driven investment agenda’ that actually drives 
alleged ‘win-win’ Delta solutions in low-income countries (Stravens 2018). While they agree that Dutch 
organisations have considerable water expertise and can play a valuable role in tackling water 
problems abroad, “it is horrible to see how we think we have a monopoly on wisdom (...) the white 
man who knows what is best” (ibid: 60). Yet other critics draw attention to ambiguities and concerns in 
actual processes where DWS-related companies are involved, such as in the development of 
comprehensive water ‘master plans’ in Mozambique or Indonesia. Such master plans are the 
quintessential win-win solutions for multiple development problems and they are captured in neat 
designs and images. However, they argue, these master plans involve potential environmental damage, 
high financial risks, forced displacement of people and, more generally, a trend towards increased 
private gains and public losses (Bakker et al. 2017).  
 
In between these positions are various groups with more or less consensual, more or less critical 
opinions. There is a group of actors who welcome more emphasis on trade between Dutch and 
Mozambican businesses, but point at the need to further develop trade (structures) and an ‘enabling 
environment’ in Mozambique so as to better enable trade in the water sector. They believe trade is an 
equaliser; one interviewee believed this move makes possible “a more healthy relationship between 
them (Mozambique) and us, with more equality”.
312
 An EKN employee argued in the same way: 
 
Going from aid to trade will make sure you develop a more equal relationship. In the Netherlands, the 
private sector, the state and knowledge institutes join forces to jointly promote the Netherlands Inc., so 




A Mozambican water professional said about this emphasis on (Dutch) trade in the Mozambican water 
sector that “...on the bright side, processes become more transparent. There is no pretending anymore, 
trade is just trade, with benefits for both sides”. But it also had “a dark side”, he said: “it is sort of going 
back to the old way of doing cooperation, what used to be called tied aid: we give you money, if you 




Those I interviewed at DGIS regretted the emphasis placed on trade in the benefit of the DWS or the 
association of the water aid and trade agenda with tied aid. They emphasised that aid money spent on 
Dutch companies, as was common in the tied aid era, is simply impossible nowadays, prohibited as it is 
by international regulations.
315
 Moreover, the framing of the agenda this way does not do justice to 
what it was actually meant to do in their eyes: enabling trade in the (Southern Africa) region itself, so 
that countries like Mozambique could one day become self-supporting. Yet, one DGIS interviewee 
acknowledged that other agents like EZ, employer organisation VNO-NCW and NWP thought 
differently about this and knew that they rather emphasised and/or lobbied for the involvement of the 
Dutch private sector in water aid projects abroad. This led to difficult discussions within DGIS, and 
between them and colleagues of DGBEB. As one DGIS interviewee stated: “DGBEB is supporting the 
Dutch private sector; we know that and that is OK—but it is not always easy when it comes to making 
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 Another DGIS interviewee emphasised the importance of substantive discussions about 
water and sanitation. He said they rather visit conferences like the Stockholm Water Week or those 
organised by the UN than a conference like the World Water Forum, “which is mainly focused on the 
private sector”.
317
 The NWP, the platform representing the DWS abroad and with almost 200 members 
from across the DWS, found itself in the midst of this struggle. The former director said that NWP 
members “look at the NWP from their own perspective” and that by the one group of actors the NWP 





In all, the imagineering of the DWS has been going on for a long time, has nurtured the idea of the 
Netherlands as water champion and basically advocates the message to “bring in the Dutch’. I view this 
process as an ambient exclusion, that is, as a dominant and ethnocentric construal that tends to 
narrow down one’s imagination on how water problems ought to be solved, by whom and with what 
technologies (of power). However, intensive power struggles ensue between distinct but connected 
groups of water-related agents over this process and what it epitomises. These struggles essentially 
revolve around the question for whom and for what the DWS is imagineered and how to balance 
(Dutch) economic benefits and processes against burning political and other extra-economic water 
issues in countries such as Mozambique. Another ambient exclusion in bilateral aid and trade 
processes is that of the ‘water business case/ model’, which the next section examines.  
 
6.4 Ambient exclusions II: “It’s the business case, stupid!” 
 
This is how the former director of one Dutch water NGO, called Aqua for All, phrased what he deemed 
to be the most important success factor for making PPPs in water aid contexts work (NABC 2017: 32-
34). A viable business case or –model is crucial for ensuring the sustainability of water services, he 
argues, as is a business model’s inclusivity: 
 
For inclusive business it is not only about who the potential customer is and how the enterprise is going 
to make a profit. There are other, equally relevant questions that must also be asked. How can the 
additional beneficiaries be targeted if they are not direct clients? How can the governance of the 
partnership be organised? How can the ecosystem in which operations are being carried out be 
improved? And what social impact will be created through the intervention of the PPP that will help to 
cover the deficit in revenues and costs?”  
Ibid: 33 
 
Aqua for All was one of a number of Dutch aid agencies whose preoccupation with ‘business models’ 
and associated market discourses had grown considerably prior to and during the implementation of 
the water aid and trade agenda. As discussed in chapter four, business models occupied a central 
place in meetings of, or reports by, the Dutch water aid community as well as in established or new 
water and sanitation financing mechanisms.  
 
This section further delves into the buzz around business models in the Dutch water aid and trade 
community and examines their rationale and attempted implementation in the bilateral aid 
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intervention PO15. This intervention, as outlined in the previous chapter, had one Work Package (WP 
4) that focused exclusively on ‘innovative business models’, meant to help increase access to 
sustainable water and sanitation services. This was the smallest WP of the intervention, with a relatively 
small budget of €200,000 for implementation. Despite its size, the WP provided an opportunity to 
assess the discourse around water and sanitation business models and how they were put into 
practice. The section makes two points. One, while meant to be ‘demand-driven’, this WP and the 
activities carried out as part of it were predominantly supply-driven. Second, while meant to be 
‘inclusive’ and opening up access, the investigation of one particular model revealed instead its 
tendency to exclude, both in a discursive sense and in the way it was envisaged and set up.   
 
6.4.1 The business model work package in PO15 
 
The process of including a WP specifically on innovative business cases in PO15 is in line with how 
PO15 became established more generally.
319
 Individuals from Aqua for All, BoP Inc. and VEI, three 
Dutch water aid agencies that would end up playing a role in PO15
320
, had been involved in a study on 
water business models carried out in 2011 by Hystra. Hystra is a French consultancy firm, and their 
study was sponsored by the French Development Agency AFC and French multinationals Suez and 
Veolia, among other agents (De Carvalho et al. 2011). While the study had a global scope, the idea was 
to propose ideas and innovations for private sector participation (PSP) in French water aid. Inspired by 
this, similar studies were carried out for water and sanitation business models that could be used in 
Dutch aid (Pietersen 2011; BoP Inc. et al. 2012). Having been involved in these studies, Aqua for All was 
invited to help assess opportunities for PSP for the Dutch embassy in the Mozambican water sector 
(Jansen et al. 2011). The representative of BoP Inc. was granted a tender to assess the potential for 
implementing water and sanitation business models in Mozambique. The outcome of this latter 
mission was that the 
 
....AIAS proposal has been extended with a dedicated component on ‘Innovative business models’. BoP 
Innovation Center will be part of the consortium to support realization of a local Water & Sanitation 
Innovation HUB that will focus on identifying and facilitating innovative scalable business concepts for 
water & sanitation services, linking the Mozambique private sector and the Dutch private sector. Through 
this component Water Mondiaal embeds the activities for market driven innovation and linking Dutch 
private sector involvement.  
Partners for Water 2012 
 
The project manager of PO15, who was not himself involved in setting up PO15, also linked the 
decision to include a WP on business models to the Dutch aid and trade agenda. He thought it 
probably had to do with the word ‘innovation’ and associated PSP that BZ as financier wanted to hear. 
He thought this move a bit odd, as PO15 already suited the rationale of the aid and trade agenda, with 
its focus on helping AIAS implement the DMF and PSP.
321
 The WP on business models can indeed be 
considered an additional component within PO15 to ‘strengthen the business side of the project’, said 
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Like the DMF, the WP on business models was rooted in a neoliberal discourse that emphasises the 
desirability and need for PPPs and the various outsourcing options and contracts available within 
them. They also partly overlap in the market terminology used, viewing water and sanitation aid 
processes as revolving around supply/suppliers and demand/customers, ability and willingness to pay 
and so on. Yet, the preoccupation with business models went one step further. It was embedded in 
what might be called an ‘advanced’ (but not new) neoliberal discourse, rooted in one ‘theory of 
change’ in particular: the Bottom (or Base) of the Pyramid (BoP). The BoP refers to the poorest four 
billion people in the world, those living on less than $1500 per year or up to $4 a day. It was Prahalad 
and Hart (2002) who coined the idea of the BoP in support of an ‘inclusive capitalism’ in which “...the 
real source of market promise (...) are the billions of aspiring poor who are joining the market economy 
for the first time” (ibid: 1). From a BoP perspective, poverty is a problem of the individual who has 
failed to integrate into the market. Escaping poverty, then, is equally an individual’s responsibility, to 
be achieved by embracing entrepreneurship so as to successfully enter markets (Dolan 2012). It is 
assumed that doing business with the poor will lift them out of poverty, amongst other beneficial spin-
offs (Prahalad and Hart 2002: 2). 
 
Appropriately, the business model WP in PO15 was led by BoP Inc., the Dutch non-state actor whose 
name derives from Prahalad and Hart’s theory. BoP Inc. and its members had deeply internalised 
market discourses and market thinking, and words like ‘incubate’, ‘value proposition’, ‘bankability’, the 
‘up-scaling’ of models exemplify their business model vocabulary. It held bold assumptions and high 
expectations regarding WP4 in PO15, as the original ideas behind the WP convey: 
 
There is a fast growing interest from investors, including impact investors, which aim for a combination of 
social, environmental and economic impact and are willing to accept higher risk and lower returns. 
Hundreds of funds have been set up in recent years and billions of dollars are waiting to be invested. In 
order to attract these investors and realize initiatives by private sector and entrepreneurs we propose to 
demonstrate and realize the potential of a Water & Sanitation Innovation Hub closely linked or 
embedded within the AIAS organization facilitating and supporting promising innovations of relevance 
for scaling Access to Water & Sanitation for small villages.  
 
Through the realization of a local Water & Sanitation Innovation HUB, we will develop an initiative with a 
“mission-driven” commercial profile and “value proposition”. The Hub contributes to improved access to 
water, sanitation and waste services and creation of income opportunities for people at the Base-of-the-
Pyramid, by orchestrating a business development network that offers local entrepreneurs and Dutch 
private sector with the necessary services to incubate & market driven innovations, that represent a 
natural fit with the objectives of committed investors.  
AIAS and Consortium 2013: 29; 57 
 
The hub thus played a central role in the prospected business model framework proposed by PO15, 
and the idea was in fact to position AIAS itself as the ‘Water & Sanitation Innovation Hub’ in 
cooperation with other actors, such as PLAMA. This idea never materialised, however. Although a hub, 
or so-called ‘Inclusive Business Accelerator’, was set up in Mozambique, this was done as part of 
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another project managed by SNV and financed by BZ. BoP Inc. was involved as a partner in this hub, 
together with Venture Capital for Africa, an organisation building ‘robust entrepreneurial ecosystems 
across the African continent’. But this hub was quite different from the one envisaged by BoP Inc., as it 
focused on various sectors, including, but not limited to water and sanitation. Under the aegis of this 
hub, a couple of studies and other activities were carried out, but it had not worked out as planned 
and soon stopped functioning after the subsidy dried up. According to the BoP associate, the hub had 




Without the envisaged hub, BoP Inc. concentrated on ‘market scoping for innovation opportunities’ 
and the ‘incubation of innovations’. The goal was to “ensure start of at least 2–3 concrete pilots in both 
water & sanitation” (ibid: 57). A list of potential innovations carried names like ‘Umbrella Water Utility’, 
‘Mini Water Factories’, ‘Facilitator Household Platform’ and ‘Integrated Waste Collection & Processing’. 
Nearing the end of the project, in 2017, two innovations had been set up and were still ongoing. One 
was named ‘Smart Water Metering’, the other revolved around the use of biogas for sanitation 
purposes. The latter is examined in the next section. 
 
6.4.3 Turning poo into profit? The ‘decentralized waste-2-value business model’ 
 
Sanitation, broadly conceived of as ‘the safe disposal of human waste’ (McFarlane and Silver 2017: 
128), is often taken together with water supply in aid programs, and combined the two are referred to 
as WASH: Water, Sanitation and Hygiene. As such, and notwithstanding the different discipline that 
sanitation is, the way aid agencies have approached sanitation development has been similar to water 
aid approaches. In the era of structural adjustment, WB-funded programs in countries like 
Mozambique sought to replace supply-side sanitation approaches with demand-responsive ones, 
which, according to Engel and Susilo (2014: 165), “...encouraged the poor to ‘take responsibility’ for 
their own development—and, of course, to pay for it”. Compared to water supply, the development of 
sanitation and wastewater infrastructure is generally given low priority by state entities, not least 
because excreta is often treated as a taboo subject (Jewitt 2011). According to actors involved in PO15, 
this is also the case in Mozambique and AIAS also tends to prioritise water over sanitation. Moreover, 
said one interviewee, setting up and running sanitation services is more complicated and more difficult 
to attain than water supply services, and there is often a lack of know-how on social and technical 
issues associated with sanitation.
324
 Traditional sanitation aid, at least in rural and peri-urban areas, 
often involved the placing of pit latrines, but many aid agencies now consider this insufficient and 
unsustainable in the long run. Rather, they have become, in the words of one WASH NGO, 
“...passionate believers in the transformative power of markets and innovation”, meaning “enormous 
strides can be made by bringing the local and international private sector into the urban WASH space 
(WSUP 2016: 3; italics in original).   
 
Biogas as the basis for the business model 
 
The ‘transformative power’ central in the examined business model is biogas. Biogas is embraced in 
sanitation business models for its potential use values and associated health, environmental and 
economic benefits. Yet, it is not new. Humans have produced biogas through anaerobic digesters ever 
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since the mid-nineteenth century (Jewitt 2010: 765). Such digesters have improved over time and come 
in a variety of designs and sizes nowadays. The principle has remained the same, however: liquid and 
organic waste types, such as those emanating from humans and animals, are put into an oxygen-free 
tank so as to allow waste to be fermented by micro-organisms. This process of anaerobic digestion 
(AD) produces a gas that can be used, inter alia, as cooking fuel, energy- and heat sources and for 
motor fuel, which is cleaner and/or easier to attain than alternative sources such as firewood or energy 
produced from fossil fuels. The slurry that remains after AD can be used as fertilizer, further reducing 
environmental impact. Maintaining and managing the digesters may create employment, and health 
conditions improve when biogas production in developing contexts is combined with the provision of 
improved sanitation facilities (Jewitt 2010; Sibanda et al. 2013). The prefix bio stresses the ‘naturalness’ 
of this process. The materiality of waste used in AD matters for the quality of biogas produced. Biogas 
is produced at different scales, from large quantities using sewage sludge in advanced AD processes, 
to smaller quantities using human, animal and household waste in simple digesters. The latter is 
usually the focus in sanitation business models for development. 
 
Because of the potential benefits, biogas production has been applied in different development 
contexts. In Asian countries such as China, India and Nepal, biogas is already used quite extensively. In 
Sub-Saharan Africa, its application is not as widespread, but states, NGOs
325
 and social enterprises
326
 
have proclaimed biogas in Africa amongst the most promising clean energy sources, and their 
initiatives have aimed at rapidly expanding the number of biogas plants in various African countries. 
 
These actors view biogas as a potential commodity with an exchange value, on top of its multiple use 
values and, in the words of one agency, are eager to “turn biogas users into entrepreneurs”.
327
 This is 
achieved when individuals produce more biogas than the immediate family requires, selling the 
surplus to others. These entrepreneurs, together with suppliers and maintainers of materials, can then 
develop into a “commercially viable and market-oriented biogas sector” on the national level.
328
 Biogas 
for and by the ‘BoP’ in Africa thus constitute a main pillar of these structures, and their sustainability is 
built on the premise of market mechanisms and private sector involvement. But this premise proves 
fragile. The Policy Evaluation Department (IOB) within BZ investigated this premise for a national 
biogas program in Rwanda and concluded that it does not hold (IOB 2014b; 2015). Kamp and Forn 
(2016) examined a nation-wide biogas program in Ethiopia and arrived at similar conclusions. They 
observed the absence of private sector involvement, the difficulties in developing a biogas market and 
a lack of understanding amongst experts how to develop this market component in a next project 
phase (ibid: 482).  
 
In Mozambique, biogas initiatives have not been as many or as encompassing as the ones in Rwanda, 
Ethiopia or other African countries. The ones that have been tried out failed, and a study on the 
potentiality of the biogas market in Mozambique, carried out under the framework of the 
abovementioned hub, infers that this is due to approaches not being commercial: 
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A history of a handful of pilot initiatives backed by donor funding but with no commercially sustainable 
operational models has left Mozambique with biogas projects that have not been successful. There exist 
very few reference projects that have been commissioned and are currently still in operation.  
 
Hanekamp and Dietz 2016: 6 
 
The biogas business model envisaged in PO15 was meant to tackle this lacuna and present an 
operational model that is ‘commercially sustainable’. The basic plan was to place small anaerobic 
digesters in three locations in Manhiça, a town eighty kilometres north of Maputo and participating in 
PO15. The three locations are a school, a market and a slaughterhouse. Sanitation facilities would be 
provided or upgraded, and human and animal waste collected at the school, the market and the 
slaughterhouse for treatment in the digesters. The produced biogas would be put into small gas bags 
that can be connected to cooking stoves, thereby replacing charcoal as cooking fuel. The pilot would 
thus tackle sanitation, health and environmental issues, as sketched above. It was labelled a 
‘decentralized waste-2-value business model’, referring to the expected exchange value of waste which 
ought to make the model financially viable, even profitable. Or, to put it in the more evocative 
phrasing of WASHplus, a platform linked to USAID, the idea was to ‘turn poo into profit’ (USAID 2012). 
 
A contested and exclusionary pilot 
 
In taking the initiative further, BoP Inc. partnered with ACRA, a like-minded Italian aid agency 
committed to ‘innovative solutions tackling poverty’, meaning ‘market-based solutions with high social 
and economic impact’.
329
 The consultant of BoP Inc., in the role of coordinator, had the most ambitious 
ideas for the business model. He was well-aware of the importance of sanitation ‘software’ next to 
‘hardware’. The model, rather than the AD technology per se, was what mattered most. It had to 
become a replicable, self-sustaining model, by generating a profit. He approached (human/animal) 
waste as both a resource and a potential commodity, but also knew that the mere production and sale 
of biogas would not make the model commercially viable:  
 
...lessons learned in most biogas sanitation initiatives demonstrate that new business models are required 
that create value beyond the value of the ‘products’ of the AD themselves (...) Selling BioGas is non 
sustainable! Selling ‘Cooking Concept & Services’ will be more sustainable! Creating a Business around 




Hence, in moving up in the chain from poo to profit, he envisaged additional ‘value drivers’, notably 
creating a business around cooking on biogas. His idea was to partner with a food company who 
would use the biogas in “...new type of restaurants aiming at low-income groups to market their 
nutritious food”. ‘Waste-2-value centers’ would be built, each with a sanitation and treatment unit. 
These centers would in turn be connected to a ‘waste-2-value cooking/ kitchen service provider’ who 
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Based on this idea, ACRA applied for and received funding from a ‘clean energy financing facility’ 
called the Energy and Environment Partnership Africa (EEP Africa)
332
. However, this severely 
complicated the business model. EEP demanded a private sector actor to participate in the process, 
who would take care of the biogas digesters. A Mozambican wastewater recycling company was found 
willing to participate, provided that one of its products, a decentralized wastewater treatment unit, 
would be included in the biogas business model. This request was accommodated; the unit was added 
as a post-treatment option in the business model, which would treat the resultant slurry after AD and 
turning it into clean water—thereby closing the cycle from wastewater to clean water. The only matter 
of concern was that this treatment unit consumes a considerable and costly amount of energy.    
 
If the idea of a biogas cooking business already proved ambitious and based on questionable 
assumptions
333
, this energy issue further undermined the viability of the business model. Calculations 
in the proposal to EEP did suggest that the model—including this post treatment unit—was 
commercially viable, but this was contested by a young Dutch expert hired by PO15 to work on the 
digesters for half a year. She said that the proposal contained unclear and wrong calculations as well 
as other errors, or “...various elements that made the business model much more appealing than it 
actually was”.
334
 This included unsubstantiated estimates of biogas production, completed designs for 
the digesters that were not yet there, and the indication of various locations for biogas production that 
were in fact not suitable.  
 
Materiality played a key role in the process of getting the model sustainable. The school proved not to 
be a suitable location, because of the kids’ poo. Their poo was based on a diet without much meat, 
with which the production of biogas would not be very good. The school’s canteen also produced 
insufficient waste.
335
 It was therefore decided to abandon the school as location, even before the EEP 
proposal was written. Of all locations considered suitable slaughterhouses topped the list, given the 
potency of animal waste for biogas production. Including slaughterhouses in the model as location 
thus made sense from a biogas production point of view, and it would have a positive by-effect: 
preventing animal waste from being dumped in the nearby river. However, excluding a school and 
including a slaughterhouse in the model raised the question for what or whom the model is set up. 
The model was supposed to be about sanitation and hence, about human waste, but rendering the 
model commercially viable was better served by the use of animal waste.  
 
Rendering the business model commercially viable in fact became the biggest point of contestation 
within the partnership. The BoP Inc. consultant insisted that, in spite of the energy issue, the model 
could still become profitable. If a cooking business would not suffice, then other activities could help 
make it profitable. He proposed selling additional items like soap and condoms, or using bioslurry as 
compost with which to grow pineapple trees and make a business out of that.
336
 The problem, said the 
young expert, is that “...he only talks about such ideas, but does not manage to put them in practice”. 
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She became annoyed that the complications as a result of trying to make the case commercially viable 
‘raped’ the otherwise sound idea of biogas production from waste.
337
 The owner of the wastewater 
recycling company said that one should not expect “the system to pay for itself (...) that is not going to 
happen’.
338
 The ACRA representative was outright sceptical. On a personal title, she did not think 
biogas was worth the effort, looking at the amount of resources needed to build up biogas plants and 
maintain them vis-à-vis the benefits of biogas. She hinted at biogas being a fashion internationally, 




These different viewpoints led to rising tensions and complications, further aggravated by financier 
pressure and bureaucracy. EEP made various time-consuming demands, notably that materials would 
be publically tendered. They also imposed a stringent project management regime that it outsourced 
to accountancy firm KPMG. KPMG did an unannounced audit and found that not all activities listed in 
the proposal had been carried out. Some of these activities had become redundant by then, but still 
had to be, and were, carried out for the sake of project compliance. Next to EEP, PO15 had reserved 
budget and wanted it spent with the project’s end drawing near, so they too put pressure on partners 
to deliver. A quarrel arose over who would pay for the materials in Manhiça, since both PO15 and 
ACRA (through EEP) had money reserved for this. They finally agreed on placing digesters in another 
village paid for by PO15’s budget, even though the potential for biogas production proved not as 
good there. And since it became clear to all that the inclusion of the post-treatment unit would curb 
any effort to recover costs, let alone make profits, the wastewater recycling company gave up its 
position in the partnership. It continued in the role of mentor of a recent university graduate, who had 
the ambition to start up his own biogas company and take over the original role of the wastewater 
recycling company. 
 
AIAS was supposed to be the state entity taking responsibility of and ownership over the pilot, and 
while it became involved during the pilot’s implementation, its involvement remained minimal. The 
idea of making money in the biogas model so as to render it self-reliant was not shared by AIAS, 
according to the young expert.
340
 Another interviewee said that AIAS was reluctant to involve 
companies like soap distributors; it did not want to give the impression of privileging some companies 
over others, and it was afraid it would not adhere to procurement procedures.
341
 The AIAS employee 
who was appointed as the ‘focal point’ for the pilot stressed that he and others at AIAS lacked any 
knowledge about biogas, but that it was necessary for them to gain such knowledge, as they had to 
ensure the sustainability of the concept. In any case, he and others at AIAS had low expectations. He 
stressed the importance for people in the village to see benefits accruing from the model, because that 
is the primary task of AIAS.
342
    
 
Community involvement was also considered the foundation for success in WP4. As the project plan 
stated: “...only when the needs of low-income groups are taken as point of departure, it is possible to 
develop truly sustainable innovations and business models” (AIAS et al. 2013: 29). However, notably 
absent in the design and attempted implementation of this business model were citizens and 




 Interview owner of private company, 22 March 2017. 
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 Interview AIAS employee, 24 March 2017. 
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communities as the prospected key participants and beneficiaries, or in the business model’s 
vocabulary, the ‘BoP’. Citizens of Manhiça had not been consulted directly, but through municipality 
members who, partners claimed, showed interest in the biogas plan. Citizens would only be informed 
about it once the design of the biogas digesters was decided upon and before construction would 
start. This procedure was agreed upon, said one interviewee, because in case the pilot would not 
succeed and communities would have been informed about its existence and potential benefits 
beforehand, they may become disappointed or even frustrated about yet another failed development 
project.
343
 Consequently, the needs of the biogas pilot became leading rather than taking the needs of 
beneficiaries as point of departure. People had to be sensitised into adopting the (potential benefits 
of) the model, as the pilot required “buy-in to sanitation solutions and decentralized treatment 
plants”
344
. But according to the owner of the wastewater recycling company, communities would only 
become involved in matters of human waste “if it is good for their pockets”.
345
 This relied on the 
amount of biogas that could be produced as well as the price in relation to charcoal that is normally 
used for cooking. Yet, as mentioned, most actors involved regarded this highly unlikely. 
 
In all, the idea of transforming poo into profit never materialised and proved a main factor in 
rendering the pilot’s politics contested and exclusionary. This idea drew a line of separation among the 
participating actors; non- or for-profit agents that were familiar with or interested in this idea and the 
associated innovation and market discourse came to drive the pilot while others, notably communities 
and AIAS as the state entity responsible for sanitation, were marginally or not involved. Biogas plants 
were eventually installed in Manhiça and another PO15 town, Chibuto, but these risk ending up as 
another unsuccessful pilot, with this ‘hardware’ not being used in the longer term. 
 
6.4.4 Business models based on the BoP: a new form of inclusive capitalism?  
 
The exclusion of AIAS and citizens in the biogas pilot is indicative of the business model WP in PO15 in 
general, which evolved into quite an exclusionary WP. This process already started with the inclusion of 
this very WP in PO15, which was clearly pushed by agencies on the Dutch side rather than asked or 
desired by Mozambican actors. The former director of AIAS put it diplomatically: 
 
We did agree with it [WP4], to explore new things. In the beginning it was not easy (...) In the beginning, 
other components were considered more basic—say the first three work packages in PO15. We were fine 
with those, but the one about innovations was more complicated. So we started carrying out the first 
three work packages, leaving the fourth quite behind. We thought that once we have the first three work 




Indeed, AIAS was still in the process of getting fully operational as a relatively new entity. It lacked 
qualified staff and often sufficient know-how to fulfil its primary tasks, let alone more complicated and 
ill-founded business models. It was only after an external review of PO15 concluded that the WP on 
business models “is just an addendum to the project” (Bouman and Beete 2016: 18) that the 
aforementioned AIAS employee got appointed as the focal point for innovations in WP4. 
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What did not help bridging the divide between AIAS and this WP was the business model discourse; 
the market vocabulary and ideas that underpinned the WP in general and the biogas pilot in particular 
were not well understood, used or shared by AIAS employees.
347
 In the words of the technical manager 
of AIAS: “investing in water systems we already knew. But innovating our views is something new and 
challenging”.
348
 Even Dutch actors who were themselves involved in novel aid and trade approaches 
were critical of BoP Inc., claiming its employees are good at ‘mixing newspeak’
349
 and writing reports, 
but not so much producing concrete results.
350
 On the other hand, the BoP Inc. associate as the key 
actor in WP4 said he felt himself an outsider. He explained this by opposing mentalities and ways of 
working; AIAS was like a factory, he said, focused on production, stability and regularity, while his way 
of working is more like a ‘flexible machine’. He said he had spent little time at AIAS whenever he 





The turn to business models is rooted in the idea of a failure of supply-driven (traditional) aid 
approaches managed and/or financed by state and non-profit entities, and the need to replace these 
by (modern) demand-driven, market-based approaches—in this case, driven by the demand of the 
BoP. As Dolan (2012) argues, this makes the BoP a “...compelling proposition, promising a new form of 
inclusive capitalism that simultaneously cleanses development of its paternalist and interventionist 
heritage and repositions capital accumulation as moral” (ibid: 3, italics added). Poverty reduction, she 
argues, is effectively outsourced to the poor who have to conform to market ideals of “responsibility, 
competition, risk-taking, a positive attitude and market discipline” (ibid: 6). This, according to her, 
produces a sharper division between ‘who is in’ and ‘who is out’ of development, as not everyone can 
(physically, financially or otherwise), or wants to, conform to such ideals and make it as entrepreneur. 
And those who do succeed as BoP entrepreneur, find themselves reliant on the peculiarities of often 
fragile consumer markets with uncertain long-term perspectives (ibid: 7).  
 
In the case examined in this section, I conclude that people that were considered the BoP were hardly 
or not the point of departure. While marketed as demand-driven and inclusive, the discourses and 
practices related to BoP and business models were instead supply-driven and they tended to exclude 
and divide rather than include or unite the various other stakeholders. The entire BoP discourse that 
underlie water and sanitation business models in PO15, in sum, is a compelling proposition for those 
who have internalised this ostensibly ‘inclusive’ market thinking and therefore believe it to be of 
universal value. For other groups of actors, this narrowed down rather than opened up water and 




In reviewing Hall et al.’s work on ‘powers of exclusion’ that I started this chapter with, Corbera (2012) 
argues that rather than paying attention to either powers of access or  exclusion, the two should be 
viewed as standing in a dialectical relationship: 
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Access (i.e. how and why people benefit from things) holds a dialectical position with exclusion (i.e. how 
and why people cannot benefit from things): they speak to each other and therefore the latter cannot be 
understood without the former. 
Ibid: 223 
 
The present and previous chapter taken together indeed provide insight into powers of access and 
exclusion to water (aid), and their dialectical interplay. The previous chapter focused on the 
implementation of a market-based access mechanism, in which attempts to open up access stumbled 
upon different countervailing, territorial logics. This chapter inverted the entry-point by focusing on 
exclusionary events and tendencies impacting on or embedded in the bilateral water aid and trade 
relationship. These tend to narrow down individual and collective agency in pursuit of access to water 
and sanitation, but at the same time generate countervailing powers and voices.  
 
In the first part, I used the debt crisis that broke out in 2016 as a tragic but (from a research point of 
view) revealing, empirical event to make two interrelated points. First, this crisis, and measures taken in 
response, reproduced and deepened already problematic social and material conditions in which water 
(aid) actors carry out their projects, and narrowed down the strategic options of where and how to 
deploy water aid interventions. Such exclusionary effects triggered deep frustration and contestation 
that was primarily aimed at the ruling capitalist and political classes in Mozambique and international 
private financial actors who together created conditions for the crisis to occur. Second, it shows how 
development in and of the Mozambican waterscape is inherently entangled with the Mozambican 
political economy. The second part of this chapter dealt with two so-called ambient exclusions in water 
aid and trade processes: the imagineering of the Dutch water sector and the preoccupation with water 
and sanitation business models. Despite discursive emphasis placed on ‘inclusiveness’, ‘demand-driven 
solutions’, equality, ‘participation’ and the like in Dutch water aid (GON 2017a: 10), I conclude that 
these are rather ‘supply-driven’ processes that tend to exclude important actors and privilege Dutch 
ideas and concepts over those of the host environment.  
 
The latter two events exemplify what is problematic about the water aid and trade course pursued in 
Mozambique. They spur agents into designing and offering another set of technological fixes and 
solutions, rooted in the capitalistic logic of liquid power and deemed universally applicable. This is line 
with an emphasis on depoliticised perceptions of problems in the Mozambican waterscape. However, 
the debt crisis has once again made clear that hydrosocial problems and development is an inherently 
political affair and that to tackle uneven development requires, in the words of one interviewee, “deep 
system reforms”. This interviewee pointed at reforms in power relations in Mozambique, and the need 
to decouple the toxic mix of the ruling class power and state power in Mozambique. It appeared as if 
the GON realised this when it acknowledged, in response to the debt crisis, that “business as usual” 
cannot continue with the GOM (GON 2016c: 1). Like other aid agents, it suspended aid and imposed 
other measures to emphasise this. 
 
However, this call for system reforms equally applies to Dutch aid.  The GON was the first of (Western) 
donors not to await the findings of the audit that had been initiated into the causes of the debt crisis 
and invited president Nyusi on an official state visit to the Netherlands in 2017. A key objective of this 
visit was to stimulate bilateral trade, among others in the fields of gas and water. This visit led to 
controversy, with one Dutch newspaper concluding that ‘Fraud must not hinder trade’ (NRC 2017). 
Critical questions were asked in the Dutch Parliament about this event, with parliamentarians saying 
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this gives the wrong signal. The GON rejected this criticism and claimed that “...increasing market 
access and improving the business climate, thereby strengthening the trade relations, are important 
elements (...) to combat poverty and enhance stability in Mozambique” (GON 2017b). In other words, 
the GON was one of the first donors to resume ‘business as usual’. But this meant a return to a very 
problematic business as usual. What was needed was a transition to a radically different ‘business as 
usual’—one that does not reproduce but radically challenge the status quo and rooted power relations 
in Mozambique. But that required a radically different development vision, one not rooted in the logics 










The first chapter started with Karl Polanyi’s (2001) statement about the introduction and development 
of a market for land, which he considered a weird undertaking of our ancestors. The PhD project that 
resulted in this thesis started with a similar bewilderment, about the perseverance of subjecting water 
to the market, despite many and well-known social, moral and material obstacles.  
 
This thesis looked specifically at the perseverance of subjecting water to market mechanisms in 
Mozambique, driven by policies and agendas adopted by the Dutch state in the early 2010s (GON 
2010; 2011a; 2013a). These agendas aimed to tie aid–related agents, institutions, processes and finance 
closer to those of trade. Given their similar rationale, these agendas are commonly known under the 
rubric ‘aid and trade agenda’. My initial entry-points for this research were two strategic choices in this 
aid and trade agenda. The first is water, as one out of four priority aid and trade sectors. The second 
was Mozambique, as one out of seven so-called ‘transitional’ aid and trade partner countries of the 
Dutch state. While the GON considered Mozambique and its waterscape to be a suitable aid and trade 
destination, the initial strategy was even to replace (water) aid by trade altogether. This decision to 
move from aid to trade was soon abandoned, as it was based on an economically reductionist 
imaginary about Mozambique’s foreseeable future and considered far-fetched in practical terms 
and/or undesirable given the highly problematic state of development in the country.  
 
How to ‘read’ and interpret this aid and trade agenda in the Mozambican-Dutch water aid 
relationship’s longer run was a generic question asked throughout the research journey. I tackled this 
question using a political ecology lens. This means I approached development as a historical process 
of socio-environmental change unfolding in global capitalism as the dominant political economic 
system. This research must therefore not be seen as a ‘policy study’. My intention was not just to look 
at the implementation of this Dutch aid agenda in Mozambique, reaching the inevitable conclusion 
that there is a gap between policy and practice. Such a gap can be assumed beforehand, as aid 
processes are nothing like the depoliticised and linear processes often sketched in aid project 
proposals, where a given ‘input’ leads to neatly defined ‘outputs’ and ‘impacts’ following a predefined 
strategy. On the contrary, drafting aid agendas or projects are themselves deeply political processes 
and their attempted implementation does not occur in a space devoid of context or pre-structured 
power relations.  
 
From this relational and historical perspective, the aid and trade course pursued in Mozambique must 
be seen as representing an intensification of processes that were already going on. In other words, if 
trade in this context not simply represents the exchange and circulation of commodities in capitalist 
markets, but more generally applying capitalist logics such as competition or market mechanisms to 
(water) aid processes, then this has been going on for much longer in Mozambique. Phrased 
differently, Mozambique had already been integrated in global capitalism, and aid mechanisms and 
agents, including the GON, had played a significant role in this process. The way this integration 
occurred, through the specific political (economic) system built up in postcolonial Mozambique, has 
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(re)produced deeply engrained patterns of uneven development in the country and its waterscape. I 
thus departed from the assumption that ‘aid’ and ‘trade’ were intertwined long before this agenda was 
introduced and that this entanglement had co-produced, or at least failed to fundamentally address, a 
problematic type of hydrosocial development. Introducing an agenda that is focused on ‘inclusive 
growth’ and ‘combating inequality’ (GON 2013a), yet even more strongly committed to the idea of 
market-based and private-sector driven growth, was deeply puzzling against this background. Rather 
than taking water aid and trade as complementary processes leading to a more inclusive and more 
equal type of development, this thesis argues the agenda and its implementation in Mozambique can 
better be understood as deeply contradictory processes, complicating water management while 
leaving the root causes of uneven hydrosocial development by and large unaffected.  
 
This concluding chapter recapitulates why I think this should be understood this way, guided by the 
main research question: how have contradictions within Mozambican–Dutch water ‘aid and trade’ 
relations and interventions evolved under contemporary capitalism, and how do these relate to the 
reproduction and transformation of uneven development in the Mozambican waterscape? In the next 
section, I elaborate on the main argument by summing up and tracing the linkages between the 
individual chapters. In doing so, I tackle the thesis’ first aim, which was to come to grips with the 
ontology of contradictions as they played out in the bilateral water aid relationship. The second aim of 
the thesis will be addressed in section 7.2, by discussing and reflecting on the conceptualisation of 
socio-environmental contradictions proposed in chapter two. 
 
7.1 Water aid and trade contradictions  
 
I departed from the notion that the aid and trade agenda has fuelled contradictory ‘powers’ that had 
already been generated within the bilateral water aid relationship (long) before this agenda was 
introduced. These powers make up what I refer to as ‘water aid and trade contradictions’, after the 
agenda introduced above. I defined a primary water aid and trade contradiction that operates 
throughout the structure of the bilateral relationship, which in turn is derivative of and expressed in 
‘secondary’ contradictions.  
 
In chapter two, I have introduced the primary water aid and trade contradiction in terms of the 
territorial and capitalistic logics of liquid power. These logics are based on works in political economy 
(Arrighi 2010; Harvey 2003) and development studies (Kim and Gray 2016), and I relate these to what 
Swyngedouw (2015) calls ‘liquid power’—the politics and power struggles revolving around water. The 
territorial logic of liquid power broadly revolves around place-based waters found in national 
territories and around water’s elemental role in social reproduction and production. This renders it a 
key object of state agents and politicians. The capitalistic logic of liquid power refers to water as itself 
an object of capital accumulation and subjecting various water-related processes (such as water 
supply) and things (such as water technologies) to market imaginaries and mechanisms. Key actors 
related to this logic are those making up the private sector, but in the context of this thesis, a more 
diversified set of agents drive and are driven by this logic, including state entities and aid agencies.  
 
Chapter three sketches the generic political economic and hydrosocial structures in which the bilateral 
relationship and indeed, this primary contradiction, developed from the mid-1970s onwards. It traces 
the gradual strengthening of the capitalistic logic of liquid power throughout the relationship’s history, 
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which occurred in tandem with the rise of contemporary (neoliberal and financial) capitalism from the 
1980s onwards. The chapter argues that the logics of contemporary capitalism have grown into an 
increasingly tense and indeed contradictory relationship with territorial logics of liquid power, and one 
in particular. This is a logic in which central state/bureaucratic power is regarded leading in governing 
and managing water affairs in Mozambique. The root of this particular territorial logic lies in the first 
decade after dependence. The GOM constituted of members of the ruling party Frelimo, who 
mobilised the state apparatus as the key means for (hydrosocial) development based on a socialist 
political doctrine. The state was also mobilised as a political apparatus, in which water was used to 
profile Frelimo and its socialist program favourably.  
 
Driven by this logic, the GOM launched overambitious hydrosocial programs and imposed rigid and 
homogenous methods on a highly heterogeneous population. It did so in a context rife with 
challenges stemming from its colonial past, the hostility of its apartheid neighbours, global Cold War 
dynamics and an expanding civil war. Faced with these challenges and with its own errors, the GOM 
and its state-driven programs could not live up to expectations. Deep problems led the GOM to allow 
aid from hitherto despised Western nations and institutions to flock in. Together, these actors ushered 
in a transition in which socialist ideals were replaced by liberal ones, the one party system by a multi-
party democracy and a central state-driven economy by a capitalist market economy. Formally, that is, 
as this transition had been messy and problematic, with the novel logics of contemporary capitalism 
beginning to operate alongside rooted territorial logics. In particular, social relations between Frelimo, 
the GOM and the state remained by and large as tight as they had been under socialism. This 
translated in the reproduction of the territorial logic of (liquid) power, whereby economic and 
hydrosocial development kept on being orchestrated centrally, not least in the benefit of a rising 
political and economic elite. Especially this territorial logic developed into a contradictory relationship 
with capitalistic logics that increasingly informed bilateral aid relations and programs.     
 
I examined the empirical manifestation of these logics, and their contradictory interplay, in the 
Mozambican–Dutch water aid relationship in chapters four to six. Chapter four examined how a rising 
capitalistic logic of liquid power became expressed in a growing emphasis on water (aid) 
marketisation. Water marketisation aimed at transforming the centralised, bureaucratised and 
politicised approach to governing water affairs in Mozambique into a decentralised, depoliticised and 
market-oriented approach. In other words, the hitherto dominant form of territorial logic had to be 
rendered less powerful and be substituted by a variant complementary with the espoused capitalistic 
logics—one in which the central state has an ‘enabling’ and guiding role rather than a commanding or 
implementing one. As enabler of this transition, Dutch aid also itself had to change in a similar 
direction.  
 
To this end, various market mechanisms were deployed and three in particular: corporatisation, 
outsourcing based on competitive tendering and the private sector imaginary. I have noted how these 
mechanisms have indeed transformed Dutch water aid and the Mozambican waterscape in various 
respects, but their attempted implementation was also one full of power struggles and complications. 
These politics and struggles, I contend, exposed a contradictory reality: rather than these attempts 
diminishing central state and bureaucratic power in Mozambique, they kept relying on and tended to 
be thwarted by this power that had only gained rather than lost in strength. This is a power, moreover, 
exerted by Frelimo-cum-GOM members intent on keeping decision-making centralised, so as not to 
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hamper their political agendas. The aid and trade course only intensified this contradictory reality, with 
the Dutch aid bureaucracy more focused than before on producing results and rendering—the deeply 
uncertain and political—water aid processes quantifiable, predictable and transparent.  
 
In relation to water supply, the rising strength of the capitalistic logic of liquid power became 
expressed in a preference for market-based water access mechanisms and one in particular: the 
Delegated Management Framework (DMF), based on private sector participation (PSP). Chapter five 
examined the bilateral aid intervention called ‘PO15’ that helped AIAS implement the DMF in small 
towns in Mozambique. The chapter reveals two things. One is how the DMF became the preferred and 
indeed formally adopted mechanism for organising water supply in small towns in Mozambique in 
spite of its problematic past application in selected cities and small towns. This suggests the decision 
to maintain, and even expand the scope of, the DMF–PSP mechanism was driven by neoliberal 
ideology rather than ‘based on evidence’ that many aid actors swear by. Second, the implementation 
of the DMF in small towns showed how the ideal-based market logics underpinning the DMF was 
countervailed by various kinds of territorial logics and conditions. With territorial conditions, I refer to 
the ‘material environment’ that was ill-suited in many towns for PSP to work well. This notably included 
the poor technical condition of many water supply systems. Moreover, the DMF’s implementation 
represented a terrain of liquid power struggles. The DMF relied on functional relationships between 
AIAS and operators on the one hand, and between them and central state agencies, local authorities 
and citizens on the other hand. However, relations were deeply political. While these actors sometimes 
acted in line with their ‘allotted’ functions and roles, their agendas and interests often diverged, which 
thwarted a smooth implementation.  
 
PO15 handsomely mediated the contradictory interplay between the capitalistic and territorial logics as 
they became expressed in these power struggles, by fixing technical or organisational problems and 
resolving minor tensions through the delivery of various types of aid. This enabled the implementation 
of the DMF and PSP to move on. Securing certain conditions it itself deemed essential for the long-
term sustainability of this access mechanism proved far more difficult and indeed not possible in the 
time span of PO15, including ‘stabilising’ AIAS as organisation or arranging mechanisms required for 
financially viable operations. These were conditions that relied on centralised and indeed, political 
decision-making. It indicates that while PO15 actors could technically ease some of the tensions arising 
as a result of the logics clashing, they could not change the (political) nature of these logics and were 
bound to operate within the boundaries set by these logics. Rather than these logics operating in a 
‘complementary’ way, they have kept contradicting each other, which calls into question the 
sustainability of this mechanism. 
 
Chapter six inverted this focus on water access, and examined the exclusionary nature and effects of 
three events impacting on or stemming from the bilateral water aid and trade relations. The first event 
is a major debt scandal that came to light in 2016 in Mozambique, which plunged its economy in a 
deep crisis. The debts likely benefited a few members of Mozambique’s political and economic elite, 
but impacted negatively on the great majority of the population. This spurred a range of domestic and 
international actors into protesting the deeply exclusionary nature not only of this event (crisis), but of 
the political economy that structurally tends to privilege a minority to the expense of the majority. I 
showed how this political economic event is at the same time a political ecological event, having major 
hydrosocial impacts. The crisis led to a breach of trust between the two states and severely restricted 
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the agency and development options of Dutch aid actors, Mozambican water agencies and of 
operators and other actors in PO15, affected as they were by austerity measures and lower budgets, 
inflation, import and investment restrictions, the suspension of aid money and/or a change in aid 
modalities.  
 
I have dubbed the second and third events ‘ambient exclusions’. These refer to two Dutch aid and 
trade processes in which hydrosocial problem perceptions and solutions are branded as universally 
valid, desirable and applicable or as ‘inclusive’. Yet, I argue, these processes tend to take ideas and 
products from the Dutch water sector as privileged frames for interpreting problems and offering 
solutions, rather than taking hydrosocial developments and recipient communities in Mozambique as 
the point of departure.  
 
This tendency was, firstly, evident in the global branding of the Dutch water sector, inter alia aimed at 
giving Dutch water organisations a competitive edge in the world market for water services. This 
process is driven by the aid and trade agenda and other, compatible Dutch state agendas and projects 
with a nationalistic-economic orientation. Organised and supported by some state and non-state 
actors, it is at the same time contested by other Dutch state and non-state actors as well as by some 
Mozambican water professionals. The latter group pointed out that not Dutch economic interests and 
reasoning, but hydrosocial problems and needs in Mozambican territory should determine what type 
of Dutch support is delivered, and how. This tendency was also, secondly, noticeable in Dutch aid 
agents’ preoccupation with so-called innovative and inclusive business models for water and 
sanitation. Such market-based models were promoted as ‘modern’, demand-driven alternatives to the 
‘traditional’ supply-driven aid approaches managed and/or financed by state and non-profit entities. 
Likewise, business models proposed in PO15 that I examined were said to be demand-driven, that is, 
driven by the needs of ‘low-income groups’. My findings suggest that they were rather supply-driven 
and exclusionary affairs. Models were proposed, designed and implemented by Dutch and other, 
mostly European, agencies, without much involvement of actors that ought to secure or benefit from 
them in the long run, namely AIAS and targeted communities. I explained this by these models being 
immersed in a market discourse and terminology that many Mozambican actors were unfamiliar with 
and which did not link up with their problem perceptions and realities.  
 
On the whole, I argue, these contradictions severely complicate the governance and management of 
(Dutch) water (aid) in Mozambique. They have intensified power struggles between Dutch and 
Mozambican water aid actors, and within either of the two states. Specifically, I conclude that the aid 
and trade course pursued in Mozambique has failed to fundamentally address the problem that I 
started this and other chapters with: uneven hydrosocial development in Mozambique.  
 
I started chapter three with sketching how the waterscape had been pre-structured before the bilateral 
water aid relations took shape. I concluded that this bilateral relationship was established in a political 
economic and hydrosocial context characterised by extreme inequalities and deeply rooted patterns of 
uneven development. This context was produced by colonialism with race, class and capitalist 
exploitation as key determinants. Undoing this legacy represented a massive task for the independent 
GOM and could only seriously be addressed after the civil war in 1992. The numerous efforts and large 
amounts of capital that have since then been geared towards developing the Mozambican waterscape 
have resulted in considerable changes and many improvements, some structural, others short-lived. 
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But these benefits have been distributed in highly uneven ways, studies by aid agents conclude, 
notably in the area of water supply and sanitation (WB 2018; Unicef 2016; 2017). These studies showed 
that inequality in access to these services has been consistently high and growing still. This inequality 
manifests itself spatially, between regions and between urban and rural areas, as well as socially, 
between different income groups. This in turn follows broader (under)development patterns; the poor 
have had growing difficulties in accessing improved water sources, while the wealthiest income groups 
have benefited most from improvements and investments in the water sector (WB 2018: 1; Unicef 
2017: 19). Consequently, the gap in the ability to access improved water sources between poorer and 
richer groups has only widened in the past years (WB 2018).  
 
This begs the question how such uneven hydrosocial development gets reproduced or transformed. 
The WB’s lessons and recommendations with regard to this problem in the Mozambican waterscape, 
which resonate with approaches followed in the bilateral water aid and trade relationship, include 
making progress in water decentralisation, addressing the water sector’s “high dependency on donor 
financing” and tackling “pressing financing gaps”. The latter is to be done by, inter alia, “pursuing 
independent budget classifications for the sector and separating its financial allocations and budget 
cycles from other sectors” (ibid: 7). The study also points at an alleged ‘vital change’ that is needed in 
urban water supply, by better and more widely implementing the DMF and PSP.  
 
This thesis casts a different light on the question and problem, departing from the observation that 
these lessons and recommendations have been put forward and tackled by the water aid community 
and the GOM for decades already. Decentralisation has been on the agenda ever since aid flocked into 
the country in the 1980s; water aid dependency has been consistently high throughout the same 
period; and corporatisation (including financial ‘ring-fencing’) has been part and parcel of the water 
architecture erected after the civil war ended in 1992. In particular, chapter five discussed at length the 
powers and politics involved to extend the DMF from cities to towns in Mozambique, and the multiple 
attempts to have it better implemented. In other words, this thesis suggests that another course is 
needed; one that more fundamentally addresses the root drivers of uneven development. This brings 
me to the final section of this chapter and thesis. 
 
7.2 Conceptualising socio-environmental contradictions: a discussion 
 
In chapter one, I claimed that socio-environmental contradictions are often problematic, but that there 
is also a problem with the use of contradictions in literatures I engage with. Conceptual premises, I 
observed, are often left implicit in scholarly work on socio-environmental contradictions. My aim has 
been to tackle this gap and to make my approach on contradiction explicit, so as to open up debates 
on what a contradiction is and does. By making this explicit it allows for targeted critique that, I hope, 
can be used for improving the use of this concept. This final section thus reflects on the premises of 
contradiction explored in chapter two in relation to my empirical data. In doing so, I return to the 
question what I think ought to be done to resolve or use these contradictions for more emancipatory 
pathways to hydrosocial development.  
 
While in chapter two I explored and listed dimensions of contradiction sequentially, combined they 
define what a contradiction is and does. Thus, to briefly recall, I conceptualised contradiction not as a 
logical statement, but as a dialectical process—a historical process, that is. I treated a contradiction as 
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entailing two mutually constituting, but opposing (sets of) powers united in a single structure. I 
defined structure, as well as powers and human agency/events, in a critical realist sense. This means 
they are all ontologically real, but ‘stratified’, having different properties and qualities. Applied to the 
case, I looked at contradictions as having evolved in and along with the structure called the 
‘Mozambican-Dutch water aid relationship’. In other words, the logics making up the contradiction 
emerge from this structure, and from larger structures that this relationship is nested in. These larger 
structures are [1] Dutch aid, [2] the Mozambican waterscape, [3] both states and political economies 
and the most generic is [4] contemporary capitalism as a global, singular but spatially variegated 
system.  
 
The implication of this process-based view on contradiction is that the primary contradiction examined 
in this thesis only came into existence after the capitalistic logic grew powerful, from the mid-1980s 
onwards. This is of course not to say that capitalism did not exist before that, or that it had no impact 
on the early relationship. I have examined in chapter three how Dutch aid and the colonial 
Mozambican waterscape were deeply entangled with global capitalism. Yet, the early relationship 
came into being during a time of major political economic and societal changes in both societies. 
These included, in Mozambican society, the abolishment of colonialism and the (rhetorical) 
denouncement of imperialism and capitalism by the independent GOM. In the Netherlands, this 
involved progressive changes in society and in government and state politics in the 1960s and 1970s. 
These changes in both societies opened up a certain sympathy and the potential for cooperation 
between the two on similar ideological grounds. The early relationship that became established in this 
context allowed for the territorial logic to emerge, the one that I argue has remained powerful in the 
structure, with the central state seen as the principal vector for hydrosocial change. In this context, a 
capitalistic logic was not suppressed nor absent, but the ideological and material environment proved 
unsuitable for this logic to prosper.   
 
This capitalistic logic was able to prosper, again because of fundamental changes. This time, the major 
change was a rise in power of the neoliberal political doctrine and its insistence on a ‘free market’ type 
of capitalism from the 1980s. This doctrine had radical and swift impacts in Mozambican society, 
particularly through structural adjustment. Its logics also grew powerful in Dutch aid and in the 
bilateral structure, although more gradually. These changes opened up space for the (gradual) 
introduction of new agents, new frameworks and mechanisms, other types of money and the rising 
attention paid to other than Mozambican place-based waters in the structure. The simultaneous 
preservation of the dominant territorial logic in Mozambique was based on social relations between 
the GOM, the Mozambican state and the ruling party Frelimo that had established during socialism 
and which remained as tight as they had been since independence. Thus, powers making up a 
contradiction ‘work’ not on the basis of a single agent or other single elements in the structure. Powers 
are rather constituted by an assemblage of agents and ‘things’ in a structure, and by that structure in 
relation to broader structures in which it is nested. 
 
The capitalistic and territorial logics are internal to the structure, but they are not unique to the 
structure. They are internal, in the sense that they define the properties of the structure as well as the 
scope in which actors implicated in the relationship do their work. This notion of ‘internal relation’ is 
important, as it relates to how I have assessed some of the aid and trade events examined. For 
instance, I noted in chapter five that the project PO15 did not meet some its own objectives/indicators, 
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but that the project could nevertheless continue as the fulfilment of these objectives was said to be 
beyond these actors’ control. I agree that individual actors at once lacked the political power to 
enforce decisions required for these objectives to be fulfilled, which rested with GOM and other state 
actors. Yet, my point is that these political and state actors are inherently part of the structure; their 
influence and politics cannot be wished away. These codetermine any bilateral intervention in 
Mozambique and certainly those that, like PO15, are directly implicated in the state structure of 
Mozambique. These logics are thus also internalised in such an intervention. Both logics, however, are 
not unique to the bilateral relationship structure. That would not make sense; this structure, as 
mentioned, must be considered one structure (‘case study’) emergent of and operating in a larger set 
of structures. Both logics likely play out in other, similar structures. Yet exactly how these powers play 
out, and the events and outcomes they generate, is contingent on the particular structural 
configuration. 
 
The two powers act tendentially on human agency. This means they enable or constrain actors to think 
and act in a particular way or direction. It depends on the type of actor and an actor’s interest and 
vision whether a particular power is perceived as enabling or constraining. But if opposing powers 
grow equally strong and the strain between them increases, the agential implications are that one 
group of actors (are stimulated to) act in ways that conflict with how another group of actors behaves 
in the same structure. This is a breeding ground for feelings of frustration (which can be confined to a 
particular actor) or tensions (which always includes more than one actor). In the structure examined, 
this was best noticeable among agents most directly involved in the bilateral water aid relations and 
interventions, notably the central state entities on both sides (e.g. EKN, DNA), but also other state and 
non-state actors (e.g. AIAS, VEI, consultancies). These actors were ‘squeezed’ so to say between the 
two logics, most prominently in the aid and trade period. That is, the capitalistic logic has been an 
increasingly powerful driver for Dutch decision-makers, in turn spurring actors involved in the 
relationship to continue searching for ways to involve the private sector, attract private finance and 
apply market mechanisms. This was challenging and problematic enough on its own, but the particular 
territorial logic and associated state politics and practices maintained by the Frelimo-led GOM simply 
negated many of these processes. 
 
These powers should, however, not be considered all-powerful. There is more or less scope for human 
agency to act in line with their own ideas and to contest, circumvent or even undermine the pressure 
exerted on them by these powers. The contestations and power struggles that I have paid attention to 
throughout the thesis attest to this. These included not only power struggles between Mozambican 
and Dutch state/non-state actors, but also struggles unfolding within either of the two states. Such 
struggles occurring in one and the same state indicates that states are not homogenous entities, but 
rather comprise of social relations between different groups, with different idea(l)s and interests. That 
actors withstood the pressure mounted on them was best noticeable in ‘extreme’ events generated by 
the powers. For instance, the decision to move from aid to trade in Mozambique illustrated the 
exertion of the capitalistic power via decision-makers, but was considered too drastic a decision by 
other actors in that same state. The latter thus refused to accept it as a fact and successfully contested 
this decision. The debt crisis, to take another example, invited subtle but fierce criticism from water 
civil servants aimed at Mozambican politicians, for having put them in the difficult position they were 
in. In sum, these powers act tendentially in the sense that a pressure is exerted, but this not necessarily 
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translates into the actualisation of events. Precisely this scope for autonomous behaviour enables 
powers to be challenged and changed.  
 
Whether and how these powers translate into specific events and certain behaviour not only hinges on 
human agency, but also on nonhuman nature and material properties. This is what my investigation of 
the DMF-PSP mechanism in chapter five tried to make clear; a conducive material environment was 
essential for this mechanism to work well, but was in reality often not conducive at all. Challenging 
were the biophysical conditions in many towns, not least during my fieldwork when various regions 
were afflicted by drought or floods. This being the case, the success of piped water supply then 
depended on other material conditions, notably water supply systems in good technical shape. These 
were insufficiently available in many (though not all) towns, which spurred a chain of other events. 
Precisely these material properties and technologies ‘fixed in earth’ sets a socio-environmental 
contradiction apart from social contradictions. If agents fail to render the nonhuman and material 
environment suitable for water supply, which proved to be the case in many towns I did research in, 
then this will immediately give rise to all kinds of struggles, first and foremost at the ‘local level’. This 
thus adds another, crucial element to the territorial logic of liquid power and to the contradictory 
interplay between this logic and the capitalistic logic underpinning the DMF. It implies that in order to 
make the DMF work, not only social relations and institutions had be rationalised, but indeed also 
environmental relations. Rationalising nature was not easily, if at all accomplished. But rationalising 
social relations proved all the more difficult. State and non-state agents not only engage in 
‘partnerships’ and ‘cooperation’ to make mechanisms such as the DMF work, but also engage in harsh 
power struggles, chasing interests beyond those listed in cooperation contracts and project proposals.   
 
During the aid and trade course followed in Mozambique, these struggles have been particularly 
intense. I explain this by the contradictory powers exerting stronger pressure on actors during this 
period than before. In other words, these powers had further narrowed down the scope of actors to 
act independently of these powers. Dutch and Mozambican state/aid actors were pushed stronger 
than before to think and act in accordance with the capitalistic logic, for instance due to pressure from 
BZ, adapted funding conditionality and tightened accountability mechanisms. At the same time, the 
hegemony of hard-line factions over other, more moderate factions within Frelimo had only 
strengthened. This translated in attempts by GOM members to centralise decision-making power, and 
to extend its influence in the state, even more. Moreover, what also makes these powers strong is that 
they build on the implementation of past decisions and frameworks that have gained a relatively 
structural position in the Mozambican waterscape. For instance, even though I and others assess the 
past implementation of the DMF and PSP in Mozambique as deeply problematic, these mechanisms 
are still in place. They still provide one of the dominant frames for organising water supply services in 
the country. And they provided an opportunity for the EKN to bring its water aid programme in line 
with the aid and trade agenda, thereby reproducing this same mechanism. Yet, the fact that the 
original plan to organise the extension of the DMF and PSP to small towns in a decentralised way was 
changed by the GOM into a much more centralised approach, illustrates the dominant territorial power 
at work.  
 
A final dimension I paid attention to in chapter two, concerns the outcome(s) of contradictions and 
whether and how a contradiction can be resolved. This dimension allows me to come back to the 
question what ought to be done to ease or resolve the contradictions I observed. In tackling this 
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question, it is imperative to acknowledge the differences between structure and agency. In critical 
realism, structures are relatively enduring and powers relatively strong, as they are made up by an 
assemblage of agents and things in the here and now as well as in the past. These must be 
distinguished from human agency and specific events in the here and now, with a more short-lived 
character and impact (Fleetwood 2014; Archer 1995). 
 
We should therefore also distinguish contradictory powers from the effects they generate and 
consider, in the words of De Ste. Croix (1981: 49-50), “‘conflicts’, ‘antagonisms’, ‘oppositions’ or 
‘tensions’, arising as (in a sense) the result of ‘contradictions’”. Resolving conflicts is not the same as 
resolving contradictions; a conflict between human agents may be resolved by them through 
conversation or some kind of practical solution. In the aid and trade processes I examined, tensions 
and frustrations were often (temporarily) ameliorated through technical means or the extension or 
modification of ‘intentional’ aid. For instance, contestation over the initial aid to trade strategy in 
Mozambique led to the aid and trade consensus. PO15 often solved minor problems between 
operators and AIAS by providing equipment. PO15 did not, however, secure some of the conditions it 
itself considered essential for the future of AIAS or the DMF. Therefore, this task was shifted to its 
successor project PO35, bringing new hope that it would be achieved after all. PLAMA had met few of 
its objectives, presenting dilemmas whether or not to go ahead, but support to it was extended. The 
fifth ASAS program was a source of tensions between Dutch and Mozambican state actors, and was 
put on hold, but would end up in negotiations on a modified ASAS VI program. In the case of the 
breach of trust between the two states as a result of the debt crisis, the GON offered a way out by 
inviting the Mozambican president on a state visit and (water) business trip to the Netherlands. There 
are more examples, but the point is: resolving disputes and conflicts in specific events such as these 
does not necessarily affect the powers or resolve the contradictions that give rise to them. This often 
requires more fundamental changes in (parts of) the structure, and by implication, within the broader 
political economies and waterscape the relationship is embedded in.  
 
The 2016 debt crisis offered the GON a perfect opportunity to radically confront Frelimo-cum-GOM 
politics and to fundamentally reflect on its own politics. In other words, a crisis this big could have 
been used for spurring positive and progressive change and to attempt to ease or resolve more 
fundamentally the primary water aid and trade contradiction. It offered an opportunity to break, in the 
GON’s own words, with “business as usual” (GON 2016c: 1). Yet, as mentioned above and in the 
previous chapter, the GON was among the first of donors to resume business as usual and to 
normalise relations with the GOM, by inviting the Mozambican president on a state visit and (water) 
business trip to the Netherlands. This was a controversial move, as research into the causes of the 
debts was still ongoing. This was thus a lost opportunity, leaving power relations in Mozambique very 
much intact, and preventing Dutch agents from radically changing its course in Mozambique. It 
indicates that the logics not only clash, but that in order to make the aid and trade agenda work in 
Mozambique, the Dutch state also inherently depends on and makes use of a contested GOM—just 
like the GOM deeply depends on the aid offered by the Dutch and other donors.  
 
In all, fundamental changes in the structure of this relationship are difficult for a single actor to bring 
about and therefore require, in the words of one interviewee, “deep system reforms”. Indeed, it starts 
by acknowledging the political nature of water and that a rupture in established power relations is 
required. This interviewee pointed specifically at reforms required in the Mozambican political system, 
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i.e. to change the form and direction of the dominant territorial logic. This is indeed needed, but I 
suggest the same critical lens needs to be directed towards the capitalistic logic of liquid power. This 
logic keeps incentivising agents to think and act in line with market imaginaries and mechanisms, 
which has all too often proven to be a problematic guide to understanding and tackling problems in 
the Mozambican waterscape. It is time to open up space for alternative territorial and economic logics 
of liquid power to rise in strength, those that put water’s use value considerations in the common 
interest before those of powerful political and economic classes. 
 
The question is thus not one of eliminating logics of liquid power, or pretending they do not exist, as 
our actions are always ultimately political. The quest is to change the form and direction of these logics 
of power in such a way that they drive hydrosocial development in Mozambique into a more 
emancipatory direction. These logics need not be invented. They are already there, within both states 
and societies, and they need to be strengthened. This requires political struggle not just in 
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Annex I – List of semi-structured interviews  
The following table provides an overview of the number of interviews carried out per type of 
organisation. The names of the interviewees are not provided for reasons of anonymity. 
 
Organisation/ affiliation Number of 
interviews 
MPOPHRH/ DNAAS / DNGRHR 17 
EKN 10 
AIAS 5 
CRA (water regulator) 3 
BZ / DGIS / RVO 
Foreign affairs/ development 
cooperation Netherlands 
11 
Dutch and Mozambican 
consultancy / private company 
12 
Municipality members 3 
Non-governmental / non-profit 
organisation 
18 
World Bank  2 
Private water operator 6 
Total 87 
 
 
 
